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EQUITABLE ESIOEPEL AND THE EKPORCEMENT OE PROMISES 
I a n William Dvmcanaon 
Submitted f or the award of the degree of 
Bachelor of C i v i l Law i n the Un i v e r s i t y of Durham. 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL ARB THE EKFORCEIVIEI'JT OP PROMISES - Thesis submitted f o r the 
degree o f Bachelor o f C i v i l Law. 
ABSTRACT • 
Taking as my s t a r t i n g - p o i n t the view t h a t e q u i t y i s e s s e n t i a l l y a mechanism 
f o r preempting the enforcement o f common law remedies, I attempt t o show t h a t 
e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l i s i n the main stream o f e q u i t a b l e developments; t h a t i t s 
h i s t o r y i s l o n g e r than t h a t recognized i n the more recent cases; and t h a t i t 
c u r r e n t l y a v a i l s promisees who are unable t o frame t h e i r s u i t s i n c o n f o r m i t y 
w i t h the r e q u i r e m e n ts o f common law c o n t r a c t . 
I have preferred t o l o o k t o the d i s t i n c t l y e q u i t a b l e view o f c o n t r a c t , obscured 
f o r a time by t h e c o u r t s o f the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , r a t h e r than t o the answer 
suggested by A t i y a h , i n o r d e r t o meet the problems encountered at law by reason 
o f the. o f f i c i a l obeisance t o the d o c t r i n e o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The e q u i t y , I 
suggest, f a c i l i t a t e s a more u n i f i e d p i c t u r e , when placed i n the c o n t e x t o f 
e q u i t y ' s t r a d i t i o n a l aims, o f r e c e n t changes, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the f i e l d o f 
l i c e n c e s : f o r by emphasising i t s e q u i t a b l e n a t u r e , one may more e a s i l y counter 
t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t new i n t e r e s t s i n l a n d are being c r e a t e d . S t a t u t e aside, the 
t r u s t i t s e l f i s a mere h i g h l y developed form o f preemption o f a l e g a l c l a i m ; 
so, I urge, i s the s o - c a l l e d "new e q u i t y " . And again, the c o n f u s i n g kaleidoscope 
o f reeent cases may g a i n meaning i f one sees them i n t h i s way. 
By r e f e r e n c e t o i t s h i s t o r y , i t s analogy t o sO-called " p r o p r i e t o r y e s t o p p e l " , 
axidi i t s l a c k o f r e a l connexion W i t h common law e s t o p p e l , I suggest t h a t e q u i t a b l e 
e s t o p p e l i n a l l o f i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s can p r o p e r l y found a cause o f a c t i o n , and 
t h a t o n l y an u n j u s t i f i a b l e j u d i c i a l t i m i d i t y prevents the r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h i s . 
Moreover, I s t r e s s t h a t g r e a t e r equivalence between law and the mores, both 
o f the commercial anS. t h e p r i v a t e t r a n s a c t o r , may be o b t a i n e d through grer.ter 
use o f the p r o m i s e - e n f o r c i n g remedy: t h a t i s t o say, i t s c r i t e r i o n o f enforce-
ment, " e q u i t y " , l i k e t h a t o f the reasonable man at common law, i s a parameter 
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INTRODUCTION 
f 
The object'' herein TTJUI be to examine the nature of what has been termed variously as 
1 2 3 promissoiy , equitable and quasi-estoppeL, and to do so wi t h i n the wider context of 
of promise-enforcement i n law. An account of the development of this doctrine w i l l be 
attempted, together with suggestions f o r i t s future growth. The dangers attendant upon 
le g a l stasis w i l l be indicated, insofar as they concern this area. I t w i l l be assumed, 
building upon Stone and Pound , that emphasis i s often misplaced, and that law i s less 
a body of rules than a system f o r the re c o n c i l i a t i o n of claims asserted by individuals 
and groups. The granting or refusing of legal recognition i s productive of rules of a 
pragmatic and mortal qu a l i t y , quite lacking i n the omnibus and eternal attributes 
sometimes noticed from the Bench. 
Two of the more adventurous approaches to the law of contracts have been made by judges 
who sought deliberately to many equitable with legal principles. Lords Mansfield^ and 
7 
Denning . The notion of the 'common law* i n t h i s , fused, sense, and as d i s t i n c t from 
the law of the draftsman or of the c i v i l i a n s , seems, l i k e that jury, 'to i n v i t e accolades 
g 
clothed i n robust imagery. • I n i n s i s t i n g upon the proper function of the common law 
i n t h i s sense, i t i s hoped that such accolades may be avoided. 
Footnotess 
1 Tool Metal Manufacturing Go v Tungsten E l e c t r i c Go(1955)lWLR76l. 
2 Spencer-Bower and Turners 'Estoppel by Representation 2nd ed p332. 
3 Wilsons Recent Developments i n Estoppel 67|/3R330j A Reappraisal of Quasi-estoppel 
1965 CLJ93. 
U stone? Social Dimensions of Law & Justice Chapter k-
5 Pound: Introduction to the Philosophy of Law Chapter 2; 57HLR1. 
6 Campbells 'Lives • - defends Mansfield, but i n W view not merely unconvincingly 
but also unnecessarily. See K^eton & Sheridon: Equity I9i6k p69j Holdsworth: 
. Blackstone's Treatment of Equity U3 HERl. 
7 e g i n Central London Property Co v High Trees House Ltd(l9l;7)KB130 at pl352 
•At t h i s time of day... when law and equity have been joined together f o r over 
seventy years, principles must be reconsidered i n the l i g h t of t h e i r combined 
effect.» 
3 Comishs The Jury 1970 pl38. 
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Daring the. middle ages, a formally s t r a t i f i e d society made easier the task of reconciling 
claims and recjognising interests, f o r i t could be accomplished within each l a t e r a l social 
9 10 di v i s i o n and even w i t h i n each v e r t i c a l d i v i s i o n representing localised j u r i s d i c t i o n s . 
Subject to the paramount claims of the superior j u r i s d i c t i o n , and increasingly as the 
middle ages waned, to that of the King, i n each social group and community principles 
could be arrived at which would r e f l e c t the dominant social values i n any age'l'''' The 
Chancellor himself, f o r reasons of expedience, appointed l o c a l laymen to examine 
witnesses i n areas remote from London and where possible, to arbitrate i n disputes 'to 
12 
hear and end (them) according to equity and good conscience,' thus ensuring that the 
moves of laymen should be reflected i n his system of just i c e . A cautious summary might 
be that as values changed, as new interests and claims arose, they quick]y became the 
subject of public adjudication before a t r i b u n a l of communal, feudal, or royal j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Administration, which i s bound to have value judgements about society as i t s basis was 
seen, even u n t i l the nineteenth century, as j u s t i c i a b l e , whilst i n the twentieth century 
j u s t i c e i s often seen as an administrative concern. 
FootnoteSt 
The famous remark 'Do not gloss the statute f o r we made i t and understand better 
than you what i t means* (also Plucknettt Interpretation of Statutes pij.9) attests to 
the closeness of the j u d i c i a r y and legislature w i t h i n the l a t e r a l stratum at the top 
of society concerned with the law of the King's courts. 
LO See Dawson* A History of Lay Judges 1960. He indicates that the loc a l courts were 
encouraged by the Royal Courts to be, as i t were, closed c i r c u i t s . 
|L1 Although, of course, legal development occurred by c r o s s - f e r t i l i s a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
as 'lower' groups gained i n social significance. See MLlsoms His t o r i c a l Foundations 
of the Common Law 1969 p8 'for most ordinary men and most ordinary causes the county 
court was the highest regular forum... and therefore a principal source of things 
that w i l l s t r i k e us as novelties when we f i r s t see them transacted on the lighted 
stage of the royal courts.• 
12 See Dawson op,;cit. 
13 See e g Titrausst Welfare Rights, Law and Discretion. P o l i t i c a l Quarterly 1968 p l l 3 . 
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I n i t s early development, then, English law i s closely associated with society which 
i s i t s matrix because i t s courts are generally i n touch with that social group f o r 
whomi they are adjudicating"!^ Only l a t e r do lawyers and laymen obtain t h e i r divorce i n 
the formal areas of noncriminal law, lawyers on the Bench seeming quite deliberately 
to f a i l to notice the requirements of those l i k e l y to be affected by t h e i r pronouncements. 
I t was the Donoughmore Committee"^^ which pronounced the heresy of the inter-war years 
and not Professor Laski"''^ i n the sense that the former's boundary of the j u s t i c i a b l e 
involved the assumption that discretion and public policy were unknown to, and 
unworkable by, the judges, w h i l s t the l a t t e r recognises that 'law i s always made i n 
17 
terms of what l i f e has meant to those who make the law.' Today, the marriage of the 
welfare-minded p o l i t i c i a n and the conservative lawyer could sire a most unfortunate 
18 
monster. .The l o c a l courts and, i n the pre-Stuart era, the conciliar courts, and the 
controversial l o c a l Courts of Requests which survived u n t i l I8U6 when they were abolished 
20 
by the County Oourts Act, a l l gave judgements notorious to those whom they served: 
modem a r b i t r a t i o n procedures and so called 'administrative' tribunals, on the other 
21 
hand, are private and, i n practice, unsupervised i n the majority of cases. 
Footnotes2 
U4 See White: Lawyers and the Enforcements of Rights,in Social Needs and Legal Action 
(1973) eds Campbell, Carton and Wiles, f o r a discussion of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
providing l e g a l solutions where courts are meant to serve the whole of sociely 
rather than p a r t i c u l a r sections of i t . He postulates 'A society which recognises a 
continuing multiple c o n f l i c t of interests and values taking place withi n an accepted 
overarching structure • of a more or less f l u i d or dynamic nature.'(pl7). 
15 Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers 1932, Cmd li060. 
16 See, e g, his A Grammar of P o l i t i c s Uth ed. 
L7 Opcit at p^UU. See also Abel-Smith and Stevenst Lawyers and the Courts pl20. 
L8 See %dney & Beatrice Webbs Local Government vol I I pTi-S^ They discovered that 
f i f t y Courts Baron were operational i n Northumberland and twenty i n Durham as late 
as J^hl-
19 See Winders Courts of Request 52LQR369. 
?0 County Courts Act l8it6. 9&10 71 ct c.95 (36 Statutes at Large 313) Sections A & B. 
11 See Law Commissions Working Paper No I4.O - Revision i n Administration Law p^3 para 70. 
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The argument i s thiss that lawyers who a t t e r p t to concentrate on mere legal rules 
produce disaster. Had the property lawyers of the nineteenth century looked beyond t h e i r 
22 
doctrines, contemporaiy food shortages might have been less severe. Moreover, whilst 
the lawyer might not greet with enthusiasm the request that he be imaginative, and look 
23 
to the other social sciences, professor Fifoot's comment upon Eastwood v Kenyon that 
Lord Denman's 'appeal to history must be allowed. Whatever i t s value i n the modem law, 
the doctrine of consideration s t i l l rests upon the foundations l a i d by Elizabethan 
lawyers'^^ might, with respect, be tempered by the observation that had we r e l i e d upon 
the Lord Denmans of the ju d i c i a r y we should not have a law of contract. The law i s 
dynamic by t r a d i t i o n , at the hands of the judge, and also, i n s t r i c t logic, for even 
accepting i t as a body of rules, the application of a rule which has been applied to a 
previous set of facts to a new set, must a t t r a c t the d e f i n i t i o n of c r e a t i v i t y . 
There i s l i t t l e room for argument concerning the q u a l i i y of the j u d g * role , only as 
to the extent to which he creates. 
Footnotess 
22 I n passing the Settled Land Act 1882 to give the tenant f o r l i f e much wider powers 
of dealing w i t h land subject to a settlement 'the trading purpose of the legislature 
was to prevent the decay of a g r i c u l t u r a l and other interests occasioned by the 
deterioration of land and biiildings i n the possession of impecunious l i f e tenants." 
Bruce v Ailesbury (l892 )AiS 3^6 at p363 per Lord Watson, and Megarry and Wades Real 
Property 2nd ed p287. Legislative intervention was necessitated by 'the fact that 
judges siriee I833 have shewn only l i m i t e d mastery over the fundamentals of 
^ property lawj the subject does not possess the fascination i t once did. ' SimpBons 
Introduction to the History of Land Law 196l p259. Surely t h i s i s because i t s social 
significance i s diminished. ¥e s h a l l return to t h i s point. 
23 • 181+0 11 Ad & e l U38. 
2k Fifoots History & Sources of the Common Law 19ii9 pUll. See Atiyahs Consideration -
'] A Fundamental Restatement. Inaugural Address at the Australian National University. 
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Proponents of claims which do not achieve recognition i n the courts have open to them 
two possible routes, both of which have disadvantages given the conservative climate 
of the j u d i c i a l ^stem. 
The f i r s t i s recourse to the l e g i s l a t u r e . A group which cannot e f f e c t i v e l y mobilise 
the le g a l profession, or evoke sympathy from the Bench may use i t s p o l i t i c a l power to 
bypass the courts and acquit statutory recognition for i t s claims?^-The drawback that 
i t i s s t i l l open to the courts to i n t e r p r e t the l e g i s l a t i o n i n accordance with t h e i r 
27 
own predispositions may be overcome by repeated intervention from Parliament, as has 
occurred i n the trade union f i e l d , or by the setting up of a separate system of courts 
28 
not e n t i r e l y controlled by professional lawyers. 
The second route i s simply to opt out of the legal system, and t h i s i s the route l i k e l y 
29 
to be taken by the businessman. Even though a r b i t r a t i o n may cost more, and even though 
the apparent fear that trade secrets might be revealed during l i t i g a t i o n i s unfounded^*^ 
29 
the courts continue to compete unsuccessfully with a r b i t r a t i o n procedures, perhaps 
because substantive law has lagged behind the requirements of the commercial world?''" Yet 
Footnotess 
2^ Those seeking a ' r i g h t ' to privacy might well take t h i s route. 
26 Following the extension of the franchise i n I867 to of the adult male population, 
trade unions of the s k i l l e d working class were i n a position to seek l e g i s l a t i v e 
support. 
27 See Abel janith & Stevens: Lawyers & the Courts ppll5 and I I 6 f o r a comment upon 
the unfortunate Workmen's Compensation Legislation. 
28 Calvert: Inaugural Lecture on the English Social Security System at Newcastle 
University November 1971. 
29 See Jacksons Machinery of Justice 6th ed p l l 8 . 
l30 See Russell on A r b i t r a t i o n l 8 t h edo(Walton Q C ed)Preface. The unreported case of 
Mar.Ghon.ProductS v Thomes i s cit e d (at p l 6 l ) to indicate the effective use of an 
i n j u n c t i o n to r e s t r a i n the improper use of trade secrets. 
31 L i t t l e empirical research has been carried out i n England into t h i s problem, but 
see Macaulays Noncontractual Relations i n Business - A Preliminary Study 28 Am • . 
Soc Rev 55 f o r an investigation of the s i t u a t i o n i n the State of Wisconsin. 
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there are f o r c e f u l reasons for wishing that businessmen would l i t i g a t e more, and the 
32 
c a l l f o r a Court of A r b i t r a t i o n may have merit, especially now that there i s a general 
tendency away from the omnibus courts set up i n 1875 towards more specialised ' bodies. 
33 
As Walton indicates 'no court can (or ought to ) disgiiise the fact that a dispute 
between p a r t i c u l a r parties i s i n progress (as an a r b i t r a t i o n can), but i f a particular 
person i s always involved i n disputes - even though that be his misfortune - i t may not 
be the beist public policy to conceal the f a c t . • 
More importantly for the law, 'the law must re t a i n s u f f i c i e n t hold over ( a r b i t r a t i o n 
procedures) to prevent and redress any i n j u s t i c e on the part of the a r b i t r a t o r , and to 
secure that that law that i s administered by an a r b i t r a t o r i s i n substance the law of 
the land and not some homemade law of that p a r t i c u l a r a r b i t r a t o r , or that particular 
•3! 
a r b i t r a t i o n . ' I n the words of Scrutton, L J 'there must be no Alsatia i n England, 
where the king's w r i t does not run.'^^ The r e l a t i v e independence of the businessman 
results not merely from the enormous and growing power of organisations which are 
richer than many nation-states and which seek actively to overthrow regimes which they 
do not favour, but also from the nature of relationships between organisations of a l l 
sizes i n which day-to-day a f f a i r s are controlled by managers, 'ffenagers... are not very 
keen on l i t i g a t i o n . They do not mind very much whether they win or loses what "theywant 
to do i s to get the thing o f f t h e i r table. '"^^ Disputes between commercial firms are 
Footnotess 
32 See 1958 JBL 1. 
33 Russell on A r b i t r a t i o n l 8 t h ed Preface. 
3k Czarnikov v Roth Schmidt (1922 )2KB378 at pii8i; per Bankes L J. 
35 Op c i t at pi;88. 
36 S i r Roger Ormrod 'The Reform of Legal Education' 5 J A L T 77 at p83. 
He makes the point at p82 that 'the courts are seen as the sort of nucleus of the 
whole operation' with the 'law c i r c u l a t i n g around.' This he seeas as mistaken. I f 
' the advisory role of the lawyer becomes much more important, f o r the reason given 
i n the c i t e d quotation, and upon which Ormrod 'would be prepared to take a gamble' 
the problem of maintaining contact between the law and practice w i l l increase. The 
solution, apart from a greater j u d i c i a l willingness to innovate, would seem to be 
i n attaching a greater weight to j u r i s t i c w r itings. They i n turn w i l l have to r e l y more upon empirical data concerning behaviour. P T 0 
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l i k e l y to occur w i t h i n a continuing relationship productive of mutual advantage, and 
i n . a given focus of trades there are l i k e l y to be r e l a t i v e l y few firms. This situation 
provides incentive to evolve rules and dispute-^resolving mechanisms which are f l e x i b l e 
and give least offence t o either sides i n other words rules and sanctions develop which 
37 
are consonant w i t h commercial morality. As Lord Devlin-'^' says, the merchant does not 
have to take the law as he finds i t and sees no p r o f i t i n gaining a technical advantage 
over a person or organisation with whom he wishes to continue trading. 
Professor Macaulay reports that a l l of the purchasing agents whom his researchers 
interviewed'-'expeeteci to be able to cancel orders freely subject only to an obligation.to 
pay f o r the selXer'^'s major expenses'.Cancellation was frequently accepted "by a l l of the 
39 
sales personnel interviewed. Gower suggests that i n England 'what seems to be happening 
i s that the businessman prefers to se t t l e his disputes out of court, even though that 
court be an a r b i t r a l t r i b u n a l . ' ^ ^ Inevitably practices w i l l develop of which the courts 
w i l l have no knowledge, and of which they may well ultimately disapproved The danger 
i n there being 'Alsatias' i s obvious, and the l i k e l i h o o d i s veiy great. Their existence 
i s a measure of the law's inadequacy. 
Footnotes? 
37 Devlins The Relation between Commercial Law and Commercial Practice 1UMLR2U9. 
38 Macaulayi Non Contractual Relations i n Business - A Preliminary Study 28 Am 
Soc Rev i 
See Noelle & Schmidtchen t The Significance of Mass Surveys i n Public L i f e lU ISSJ283. 
Where i t i s suggested that opinion surveys reveal a 'new idea of man.' Information 
gathered i n t h i s way may be useful to lawyers i n the future f o r , since 1875 the 
decline of the c i v i l j u r y has meant that the layman has l i t t l e voice i n the c i v i l 
l e g a l process. 
39 The law r e l a t i n g to breach of contract i s similar i n Wisconsin, to English law. See 
Tre i t a l s Contract 3rd ed p727s Hochster v Dela Tour (1853)2 E&B678; Restatement s 318. 
ho Law & Public Opinion i n England i n the 20th Century 1959 pl70. 
hpL See, e g the former practice of s o l i c i t o r s , disapproved i n Brown v C I R(196i;)3 A l l 
B R 119, of retaining the in t e r e s t arising from deposit accounts containing c l i e n t s ' 
money, i n certain circumstances. P T 0 
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' There i s no comparable measure available to indicate the dissatisfaction of the ordinary 
in d i v i d u a l with the state of the law. A request for change i n a particular area on his 
behalf must re s t on such vague notions as the current conceptions of j u s t i c e ^ ^ and 
, u t i l i t y . Viewed at large these notions are ideals or maxims merely, but placed i n context 
I and applied to p a r t i c u l a r issues I shall argue that they can provide coherence i n a 
I 
I 
I dynamic system of law: for ' a l l action i s subservient to some end^ and rules of action^ 
I 
j i t seems natural to suppose, must take t h e i r whole character and colour from the end 
to which they are subservient. When we engage i n a pursuit, a clear and precise 
conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the f i r s t thing we need instead of 
the l a s t thing we look towards.'^"^ I t i s i n this s p i r i t that I hope to examine the law's 
att i t u d e towards promises. 
I have argued that a j u d i c i a l decision must create law. Inseparable from any c r i t i c a l 
discussion of the law i s c r i t i c i s m or evaluation of the use to which judges put t h i s 
f a c i l i t y . Only by becoming f u l l y aware that they possess i t can they hope to create a 
law which i s relevant to those to whome i t applies. ' I f the law i s to stand for the 
future as i t has stood for the past, as a sustaining p i l l a r of society, i t must f i n d 
some point of reference more universal than i t s own i n t e r n a l l o g i c . ' ^ I t cannot be 
s u f f i c i e n t to say that ' I am unable to adduce any reason to show that the decision 
that I am about to pronounce i s right...But I am bound by authority which i t i s ny 
Iduty to follow.'^^ Donaldson, J, i s much more practicals ' . . . I should be sxirprised 
i f the law compelled me to f i n d i n the p l a i n t i f f ' s favour, because, contrary to popular 
beli e f , the law, j u s t i c e , and common sense are not unrelated concepts.'^^ 
Footnotess 
k2 1 accept the analysis of ju s t i c e provided i n Rawlss A Theory of Justice. 
i3 J S M i l l s U t i l i t a r i a n i s m Everyman Edition p2. 
^k Radcliffes The Law and i t s Compass pli t . 
4.5 Olympic O i l and Cake Co v Produce Brokers (1915) 112 L T 7iUi at p7i|8 per Buckley, 
L J. See Cohns Existentialism and Legal Science for a critique of t h i s type of 
approach. 
ll6 Durham Fancy Goods v Michael Jackson (1968) 2QB839 at p8ii7. 
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I t i s urged that Lord Devlin i s unduly pessimistic i n assuming that the creative 
function of the common law i s at an end, f o r the alternative, 'legislation... i s a 
cumbersome process. Parliamentary time i s i n modern times notoriously l i m i t e d and may 
) 7 
w e l l i n future become ever more precious,' and i n any event 'the cassus improvisus 
i s always with uss and i n nineitynine cases out of a hundred i t must be settled before 
Parliament can act. The appeal i s made, not to laws, for there are none, but to Law, 
c a l l i t what you w i l l - the common law, the principles of jurisprudence - anything from 
the jus summum to commonsense, from the recto r a t i o to a square deal; i t i s on and by 
1 A 
that s t u f f that judges have to work, and they must do so not as bondsmen but as free.' 
Recognition of the v i t a l role of the judge i n shaping the law i s given i n the c i v i l 
law countries. ' I t i s not generally realised that the number of decisions currently 
reported i n France probably exceeds that of the United Kingdom... thus a more rapid 
evolution of the law i s possible that i n England. '^ "^  
This i s not to 'run the r i s k of finding the archetypal image of the judge confused i n 
men's minds w i t h the very d i f f e r e n t image of the legislator.'^"'" Judicial innovation i s 
i n t e r s t i t i a l , i t must conform with 'the vast body of substantive propositions... the 
great reservoir of principles available f o r the making of law... which... at the same 
52 
time sets l i j n i t s t o the judge's power of choice.' Whilst the problem case must f a l l 
to the judge he i s l i m i t e d i n his exposition of what the law should be to the facts 
before him, i n contrast to the much wider scope of the l e g i s l a t o r . 
Footnotes; 
U7 Select Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure 1953 Cond 8878 (Final Report). 
I1.8 Shaws Legislature and Judiciary 1911; plU cited Abel Smith and Stevenss Lawyers 
and the Courts p2U. An 'accolade clad i n robust imagery' perhaps. 
i;9 Devlins 1956 Current Legal Problems. 
50 Amos and iWaltons Introduction to French Law 2nd ed p 11 . See also Cohn and 
Zdzieblos I Manual of German Law BllGL Comparative Law Series No lU f o r a discussion 
of j u d i c i a l lawmaking, e g i n r e l a t i o n to BGB s 2U2. 
51 Radcliffes The Law and i t s Compass p l i ; . 
52 Jaffes English and American Judges as Lawmakers p36 
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52 Jaffe's point that lawmaking can be successful only where judge and le g i s l a t o r 
collaborate demands acceptance. Judicial performance i n giving effect to the intention 
53 
of Parliament has been poor and capricious use has been made of the 'rules' of 
statutory i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Similarly, performance i n shaping the law i n conformity wih 
contemporary, socially-constructed r e a l i t y ^ ^ has been spasmodic?^ The judges cling to 
the doctrine of stare decisis and assert the need for certainty as though social change 
might be ignored. 'Nor w i l l I easily be l e d by an undisceming zeal for some abstract 
j u s t i c e to ignore our f i r s t duty, which i s to administer justice according to law, the 
law which i s established f o r us by Act of Parliament, or the binding authority of 
precedent?^ The same learned l o r d managed to locate i n a criminal court, however, 'a residual power to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law. 
Footnotes: 
,^ 7 
53 See Fisher v Bell(196l)lQB39l; (Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 s 1). 
Also Chandler v DPP(1961i)AC763 and Thompson: The Committee of 100 and the O f f i c i a l 
Secrets Act 1911. 1963 Public Law p201. 
51; Berger & Luckmann 1966 'The Social Construction of Reality' explain at length the 
implications of t h i s phrase. I n more lega l terminology we might discuss 'the 
reasonable expectations of reasonable man,' perhaps. 
55 e g Taff Vale Case(1901)ACU26 
Quimn y Leatham( 1901) ACli95 
Searle v Wallbank(i9l;7)AC391 
Eaglewell v Needham (1972) 1 A l l E R Ijl? (action on a b i l l dismissed on a 
t e c h n i c a l i t y ) . 
But see Dutton v Bognpr Regis (1972) 1 A l l E R U62 ( l i a b i l i t y of Local Authority 
fo r f a i l u r e of i t s Inspector to inspect the foundations of a bungalow. Donoghue v 
Stevenson was applied. See p a r t i c u l a r l y the judgement of Sachs,L J, pkB3'^ & Lord 
Denning, M R, pU72b). 
B r i t i s h R a i l v Herrington (1972) 1 A l l E R 7l49 ( L i a b i l i t y of negligent occupier 
for accident suffered by c h i l d trespasser). 
^6 Midland Silicohes-^v Scruttons (1962 )AC kh^ at pU67 per Viscount Simonds. 
7^ Shaw V DPP(1962)AC220. 
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H i s t o r i c a l l y , no doubt the declaratory view of law was useful, i n removing 'trouble' 
cases from the preview of the executive of Blackstone's times and by adhering to i t the 
'iavidious retrospectiveness of j u d i c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n noticed by Bentham might be less 
apparent. I t i s tempting to speculate whether 'the movement of progressive society 
FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT'^ ^ noticed by Sir Henry Maine, which reached i t s apotheosis i n 
the l a s t century^^ did not play a part i n detracting the judge. I n the United States, 
where freedom of contract was then teii?)ered by a real i s a t i o n that extreme competition 
leads ultimately to monopoly^^ judges have played a more positive part i n lawmaking^"'" and i n 
seeking the substance behind the form^^ A modem return to a society more concerned with 
questions akin t,o those involving status has led to an enlargement of the f i e l d i n 
which adjudication takes place, though the new courts are for the most part purpose-
designed, and the adjudicator takes his premisses from the state. 
That the apparently neutral, precedent-bound approach exists only i n fantasy, there i s 
no need to r e i t e r a t e . I t i s impossible to create a functioning model out of the materials 
supplied by the doctrine of precedent^"^ Seidman indicates the reason why a part i s 
Footnotess 
:58 Maines 'Ancient Law' I 8 6 I Oxford 1959 plUl. 
I59 Witness S i r George J^6?i, M R i n Printipg & Numerical Registering Co v Sampson 
(1875 )IJ^ 19 EQ li62 at pli65j that ' i f there i s one thing more than another which 
public p olicy requires i t i s that men of f u l l age and competent understanding shall 
have the utmost l i b e r t y of contracting, and that t h e i r contracts when entered into 
free.ay,.... s h a l l be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of j u s t i c e . ' Cited 
Cheshire & Fifoot 'Contract 6th ed p21. 
(^ 0 Hence the Sherman Act of 1890. cf ^bgul SS Co v McGregor Gow (l892)AC25. Though 
see the discussion of the renegotiation decision US v Bethlehem Steel (19U2) 3l5 
U S 289 i n Friedmanns Law i n a Changing iSociety 2nd ed Chapter U. 
^1 See Crosss Precedent 2nd ed. Also Goodharts Precedent i n English and Continental 
Law 50 LQRUO and p a r t i c u l a r l y Stones The Ratio* of the Ratio Decidendi,22 MLR 597; 
Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings ch7. 
^2 Seidmans The Judicial Process Reconsidered 32 MLR 5l6 at p530. 
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missing from the received version of the models 'To admit that judge-made law... 
represents the value choices of the decision-makers i n society i s to admit that the entire 
corpus of the law... represents the values... of those strata i n society pro ten¥)ore 
i n control. '^ ^ However, I suggest that t h i s j u d i c i a l unwillingness may at l a s t achieve 
the opposite e f f e c t on some issues, and deny the manifest views of those strata and 
others. 
I t i s not considered that judges should 'repossess themselves of the freewheeling powers 
of a Coke or a Mansfield'^^ but that they should respond i n a positive fashion to the 
requirements of society. I n t h i s way reform of the law rela t i n g t o promises i s possible. 
Twenty years ago. Denning believed^^ that i t was possible to implement the proposals 
i n the law Reform Committee's Sixth Interim Report^^ but I : shall argue that the judges 
can aim higher than t h i s . 
I s h a l l look at the origins of contractual obligation to see how f a r t h i s i s connected 
with the idea of pacta sunt servanda, and at the growth of the consideration doctrine. 
At somewhat greater length I shall examine the use of Estoppel to enforce representations 
of i n t e n t i o n . I n Simon v Anglo-American Telegraph^^ Bramwell, L J said ' I do not wish 
to speak against estoppels, f o r I do not know how the business of l i f e could go on i f 
the law did not recognise t h e i r existence.' I . , shall examine to what extent the doctrine 
has been used as a subsidiary of consideration, even to what extent i t has on occasion 
suffered from i l l - s u i t e d analogy with consideration, and whether i t has an independent 
role i n England, such as that conferred upon the American doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
I t w i l l be necessary to ask whether disservice has not been done to the concept of 
consideration^^ by an unwillingness to enforce promises^^ and whether i t may not gain 
coherence from being confined. 
Footnotess 
63 Jaffes English and American Judges as Lawmakers p36. 
61; Denning: Recent Developments i n the Consideration Doctrine l 5 MLR 1. 
65 Cond'5i;U9. 
66 (1879) 5 QBDI88. 
67 See Restatement of the Law of Contract S 90. 
68 See Atiyah: Consideration i n Contracts. 
I See e g De l a Bere v Pearson(1908 )1KB 280; Gore v Van der Lann(1967)2 Q B 31 . 
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I t i s proposed to consider the licence cases and the 'holding-out'cases, and to make 
some proposals f o r the future. And throughout I hope to emphasise the proper role of 
law as, i n Fleming's words 'dedicated to the r a t i o n a l solution of social c o n f l i c t . ' And 
because law i s only a means, not an end, i t f a l l s to be adjudged, not by any i n t e r n a l 
70 
standard, but by the degree to which i t furthers relevant social ends'. I t approximates 
t o Weber's 'rational substantive' category i n i t s proper function - i t i s 'guided by 
71 
general rules, t y principles of an idealogical system other than that of law i t s e l f , 
not, as some lawyers would have i t , to the 'rational, formal, l o g i c a l ' 'idealtyp.' 
I cannot agree w i t h Lord Denning that the academic lawyer i s 'not concerned as 
72 
practitioners are, only with the law as i t i s ' because we cannot accept that the 
application of an abstraction or an analogy i s l o g i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d other than by 
reference to an 'ought' proposition, the 'ought' being derived externally. The collection 
of laws available to academics and practitioners are, h i s t o r i c a l statements or abstractions, 
j i n e r t s only an 'ought' can breathe l i f e i n t o them. I t cannot be s u f f i c i e n t l y emphasised 
that there i s nothing i n t r i n s i c to the present that without more enables us to refer 
[ i t to the past. We refer to an object as an 'apple' not because i t i s inherently an 
pple, but because we t h i i i k we diould, for the purpose of communication, or so as to 
fcevelop an understanding of the universe. I f either purpose, or ary other, ceased to 
3e f u l f i l l e d , we should be wise to divide our observable universe d i f f e r e n t l y . I f we 
Lose sight of t h i s , we shall become, as Wittgenstern remarked 'betwitched' by words. 
i f i n a l points throughout I s h a l l be concerned with the provision of remedies. For t h i s 
Durpose i t s t i l l seems worthwhile to draw distinctions between law and equity, and, i n 
ointing the way to the establishment of a more comprehensive and f l e x i b l e theoiy of 
abligations, respectfully to r e j e c t Professor Atiyah's suggestions r e l a t i n g to the 
sxpansion of the f i e l d of contract, i n favour of a more equitable solution. However, 
as the growth of the t r u s t from i t s o r i g i n as the specific performance of t h i r d parly rights 
b'otnotess 
0 Fleming on Torts Uth ed preface. 
1 Weber on law i n economy and society. Introduction by Rheinstein p6. 
Dennings The Way of an Iconoclast 3 Syd L Rev 209. 
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i n contracts shows, the provision o f a remedy may at times result i n the creation of 
73 
an i n s t i t u t i o n , or 'interest.' That t h i s may be an awkward result should not deter 
us-^unduly i f we remember that, so long as the interest remains dependent upon the 
remedy, and so long as the remedy i s available only where equity and justice require 
i t , f l e x i b i l i t y w i l l be retained and innovation kept w i t h i n the bounds of the 
practicable. 
Footnotes; 
73 See, f o r example, the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered i n Binions v Evans (1972) 2 A l l E R 
|0. But see the discussion of, i n t e r a l i a , Tomlinson v G i l l ( 1756)Ambler 330 i n Carbins 
Contracts f o r the Benefit of a Third Party, i n 1;6 LQR12. 
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I s l 
I t seemed to Lord Cairns, L C axiomatic that his was 'the f i r s t principle of equity'.''• " 
His remark, has puzzled commentators, yet the solution may be i n the nature of equity. 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , the 'conception (of disparate systems) has had important effects on our 
jurisprudence. Reliance on equity to bring about a balance between legal rights and 
persons who would be seriously harmed by t h e i r s t r i c t enforcement has retarded the 
independent moral growth i n the main body of the law. '"^  Equity, too, has suffered 
'arrested development' as a res u l t . I t i s surely no coincidence that the two judges to 
have made least of the di s p a r i t y . Lords Mansfield and Denning, have travelled farthest 
toward legal enforcement of e t h i c a l l y binding promises. 
I s h a l l attempt to shew that equitable estoppel must be seen i n context of the enforcement 
of promises of t h i s nature. I shall survey, of necessity at second-hand, the emergence 
of a theory of contract i n early equity and i t s treatment of promises; then I shall 
postulate that the re-emergence of t h i s theory, strongly supported by arguments of 
morals and efficacy, and f a c i l i t a t e d by the Act of 1873 goes far to explain a number 
of apparently only p a r t i a l l y related phenomena - v i z , the licence cases and the congress 
of promissory estopped cases. The hypothesis w i l l be s c i e n t i f i c i n Popper's sense; i t 
w i l l be subject t o ' f a l s i f l a b i l i t y . ' 
Jones^ suggests that the chancellor's j u r i s d i c t i o n over contract i s based upon 
procedure. I n granting specific performance the attention of the chancellor i s directed 
to the precise nature of the promise, and he i s less concerned with the wrong done to 
the promisee. He i s moved to af f e c t the conscience of the promissor. Perhaps there i s 
a more straightforward reason why the chancellor may incline to view promises as 
inherently v a l i d . The Royal Courts allow a w r i t of covenant to enforce a promise as 
early as 1201, and i t becomes the sole remedy of the termor for a time. To begin with, 
the form of the agreement i s not settled, nor i s the subject matter, so that a sealed 
Footnotess 
1 Hughes V Metropolitan Ry (1877)2 Ap Gas k39 at p 450. 
2 Wilson, at LQR 67s 330 & CLJ 1965s 93; Gordon CLJ 1963s 222, who seem to be rather 
at cross-purposes with the aims of Lord Denning. 
Newmans^ - Equity and Law, a Comparative Study I 9 6 I ppl2 & I3. 
Joness The Elizabethan Court of Chancery. 
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document i s merely evidence, and seisin need not be alleged. Over perhaps half a century 
the deed ceases to be merely evidence however, and becomes the contract i t s e l f . . . i t 
develops 'an operative force of i t s own which intentions expressed, never so pl a i n l y , 
i n other ways, have not'^ This evolution suggests that the source of the obligation i s 
the promise contained i n the deed; f o r implied i n a concentration upon the finished 
product as w r i t t e n down that ultimately leads to an ignoring of what l i e s behind i t , 
i s a l i g h t regard f o r the motivation which produced i t . I n other words, although Pollock 
and Maitland refer to 'agreement,' there i s no suggestion that the Common Law would not 
enfoce a u n i l a t e r a l conventio, even before the requirement of w r i t i n g . 
L i t t l e i s known about the enforceability of promises i n the l o c a l courts f o r 'the County 
Court , r o l l s of pleas were not kept i n the preservative a i r of officialdom, but l y the 
6 7 Sheriffs themselves,' yet ' i t may be that cases l i k e that of Lampleigh v Braithwait 
g 
again r e f l e c t a general rule about promises i n lo c a l courts.' This general rule, about 
which there can be no more than informed speculation, may have exhibited a divergence 
from subsequent common law similar to the rule of modern German law, under which, for 
example, a buyer's primary remedy against a defaulting seller i n a Sale of Goods 
9 
contract i s specific performance of the promise, rather than damages. I n French law 
a promise i s enforceable subject to i t s having a lawful 'cause,' but regardless of 
whether i t i s a contrat de bienfaisance or an onerous contract.'^^ 
Again, the laws of Switzerland, Austria, Mexico and Louisiana, of Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, and of Pennsylvania"^ seek to give effect to promises i n certain 
circumstances. 
Footnotess 
5 Pollock & Maitland l i s 220. Also Chapter 5 generally. 
6 Milsom's Introduction to P & M's History of English Law, I x i i i 
7 ( I 6 l 6 ) 80 Eng Rep 255-
8 MLlsoms H i s t o r i c a l Foundations p3l5' 
See Gebhardts Pacta Sunt Servanda lOMffi 159 and generally Cohns Manual of German 
Law vol 1. 
10 Amos & Walton: Introduction to French Law 2 ed Chapter 8. 
11 Equity & Law/ A Comparative Study p25l-
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Notwithstanding the effects of d i f f u s i o n and borrowing, i t i s possible to suggest that 
these j u r i s d i c t i o n s place erapiiasis upon the promise because i t i s convenient to do so, 
and because not to do so may often be contra bonos mgres. The early English Ohancellors 
may borrow from Canon Law, but only to the extent that t h i s suits the nature of t h e i r 
12 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . Barbour finds the Chancellor enforcing parole contracts i n the f i f t e e n t h 
century and asks 'did (he) enforce the obligation because breach of the promise amounts 
to a t o r t , or because he holds that one who has for legitimate cause made a promise 
ought to carry i t out?' 
The l a t t e r reason i s more di r e c t , and I suggest that adoption of t h i s approach by mary 
Jurisdictions attests i t s convenience. Examination of the plea r o l l s , Barbour says, 
suggests i t to be the more l i k e l y . The pleas stress the promissor's f a i t h , not his 
deceit; the cases shew beneficiaries not a party to the agreement moving the Chancellor 
to uphold promises i n t h e i r favors 'Where p l a i n t i f f , at A's request, becomes A's surety 
f o r a debt owed by A to B, the p l a i n t i f f does not seek a remedy i n deceit, but alleges 
an implied promise by A to discharge him a promise which the Chancellor w i l l 
enforce. 
l ^ t h Century eqoity w i l l enforce promises qua promisis so f a r as t h i s accords with 
'reason and conscience.' 'God acts as attorney to f o o l i s h people,' Bishop S t i l l i n g t o n 
remarks"!"^ This i s not to suggest that equity would enforce a bare promise i n a l l 
circumstances, or that the medieval doctrine of 'causa' was at a l l absent, indeed ' i t 
looks very much as i f causa has been contaminated by insular notions of quid pro quo.'"^ 
Without examining contemporary views of causa, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to notice that there 
existed i n equity a dire c t and l o g i c a l approach to contract capable of f l e x i b i l i t y and 
expansion. A similar f a c i l i t y probably existed i n the courts of l o c a l i i i r i s d i c t i o n -
Footnotes^ 
12 Barbourj History of Contract i n Early ^ l i s h Equity. Oxford Studies i n Social 
and Legal History Cedjinogradoff) i v . 
13 lii67 YB 8edwIV,, f i ^ l l p l . . c i t e d by Vinogradoffs Reason & Conscience i n Sixteenth 
Centuiy Jurisprudence 2i|IQR 373 at p380. 
li; J L Barton. The Early History of Consideration. 8^ LQR 372. 
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counly courts, courts baron and pie powder courts"!"^ 
This contrasts w i t h the common law sit u a t i o n , which led Holmes to say that »the duty 
to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages i f you 
break i t . * ' ' ' ^ The contract i s 'not a promise to pay damages, but an act imposing a 
l i a b i l i t y to damages n i s i . l o u commit a t o r t and are l i a b l e . lou commit a contract and 
17 
are l i a b l e xinless the event agreed upon... comes to pass.' 
Holmes' analysis, odd though i t may sound, i s useful because h i s t o r i c a l l y accurate. The 
common law, authorily has i t , enabled the prommisee to enforce a promise by a w r i t of 
Covenant. The r e s t r i c t i o n s placed by a f a i l u r e , perhaps, to distinguish substantive 
and evidentiary rules, were not unduly onerous to those who wished to use the common 
law courts, and there was no, pressure on the common law judges to develop rules about 
commercial agreements and parole contracts. 
Pressure came, however, wi t h the end of the middle ages, from a variety of causes, 
ultimately economic. I n f l a t i o n followed the Black Death and was exacerbated by the 
i n f l u x of American silvers commercial adventures grew i n scale and p o l i t i c a l significance. 
The f o r t y - s h i l l i n g l i m i t drove actions from the l o c a l courts, and the Crown became 
concerned t o s a t i s f y the le g a l expectations of merchants, English and foreign. I t 
accomplished t h i s through conciliar courts e? a process attended, i n the p a r a l l e l 
Footnotes8 
15 Mayut V Aklum (l32l)): parole contract upheld 'according to the usages of 
Scarborough' cited Vinogradoff op c i t p38U. Vinogradoff suggests that the binding 
e f f e c t of a promise f o r a promise originates from the l o c a l courts. See also 
Plucknetts Concise History p^a • 'There are divers actions which a man may have i n 
the City of London which he may not have at Common Law, such as an action on a 
covenant without a sp e c i a l i t y . ' 
16 Holmes* The Path of the Law 10 HLR hSl, and see the case cited i n support of the 
h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h of his statement: Bromage v Penning Roll Rep 368. 
17 Holmes-Pollock Letters 187U-1932 de Molfe Howe ed 2nd edn Is 177-
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Scottish development, by the marriage of law and equity. 
The law of contract, already concerned with complex matters of credit, and insurance, 
and above a l l w i t h speed, i s the concern of equity, dispensed by the Chancellor, by 
the Privy Council, and by mixed commissions of laymen, lawyers, and c i v i l i a n s . 'The 
equity of the Tudor period was a kind of popular equity i n the sense that i t r e l i e d 
through a r b i t r a l commissions on the p r a c t i c a l aid and the prac t i c a l morality of selected 
18 
groups of responsible laymen.' And t h i s i s not a matter of satisfaction to common 
lawyers. They may well s i t on the Privy Council, and confer with Admirally on matters 
such as insurance; there are many grounds for supposing that they are aware of the 
necessity f o r developing a commercial law, and that the means lay outside the common 
law. l e t common lawyers have p o l i t i c a l reasons f o r opposing the growth of the conciliar 
19 
courts and f o r r e s t r i c t i n g the operation of equity. 
The i n t e l l e c t u a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n which Coke seeks for the law i s i n terms of reason, 
'which i s to be understood (a?) an a r t i f i c i a l perfection... gotten by long study, and 
20 
not... every man's natural reason.' For a law to be reasonable beyond doubt, i t 
must have stood the test of time. The paradigm i s custom, and declarations of custom 
are to be found i n j u d i c i a l decisions. The 'enlightened thinkers' of Coke's day might 
21 
seek modernity as the Tudors had done, by sweeping away and replacing. This i s what 
the c o n c i l i a r courts might be seen doing i n the area of contract. To stay t h i s the common 
lawyers opposed a l l advances made with the assistance of the prerogative by presenting 
22 
an historiography i n which the common law figured as a continuum. A l l novelty was 
resisted except insofar as i t could f i t or be f i t t e d into the gnarled forms of sixteenth 
and seventeenth centiiry common law. Ely t h i s means, that law was made 'the overruling 
Footnotes? 
18 See generally Dawsons The Privy Council & Private Law i n the Tudor & Stuart 
Periods hQ Mich Law Rev 293 & 627. 
19 See Ogilvies The King's Government & the Common Law. 
20 Cited Lewis* Coke & His Theory of A r t i f i c i a l Reasoning. 81;LQR 330. 
21 Holdsworths Some Makers of English Law p i l l et seq. 
22 See generally Pococks The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law. 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s realm?' the law, represented at times as almost eternal, a kind 
of Volksgeist, w i l l e d the King, according to the lawyers; the King had not given the 
law. A contradiction of t h i s injrth, even i n detail^ might undermine the position of 
the new men, whose strategy was to lead, paradoxically, to the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Surpreraacy. 
I f contract i s to achieve recognition at Common Law, each brick i n the pragmatic 
structure has to be positioned i n accordance with contemporary theory. The 'daring 
reformers ranged under the banner of equity' make a lasti n g contribution to contractual 
remedies, but henceforward promises must take what advantage there i s from the ' f e r t i l e 
mother of actions.' I t i s to the l i n e whose contractual elements may f i r s t be discerned 
23 
i n the Humber Jerryman's Case that the common lawyers look. And t h i s l i n e , to Slade 
and beyond, i s trespassory. One can scarcely f a i l , i n noting the c o l l i s i o n of Common 
Pleas and King's Bench i n Slade,. to note also the contribution of the action of Debt 
to the common law of contract, yet with two reservations? i n Debt 'the quid pro quo, 
as yet ungeneralised, was the p r i n c i p a l ; the promise, i f recognised at a l l , was 
merely the accessory.'^^ Debt i s available on a specialty r the l a t t e r being i t s e l f 
the obligation and i f i t were l o s t , or not cancelled by the debtor upon repayment then 
the wronged party's only recourse was to the G>hancellor who alone would f i n d and enforce 
a promissory obligation - or on the receipt by the defendant of a quid pro quo, to 
•which the defendant can merely answer n i l debet, and wage his law. 
The f i r s t reservation i s as to the q u a l i t y of the contribution. Pophamls remark i n 
[support of the idea that every debt imports a promise, that 'long use and multitude of 
[precedents.draw i t i n t o a law'^^ i s dismissed by Baker as spurious, f o r Popham 
cites no precedent. 
fche second reservation concerns the quantity of the contribution, for 'the development 
of contract i n the 17th century stemmed not from any solemn considered declaration of 
ootnotes? 
23 22 Ass 9h (No i i7) c i t e d Plucknett. Concise History klil. 
2h Salmonds History of contract XiaRl66 at pl68. Also P & M Hist I I 212. 
P & M History I I 203 et seq. 
126 Barkley v Foster cit e d -.. .Baker: 'New Light on Slad§^ Case' 1971 C L j J ^ ^ p222 
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legal.prijgipiple i n Slade's Case, but from the doctrinal confusion caused by the f a i l u r e 
27 
of the judges to reach a national settlement'. I n other words, i f Debt had much to 
contribute to a transactional theory of contract i s questionable: and i f i t did have, 
the extent to which i t contributed i s not measurable. The common.lawyers were aware, 
simply,V of where they wanted to go i n each case, but f a i l e d to reconcile t h e i r desire 
for short-term progress with t h e i r dogmatic b e l i e f i n the immutability of the law. 
I t i s not proposed to follow the growth of common law contract ftirther. That equitable 
contract i s promissory i n the 17th century i s suggested; thus Bacon can argue that 
d u p l i c i t y of actions i s not j u s t i f i e d by analogy with the situation i n which both 
Chancery and common law have j u r i s d i c t i o n to grant remedies i n contract, f o r , he says, 
28 
Chanceiy w i l l compeil the performance of a promise, i t w i l l not enforce a contract. 
Common law, unconceptualised, grows from trespass. The dichotoity has modern significance. 
Footnotes? 
27 Op c i t p236. 
28 Op c i t p59. 
22 
I I ? 1 
The next stage i n establishing the hypothesis that equity retained a promissory-
approach towards contract, and i n using t h i s hypothesis to explain and j u s t i f y a 
miscellany of modern cases hy reference to a theoretical framework, must be to explore 
the cases. J u s t i f i c a t i o n inlshistorical terms must be subordinate to explanation, f o r 
I cannot subscribe to the view epitomised by Kitto,_ J i n Wilson v Darling Island 
Stevedoring Co that a new principle may not 'atone for i t s heterodoxy by the convience 
of i t s r e s u l t s . 
I disagree respectfully with Professor Wilson's confining of the equitable estoppelJ 
2 
principle to matters of waiver and forbearance,-for these seem merely instances of a 
much wider doctrine; yet a very important reason f o r i n s i s t i n g that equity maintained 
3 
i t s i n t e g r i t y i s to be found i n the case of Foakes v Beer. The facts are well known. 
Mrs Beer' obtained judgement against Dr Foakes i n the sum of £2,090. 19 . 0. She then 
made a promise i n w r i t i n g ^ not to sue for the balance, i n return f o r an immediate 
payment of £^00, followed by the balance i n instalments. The House of Lords refused 
to uphold the promise, although the strength of the r a t i o may be diminished, since two 
members of the House considered that Mrs Beer had merely promised to wait, and not to 
forgo the i n t e r e s t . I t i s possible to see her promise as one of intention, as contrasted 
[with a representation as to existing f a c t , but i t was not necessary f o r the judges to 
speculate upon the nature of such promises generally i n order to achieve what they 
Footnotes? 
95 CKi k3, at p85. The antithesis of K l t t o , J's view i s expressed i n Cohns 
Existentialism & l^gal Science. 
Recent Developments i n Estoppel 67 LQR 330; & A Reappraisal of Quasi-estoppel 196^ 
CLJ 93. See .also his a r t i c l e i n Tulane Law Rev. 
(1883U1 221. 
f^%Qh] 9App Cas 605. 
|u I t may be relevant t o note that, as T r i e t e l points out (Contract 3 r d ed p99) 
Dr Foakes' s o l i c i t o r drafted the document. I t ought also to be borne i n mind that 
the action was brought to obtain payment of interest, as to which the promise was 
s i l e n t - The House may have been divided had Mrs Beer expressly, undertaken not to 
claim i n t e r e s t . P T 0 
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sought as between the parties? The action of Debt, as we have seen, looked to the 
benefit to the promissors Pinnet's Case^ was brought i n Debt (and even then the decision 
•7 
went the other way on a t e c h n i c a l i t y ) and the dictum cit e d i n Foakes v Beer i s of 
l i m i t e d relevance. 
However, i f we accept the case as indicative of the common law reaction to promises, 
8 8A mast we accept Jorden v Money as a summary of the equitable view? The case i s fraught 
FootnoteSt 
5 See Lord Denning's judgement i n D & C Builders v Rees 1966 2QB617. Where, again, 
to uphold the promise would have been inequitable to the promissor. 
6 1603 5 Co Rep 117a. 
7 That 'payment of a lesser sum on the day i n satisfaction of the greater cannot be 
any s a t i s f a c t i o n of the whole because...by no p o s s i b i l i t y can a lesser sum be a 
s a t i s f a c t i o n to the p l a i n t i f f f o r a greater' whilst 'The payment and acceptance 
of a parcel before the day would be a good satisfaction...; f o r . . . i t . . .would be more 
benef i c i a l to (the p l a i n t i f f ) than the whole at the day and the value of the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n i s not material'. As regards quid pro quo t h i s i s a most incontroversial 
description, but to argue from here to a theory of consideration seems unnecessary. 
To the extent that i t represents Debt's contribution to contract (ante) i t would 
be a purely common law statement. 
8 1851; 5HL Cas I 8 6 ; 10 Eng Rep 868. 
8A Atiyjah "suggests another reason for the decicion i n Consideration i n Contracts -
A fundamental restatement, p5 i i . 'The p l a i n t i f f . . .did shew a good contract and that 
is...wl^y he f a i l e d . . . (T)he Statute of Frauds required that a promise i n consideration 
of marriage must be proved i n w r i t i n g . . .but he had no written note or memorandum 
signed by the defendant. His counsel.. .deliberately refrained from arguing his 
case i n contract, but r e l i e d i n estoppel. Had t h i s stratagem succeeded.. . i t would 
have meant that any p l a i n t i f f who could show that he had altered. his position i n 
' reliance on the defendant's promise could ignore the Statute and r e l y on estoppel'. 
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w i t h d i f f i c u l t y and ambiguityj though the facts, again, are i n part fami l i a r . ¥illiam 
Jfoney, a Naval Ensign of l i t t l e percipience was persuaded by two of his colleagues to 
purchase some Spanish bonds, the honouring of which by the Spanish Government his father 
was then negotiating. He borrowed £1,200 from one Charles Mamell i n order to effect 
the purchase, but, following the f a i l u r e of his father's negotiations, the bonds proved 
worthless and the money was l o s t . Because two others were implicated i n the speculation, 
his father offered £[|.00 to Charles Marnell i n satisfaction of the debt, a sum which the 
l a t t e r intimated he would accept. On his death Charles's sister Louisa inherited the 
claim, and her s o l i c i t o r s , despite her insistence that she would never enforce the 
claim, wrote to Money's father about the off e r of £l;00. His answer was that the 
circumstances were now changed, andhe refuse_d:payment.. There was evidence of a close 
friendship between William Money and Louisa Mamell. Being assured that she would not 
enforce the claim, he married. At 'an advanced age she married, taking as her marriage 
0 
portion' the debt. Jorden, her husband, joining his wife, sued. The case went on appeal 
from Chancery to the Court of Appeal i n Chancery, thence to the House of Lords. 
I t i s worth quoting the headnote, since the current view subscribed to by the courts 
seems to owe much to i t . 'Where a person possesses a lega l r i g h t a court of equity w i l l 
-
not i n t e r f e r e t o r e s t r a i n him from enforcing i t although between the time of i t s 
'creation and that of his attempt to enforce i t he has made representation of his 
int e n t i o n to abandon i t . ' Jackson criticises"'"'^ Lord Cranworth, L C's interpretation of 
the cases which he cites? i n Montefiore v Montefiore"*""^ Lord Mansfield refused to allow 
} man to reclaim a sham note of hand which he had given to his brother f o r the purpose 
Df inducing consent to the brother's marriage by the bride's father. (No man shall set 
12 
l i s own i n i q u i t y up as a defence.' I n Neville v Wilkinson a creditor anxious to 
recover his money drew up a . much reduced schedule of the defendant's debts: the father 
3f the heiress whom the defendant sought to marry settled these, and consented to the 
inarriage. The creditor sued the defendant for the balance after the marriage, when the 
'. Pootnotes? 
Lord St Leonards, at p2ii9. 
0 Jackson? Estoppel as a Sword 81 LQR 8k. 
l l 1WBL 363. 
1.2 1 Bro c c 5U3. . , p rp Q 
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defendant was i n possession of his wife's fortune. Not surprisingly the court held the 
creditor to his o r i g i n a l representation of fa c t . Gregg v Wells'*"^ i s a similar case, 
the decisions being that a party who has 'negligently'or 'culpably' stood by whilst 
another makes a contract on bases which the f i r s t knows to be false, may not subsequently 
assert the falseness of those bases. 
Gale V Lindo^^ c i t e d by Lord Brougham, was another case of supplementing a sibling's 
fortune to enhance marriagability. Both parties being dead, the question between their 
executors was; could the brother who had l e n t his sister money i n return for a bond 
whose existence was xinknown to the future husband, and who had therefore made a 
representation of f a c t to the future husband, have enforced payment, i n contradiction 
of the representation. Lord Jeffreys, L C held that that which was once a fraud must 
always be a fraud. 
Contrasting w i t h these cases of rather oblique relevance are those referred to by Lord 
St Leonards i n his dissenting judgement. I n Cookes v Mascall"*"^ a father promises to 
s e t t l e property on his daughter's future husband, and the l a t t e r ' s father i s also to 
make a settlement on the suit o r . Disagreement occurs. Subsequently the son i s allowed 
to v i s i t the g i r l with her father's approval, and the two were married, he 'being privy 
to i t . He seemed w e l l pleased.' The son's father offers to make the settlement on his 
son, and the father of the daughter was held i n Chancery bound to perform. Another 
marriage case, Moore v Hart"*"^ concerned representations made by the defendant father 
to friends of the p l a i n t i f f that, were the l a t t e r to marry his daughter the defendant 
would give £U,000 along with her. P l a i n t i f f became a suitor, with the defendant's 
approval, but the defendant's promise l o s t , whilst his daughter's affection f o r the 
p l a i n t i f f gained, strength. A l e t t e r was produced, w r i t t e n by the defendant to p l a i n t i f f ' s 
f r i e n d , and t h i s was s u f f i c i e n t to enforce the promise to settle land on his daughter, 
once the marriage i n reliance upon the representation of intention had taken place, 
[ootnotess 
13 10 Ad & iSl 90. 
1 Vern U75, 23 Eng Rep 601. 
:l5 23 Eng Rep 730; 2 Vern 200. 
:.6 2 Verii 3 6 I . 23 Eng Rep 352. 
P T 0 
26 
Lords Cranworth and Brougham were e n t i t l e d to reach, on t h e i r cases, the conclusion 
that a fraudulent representation of fact may not i n equity be retracted when convenient, 
or indeed (Gale v Lindo"^), ever, but scarcely the position that representations of 
17 
i n t e n t i o n were unenforceable i n equity. That the contrary was true may be seen from 
Lord St Leonard's cases, and also from a b r i e f examination of a number of others. Thus 
18 
Hobbs V Norton ? an intending purchaser of an annuity charged upon (and from)the younger, 
asked the elder, brother a number of questions about t i t l e . The elder brother answered 
that he believed that a settlement antedating the w i l l would have the e f f e c t of avoiding 
the annuity, but that the purchaser need not worry, for he, the elder brother,had 
always paid the annuity to the younger on time. Encouraged, the purchaser bought the 
annuity. The Chancellor refused to allow the elder brother to take advantage of the 
settlement i n question, to which he l a t e r succeeded, i n order to avoid paying the 
aimuity, holding him to his statement, from which there could be inferred a representation 
of i n t e n t i o n to continue the annuity payments binding, at any rate i n equity. Twelve 19 19 years l a t e r i n Waiikford v Fotherley a father offered, to p l a i n t i f f ' s knowledge, to 
settle £3,000 on his daughter on the occasion o f her marriage. The father seemed to 
approve of her subsequent marriage to p l a i n t i f f , and the Chancellor ordered him to pay 
19A 
the amount to the p l a i n t i f f as administrator, following the daughter's death. 
Doubtless Waiikford v Fotherley might be viewed as a form of u n i l a t e r a l contract, a 
20 
precursor of C a r l i l l ' s case, though an intent i o n to be l e g a l l y bound by a contract 
flhich i t was necessary to discover i n that case i s perhaps absent. I t i s more usefully 
seen i n the context of the preceding Chancery cases, the rationale being analogous to 
Footnotes? 
17 See Jackson 8 I LQR 81;. 
L8 1 Vern . I36; 21 Eng Rep (1099). 
19 (I69k) 2 Vem 322; 23 Eng Rep 807. 
i:9A See also Hodgson v Hatcheson (I7II) 5 Vln^ AhT$22 p i 3h another marriage agreement 
enforceable outside the rules of common law contract. 
^0 C a r i i l l v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co(1893)1 QB 2^6. 
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21 that which j u s t i f i e s the separation of the Hedley ^ne"^"^ cases from contract. I t 
becomes important to maintain the d i s t i n c t i o n i n view of the interpretation placed on 
22 23 Luders v Anstey by Stephen, J i n Alderson v Maddison. The relevant facts of Luders 
V Anstey were that Robert Anstey made a proposal of marriage to I j i c r e t i a Light. She 
hesitated for fear of the f i n a n c i a l consequences to her children hy a former marriage. 
Anstey wrote t o her proposing to se t t l e two-thirds of her fortune on them, and one-third 
on a i ^ children of Lucretia and himself. His regiment was embarking f o r India, so he 
hastened a f t e r h i s l e t t e r , met her i n Bath, where tiiey were married. ' I do not see,' 
the Lord Chancellor said, 'how i t i s possible t o avoid making the l e t t e r the basis of 
the settlement; Mr Anstey having i n s t a n t l y followed the l e t t e r and marriage having 
taken place immediately. Upon his part the l e t t e r contains a specific and completie 
arrangement of t h e i r money a f f a i r s and upon t h i s the marriage took place. The only 
conclusion I can now draw i s , that t h i s s a t i s f i e d her objections and she married.'^^ 
No suggestion i s made that there might be a contract i n the common law sense, yet 
23 
Stephen, J, following the hearing of Alderson v Maddison at Durham Summer Assizes 
i s able to say that 'in Luders v Anstey i t was held that a l e t t e r making a suggestion 
as to a settlement followed by a marriage... such as to imply.. .acceptance.. .may be a 
contract f o r a settlement.' I t i s i n t h i s way that the history of the promise comes 
to be rewritten to f i t the pattern of common law contract. 
Footnotes* 
21 Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners(l961i)AC i;65. 
Anderson v Rhodes (1967)2 A l l E R 650 cf with De l a Bere v Pearson a908 )1KB280 a 
'result-oriented decision' which imposed a s t r a i n on the rules of contract. A 
separate basis of l i a b i l i t y i s less tortuous, but see T r e i t e l 3rd ed pli9 n 67. 
22 (1799) L^Ves 501. Also on another point 5 Ves 213; & 1 Ves Supp kS^. 
23 (1880) 5ex 293. 
2h U Ves 501 at p5l2. 
25 1880 5 ex D 293 at p29U. For other cases r e l i e d upon ( J j submit misguidedly) viz 
Hammersley v De Melk, & Prole v Soady, see l a t e r . 
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27 I n Evans v Bicknell the defendant had the fee simple i n some properly, i n t r u s t f o r 
his s i s t e r . He allowed Stansell possession of the deeds, enabling him to act as owner, 
and to enter i n t o a mortgage with p l a i n t i f f ' s wife. On the facts the case i s peripheral 
to our discussion, but there are one or two points of interest. The question put by 
the Chancellor to Romdily ( f o r p l a i n t i f f s ) concerning equity's j u r i s d i c t i o n was 
answered by r e f e r r i n g to (the l i m i t s of common law j u r i s d i c t i o n over representations? 
'In t h i s case there i s no p r i v i l y between Bicknell and the p l a i n t i f f ? no assumpsit or 
28 
contract.' ^ contrast ' i t i s a very old head of equity, that i f a representation i s 
made to another person, going to deal i n a matter of interest upon the f a i t h of that 
representation, the former shall make that representation good i f he knows i t to be 
29 30 fal s e ' The contrast between t h i s decision and the disaster of DenyyPeek indicates 
and also explains the d i f f e r i n g approaches of the two systems: ' i f (the defendant) 
p o s i t i v e l y J, p l a i n l y and precisely de'riies the assertion, and one witness only proves i t 
p o s i t i v e l y , c l e a r l y and precisely, as i t i s denied, and there i s no circumstance 
attaching c r e d i t to the assertion overbalancing credit due to the denial as a positive 
32 
i e n i a l , a court of equity w i l l not act upon the testimony of that witness. Not so at 
Law. There the defendant i s not heard. One witness proves the case; and however strongly 
•|;he defendant i s incl i n e d to deny i t upon oath there must be a recovery against him. '^"'" 
ord Eldon admonishes Lord Mansfield f o r his part i n not attending to t h i s difference 
iLetween law and equity - doubt j u s t i f i a b l y i n I 8 O I . However, an e a r l i e r fusion of 
p r i n c i p l e and procedure might have avoided l a t e r confusion. 
]i"ootnotes: j:7 (1801) 6 Ves l7U. 
1 8 Op c i t PI76. 
^9 Op c i t pl82 per Lord Sldon, L C. 
30 1889 11; App Case 337 
1 
31 ; (1801) 6 Ves 171; at pl8U. 
I 
32 See Amot V.Briscoe (I7U3) 1 Ves 96, l e Neve v Le Neve (17U7) IVes 65. The action 
w i l l not be sustained by reason of the evidence of one witness i f the denial relates 
to the same fa c t , and i f the denial i s 'precise and positive.' 
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I have indicated that the facts of Jorden's Case^^ do not j u s t i i y what i s generally 
taken to be i t s r a t i o . The remarks concerning the enforceability of representations of 
intent i o n i n equity are mere obiter; not only so, but three f i n a l cases should suffice 
to shew that those obiter dicta are mistaken. Whilst the e a r l i e r cases (cited above) 
are open to attack grounded on t h e i r age, Hammersley v De B i e l ^ ^ a House of Lords 
decision, precedes Jorden l y only nine years. Baron De Biel being minded to marry 
Sophia Po u l l e t t Thompson, her father promised to give £ 2 0 , 0 0 0 to each of his two 
daughters. De B i e l was required to s e t t l e £500 a year - 'a sum almost beyond iiy means' -
on Sophia, following which he married her. A settlement of £ 1 0 , 0 0 0 was completed, and 
when de B i e l noticed that no mention was made of the other £ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , which Thompson had 
previously promised to leave i n his w i l l , he was t o l d that inclusion of i t i n the 
indenture would be 'not proper i n point of form.' Lord lyndhurst, L C enforced the 
promise. Inducements, held are by a person 'plainly and deliberately' and having the 
desired e f f e c t of the promissee's celebrating a marriage because of them, are 
isnforceable i n equity at the s u i t of the promissee. '...A court of equity w i l l take care 
•;hat he i s not disappointed.' There seems l i t t l e doubt that Hammersley v De Biel could 
35 
Ijiave been decided on contractual principles, with the same re s u l t , i n a court of law.^ 
footnotess 
3|3 Ante p23. 
yfi (I8i;5) X I I CI & Fin i;5 8 Eng Rep 1312. 
See Stuart, V C i n Loffus v Moore ( I 8 6 2 ) 3 G i f f 592; 66 Eng Rep ^kh Jorden v 
Money (ante) cannot be considered as a reversal of Hammersley v De Bi e l ; and the 
proposition a t t r i b u t e d to Lord Cranworth i n the printed report, that a statement 
or representation of what a person intends or does not intend i s not s u f f i c i e n t 
seems irtrelsoncileable with the decision of the House of Lords i n Hammersley..., 
and with the law as l a i d down by a l l the judges of highest authority. I t i s 
remarkable that the case...was not referred to by any of the counsel...in...Jorden 
V Money.' 
35 See Wilsons Recent Developments i n Estoppel 67 LQR 330 at p 331. 
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Lord St Leonards thought so i n Maunsell v Hedges^^ a case on appeal from the Court of 
Chancery i n Ireland. ' I do not dispute the general principle that what i s called a 
representation.which i s made f o r another person to act upon and i s followed by his 
acting upon i t , w i l l , especially i n such a case as marriage, be deemed to be a contract. '^ "^  
However, Hammersley was not decided according to the narrow common law theory of contract, 
but according to a wider, equitable p r i n c i p l e . And on i t s facts, Maunsell v Hedges no 
move runs counter to t h i s equitable principle than D & C Builders v Rees can be said 
39 
to refute the modem statement of the principle i n High Trees. 
The appellant, Maunsell, wished to marry a g i r l whose guardians refused t h e i r consent, 
she being not quite seventeen, and he being unable to make adequate fin a n c i a l provision 
for her. The respondents were the administrators of the estate of Maunsell's uncle, 
Robert Hedges. Hedges' representation that Maunsell would receive large estates i n 
Tipperary under a w i l l which at that time Hedges was 'convinced...1 shall never a l t e r . . . 
to your disadvantage' persuaded the guardians to observe that the g i r l ' s 'affections 
are strongly engaged, and to agree to the marriage. They were aware that Hedges had 
•declined making any immediate settlement' upon the appellant. 
The Uncle's f i n a n c i a l adviser died i n 1819^ and i n his stead the appellant on two 
occasions gave some rather dubious advice, involving Hedges i n two lawsuits and loss 
of money. Rather unsurprisingly perhaps. Hedges was moved to question the wisdom of 
conferring upon his nephew the benefit of the Tipperary estates. He made a new w i l l , 
excluding him, and afterward died. 
Three observations need be made? f i r s t i t was the guardians to whom any inducement was 
held out^^''^ and thus the guardians who must f i l e the b i l l . Second, i t i s doubtful i f 
Footnotes? 
36 (iQSk) 10 Eng Rep 769; 18^1; HLC 1039. 
37 Op c i t at P1059. 
38 (1966) 2 QB 617. t9 Central London Property Co v High Trees House Ltd ( l 9 i ; 7 ) KB 130. 9A i e Inducement to consent? i t would not be r e a l i s t i c to hold that the nephew was 
induced to marry the g i r l , as he contended. This no doubt contributed to his f a i l u r e . 
Through quaere wether the guardians might be trustees of a r i g h t to sue on the 
pri n c i p l e of Tomlinson v G i l l (ante). 
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the inducement could be held to be a representation, f o r , had Hedges wished he could 
have made an immediate settlement upon the appellant, and the significance of his not 
doing so ought to have struck the guardians^*^ they must be takentto have known that 
the w i l l was revocable u n t i l death, f o r they knew that the appellant was not induced 
t o seek the g i r l ' s hand by the uncle's promise. Third, having cost the uncle large sums 
i n such a way the appellant may w e l l not be i n a position to request a court of equity 
to exercise i t s discretion i n his favor. His appeal to Hedges' good f a i t h i s less strong. 
These observations are relevant to a discussion of the second of the three cases more 
or less conteii5)oraneous with Jorden, and which operate to cut down i t s supposed ratios 
Piggot V S t r a t t o n ^ Here there were two plots of building land on the I s l e of Wight 
held under a lease containing covenants r e s t r i c t i n g building density. Observation of 
these covenants was undertaken by both parties to the sublease of one p l o t , and t h i s 
meant that from the bungalows b u i l t on that plot there was a view of the Solent. I n 
consequence consideration f o r the sublease was high. The sublessor then surrendered 
the headlease and took a fresh one from the lessor containing no r e s t r i c t i o n on 
bui l d i n g density. P l a i n t i f f - assignee of the sublease sought an injunction to restrain 
the sublessor from building on the property retained i n such a way as to deprive his 
bungalows of t h e i r sea view and render them unmarketable. 
(Ilearly p l a i n t i f f had no easement over the sublessor's plot!:^^ Equally clearly. Lord 
C air?»bell, L C f e l t , i t would not be 'consistent with equity and good conscience that 
il t r a i t t o n , to make an increased p r o f i t on the land which he had not sublet, should be 
£,llowed to b u i l d houses on i t . . . ' i n a maimer contrary to the agreement between the 
f ar t i e s to the sublease. There was no w r i t t e n covenant which p l a i n t i f f could re l y upon, 
1- owever but ' I apprehend the i n j u n c t i o n to be supported on the well-established doctrine 
t h a t i f A deliberately makes an assertion to B intending i t to be acted upon. ..and i t 
5!o.o±notess • 
MO: .:Jdawn.§ell's-earlier-financial Iscrape' -was mentioned, i n the l e t t e r i n which the 
uncle said that the nephew was a beneficiary"under his w i l l . 
i J l 1859 1 De GF & J 33 (see p5l f o r an interpretation of Jorden v Ifoney (ante)) 
Up For an attenpt to confer greater respectability by finding an interest i n land see 
la t e r s i n t e r a l i a Bird'ons v Evans. 
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1 Q 
i s . . . A i s estopped from denying i t s t r u t h . ' But, i t was argued, A was not here 
denying i t s t r u t h . He had made a true representation of the covenants i n the headlease, 
at the time of the sublease. The sit u a t i o n had since altered. Insofar as he had made a 
representation of int e n t i o n to observe the terms of the headlease after leasing to be 
bound by them, t h i s was unenforceable? Jorden v Money. 'But moralists and j u r i s t s t e l l 
us that words are to be understood i n courts of justice i n the sense i n which the persons 
who used them wished them to be understood by the person to whom they were addressed. '^ 
Although Stratton merely asserted that he had no power to build so as to block the sea 
view ' i t would be childish to suppose that he meant to be understood to say although 
he had no power then to do the act, he might afterwards acquire the power by surrendering 
the lease.' I n other words, Stratton's representation was worthless except insofar as 
i t was a representation of intent i o n . Whilst Louisa Jorden promised that she had no 
present wish to enforce the bond, her conduct i n retaining the bond suggested possible 
ijfuture intentions of a d i f f e r e n t nature, which she could not be said to be concealing 
iaehind an unimpeachable statement of fac t . Stratton, on the other hand, made a statement 
of f a c t which derived i t s whole substance from i t s implications about his future conduct. 
This discussion points to the casuistic nature of any d i s t i n c t i o n i n principle between 
1 
statements of fa c t and statements of intention. Such /a d i s t i n c t i o n i s bound to work 
capriciously and could favour scoundrels l i k e Stratton. Common law pragmatism ought, 
and i -argue i s , tendered by an equitable concern with substantial issues? any other 
view must be retrograde to the achievement of just i c e . And i t seems pointless to lose 
j u s t i c e i n the pa r t i c u l a r case merely because one cannot define justice at large. 
The t h i r d case i s Prole v Soady!^ '^  There was a representation which induced p l a i n t i f f s ' * 
father to marry t h e i r mother, made by t h e i r maternal grandfather,to the ef f e c t that certain 
property would become theirs (ultimately). I t was made before the marriage and on several 
Footnotes: 1;3 1859 1 De GF &J 33 at pl;9 See Nunn v Fabian 11 Jur N S 868 and, generally. Storey 
on Equity Jurisprudence (1866) p75l et seq. 
kh Op c i t at p50. 
k[> M860) 2 G i f f 1. 66 iSng Rep 1. 
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subsequent occasions. They sued his administrators as heirs of th e i r dead mother, and 
were successful on the basis of Hammersley v De Biel. As with that case and Piggott v 
Stratton, a decision might have rested on the principles of contra'ctl'''^ I t i s necessary 
to emphasise however, that these were not cases i n common law contract .Lord Cottenham 
expressed the matter quite c l e a r l y : 'A representation made by one p a r l ^ for the purpose 
of influencing the conduct of the other party, and acted on by him, w i l l i n general be 
s u f f i c i e n t to e n t i t l e him to the assistance of t h i s court for the purpose of realising 
isuch r e p r e s e n t a t i o n T h i s expression might, taken i n i t s context, and i n view of the 
predominant f a c t - s i t u a t i o n of the authorities, be confined to promises inducing 
marriage!^"^^ However, the authorities are wider than this!;^^ Moreover, and perhaps 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the l a t e r cases following Jorden v Money and ef f e c t i v e l y submerging the 
equitable beneath the common law approach to promises have not sought so to confine 
the equitable doctrine, but have instead chosen to ignore i t completely. 
Before considering developments subsequent to the procedural fusion of 1873, i t i s 
I 
necessaiy to assess another f e t t e r placed upon the enforcement of promises t y legal 
1x9 
means. I n Combe v Gombe, Denning L J reversing Etyme, J at f i r s t instance,'insisted 
Footnotes; 
kl cf Caton V Caton ( l 8 6 l ) LR I Ch 137: Lord Cranworth, L C reversing Stuart, V-C. 
The case i s decided on contractual grounds, and p l a i n t i f f loses by operation of 
; the Statute of Frauds s.k' 
kS 12 CI & Finn k$ at p62 Note. 
i|7A See also Ungley v Ungley 5 Ch D887 
& Dean Pound's comment i n 'Consideration i n Equity' 13 I l l i n o i s L Rev k3S at piUiO 
n 17 ' . . . i t i s stretching the facts to say that the daughter made a... contract 
w i t h her father to marry the man to whom she was already engaged.' 
i|8 Representations inducing consent to marriage are generally representations of fact. 
For non-marriage situations see the cases cited e a r l i e r : Hobbs v Norton; Piggott 
V Stratton. . I 
lib 19^1 2 KB 215. 
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with proper parental concern'^"^ that the High Trees principle 'does not create new 
causes of action where none existed before,• warning t h a t ' i t i s important that (the 
principle.) should not be stretched too f a r l e s t i t be endangered. This l i m i t a t i o n 
i s , he says, ' i m p l i c i t i n a l l the modem cases i n which the principle has been developed.' 
To what extent i s i t supported l?y the e a r l i e r authorities? 
1112 • 
I have perhaps said s u f f i c i e n t to establish a possible difference between equitable and 
common law approaches to promises. How far t h i s enables us to d i f f e r from the reader 
of Spencer-Bower and Turner who ' w i l l be able to cock a snook at people who t a l k 
about equitable estoppel^ '^ ^ and from the author who would apply to a l l forms of 
estoppel by representation 'the language of naval warfare (that) estoppel must always 
either be a mine-layer or a mine-sweeper: i t can never be a capital u n i t , '^ ^ we must 
now examine. I t i s necessary to look b r i e f l y at the e a r l i e r authorities before examining 
the connexion between estoppel and the enforcement of promises after 1873. 
jTurner cites Lord Esher, M R i n Seton Laing v Lafone : 'an estoppel does not i n 
I t s e l f give a cause of action; i t prevents another person from denying a state of facts.' 
! ^7 8^ 
6 f Vaughan L J's dictum i n Williams v Pinckney he i s dismissive. Vaughan L J said 
'the common law doctrine of estoppel i s of a very personal nature and only exists between 
parties to a transaction. I t i s part of the law of evidence and not the same as the 
equitable doctrine. You cannot found an action on i t as you can i n equity.' Instead, 
Footnotes: 
^',0 See Stone: Social Dimensions of Law & Justice p26l note 259: see, for the suggestion 
that the case reflected 'the moral values of our society»Atiyali: Consideration p5l. 
51 ' 1951 2KB 215 at p219. 
5 2 ^ Spencer-Bower & Turner: Estoppel by Representation 1966. 
53 Harvey: Book leview of Estoppel by Representation 30 MLR3U8. 
^li Spencer-Bower & Turner p7. 
55 Op c i t note 2. 
56 (1887) 19 QBQ 58. 
57 (3:897) 67 LJ Ch 30 at p37. 
58 Spencer-Bower & Turner pl2. 
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Turner says that estoppel';occurs as a cause of action only i n cases of acquiescence: 
i n other cases the cause of action i s i n r e a l i t y elsewhere, and estoppel i s used as a 
'mine-sweeper' to demolish a defence. Other cases are usefully categorised as wrongly 
decided. 
jThere are a number of points to make here. As Turner admits throughout his book, many 
of the cases which can be categorised as cases of estoppel by representation contain 
do 
no reference to the doctrine? Denning, J, i n Klgh Trees states that 'these are not 
cases of estoppel i n the s t r i c t sense. They are promises - promises intended to be 
(binding, intended to be acted upon, and i n fact acted upon...the proper inference was 
that the promissor did intend to be bound. Wrapped up i n a technical doctrine such 
|as that of common law estoppel, the l i m i t a t i o n asserted to l^y Turner, and p o l i t i c a l l y 
laccepted by Denning, L J i n Combe v Combe^ "*" might appear respectable. However, i f the 
i o c t r i n e o f equitable estoppel i s aptly envisaged i n High Trees, and as I should consider 
jnost useful, as merely an example of a method of enforcing promises where the facts 
J u s t i f y t h i s as being f a i r and equitable, then Turner's l i m i t a t i o n appears suspiciously 
I 
1 
l i k e an example of homeostasis. Arbitrary f e t t e r s excused by a pretense that rules of J'vidence are not i n r e a l i t y determinants of substantive r i g h t s ^ ^ are bad enough, but 
ootnotesj 5j9 Not merely the e a r l i e r cases referred to i n t h i s section, biit those r e l i e d upon by 
Denning, J i n Central London Prop Co v High Trees House Ltd(19li7)KB 130, namely: 
Hughes V Metropolitan Railway Go(l877)2 App Cas li39 
Birmingham & D i s t r i c t Land Go v LNWR(l888)liO Ch D 268 
. Fenner v Blake (1900) IQB h26 
• I n Re Wickham (1917) 3hTUL l58 
Re William Parfcsg(l937) 2 A l l E R 36I 
Butteiy V Pickard(l9U6)WN 25 
6jD High Trees at pl3U. 
5|L c f the s i t u a t i o n i n criminal law where the rules governing the admissibility of 
confessions may be seen as guarantees of certain freedoms. 
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rules of equity dependent f o r t h e i r efficacy upon f o r t u i t i e s are worse, i n an advanced 
lega l system. Thus where A makes a promise to B and B plans his future around the 
promise, he cannot sue on i t j ^ though i f A sues i n contradiction of the promise, B may 
set up the promise as a defence and estop A from denying i t . However, i f A knows that 
B i s i n f r i n g i n g a r i g h t that i has but does nothing to inform him of his, and B i s , 
reasonably, ignorant that he i s doing so, then B may sue A and estop A from asserting 
the r i g h t i n whose infringement he acquiesced^^^ I t may be wondered whether we 
cannot f i n d a less capricious underlying prin c i p l e . 
Moreover, even^if one were to r e j e c t the u t i l i t a r i a n approach, those who assert on 
the a uthorities that estoppel' cannot found a cause of action are vulnerable for 'the 
l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n i s extremely simple. No number of observations of white swans can 
establish the theoiy that a l l swans are white: the f i r s t observation of a black swan 
can refute i t . ' ^ ^ I f we accept Lord Cairns' ' f i r s t p r i n c i p l e ' i n i t s h i s t o r i c a l context, 
V 
i t has founded a cause of actions i n a number of cases, which cannot be cl a s s i f i e d as 
cases of acquiescence: nor does the cause of action l i e elsewhere, leaving the action 
18 
upon the promise a mere supportive, or 'mine-sweeper,' role. Hobbs v Norton, Cookes 
FootSo^-feeir::-- ' ' . ' 
6.2,.-. I Combe-; v •6ombe( 195l) 2 KB- 2 l 5 . . ' - i 
163 Provided there i s the ingredient of 'detrimental reliance'. High Trees cases see 
l a t e r . However t h i s seems to be a wholly unnecessary import of the rules of common 
law contract' to which, we argue, equiiy i s not subject. See Jackson: Estoppel as 
a Sword 81 LQR81;. 
Sk Ramsden v Byson(l866)LRI IS. 129. 
S5 See Nokes: Introduction to the Law of Evidence I967 at p2l5 12l6. 
36 Popper: The Listener 1971 p9 
^7 See Sheridan: jgquitable Estoppel Today 15 MLR 325 f o r a more complete l i s t of 
cases. 
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V Mascall, Wankford v Fotherley^^ Borrowes v Iiock^^ Piggott v Strattonjp- Prole v 
Soady^^ and Hammersley v De Biel*^^ are a l l such cases^^ I t scarcely seems necessary to 
distinguish these cases from the p a r a l l e l development i n wliich i t i s admitted, a 
70 
representation does give a cause of action, viz the cases i n which the p l a i n t i f f i s 
to the defendant's knowledge l e d t y the defendant to expend money on the defendant's 
land i n a n t i c i p a t i o n that he has, or w i l l receive, some interest therein. The notion 
of'proprietory estoppel,';!; suggest, i s , along with equitable estoppel, a manifestation 
of equity's regard f o r fairness i n the enforcement of promises. When the two concepts 
are seen as a part of the same whole, not only can a truer picture of the h i s t o r i c a l 
development be gained, but we s h a l l see l a t e r that greater unity may be conferred upon 
a number of apparently disparate l a t e r cases. 
Footnotes; 
68 (1805) 10 Ves ii70. Here one Cartwright offers to assign his share i n the residue 
of a testator's estate i n s a t i s f a c t i o n of a trade debt. The c r e d i t o r - p l a i n t i f f -
enquires of the defendant, who verifies, that Cartwright's share i s as the l a t t e r 
represents. The defendant had forgotten (fraud was not alleged) that Cartwright 
had assigned a part of his share already, 10 years previously. Damages were 
awarded to the p l a i n t i f f . •What can a p l a i n t i f f , do to make out a case of t h i s 
kind but shew f i r s t that the f a c t represented i s false and secondly, that the 
person making the representation had knowledge of a fact which was contrary to 
i t . The p l a i n t i f f cannot dive into the secret reserves of his heart.' Clearly t h i s 
would today be classed with the negligence mis-statement cases. But these are 
hedged about w i t h r e s t r i c t i o n s : see Mutual Life Assurance v Evatt(l97l) 1 A l l E R 
150. Immediately before Hedley ^ r n e , the continued development of the High Trees 
doctrine seemed to promise an escape from G-andler v Crane Christmas, see Sheridan: 
Estoppel Today 15 MLR 325-
69 Turner dismisses Hammersley as a case i n contract. But his authority f o r doing so 
i s probably the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n placed upon the case by Lord St Leonards i n 
Maunsell v Hedges (Ante). 
70 See Snell's Equity 26th Ed p627-633 (Distinction between proprietory and equitable 
estoppel" on p629). 
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71 I n P i l l i n g v Armitage Sir William Grant, M R, said ' i f a landlord enters into an 
arrangement with a tenant r e l a t i v e to improvements, and so completely sanctions them 
as himself to agree to advance a part of the money. . . I doubt whether t h i s does not 
fasten an equity upon the landlord precluding him from saying.. .that there i s an end 
72 
to the lease.' Similarly i n Gregory v Mghell a parol agreement for a twenty-one year 
lease was ordered to be s p e c i f i c a l l y performed at the instance of the tenant after he 
had entered and expended money i n anticipation. Failure to f i x a rent was no bar to 
73 
the equity, nor was i t necessary to invoke the doctrine of part performance where a 
father allowed his sons to occupy and to spend money on land of which he was the 
equitable owner, i t was held that he could not assert t i t l e against the sons' trustee 
i n bankruptcy: Unity Joint-Stock Banking Association v King. Approbation by a father 
of expenditure 'by his son on a piece of land gave the son a r i g h t of action to perfect 
75 tn otherwise imperfect g i f t and" obtain the fee simple: Dilwyn v Llewellyn. Lord Westbury, , C finds consideration i n the expenditure combined with the father's knowledge and 
approval thereof, and yet 'does not make i t e n t i r e l y clear whether he considers the 
case to be one of g i f t or one of contract.' I n ny view his d i f f i c u l t y i s unsurprising. 
77 
f i n a l l y Ramsden v Dyson affirmed the principle that acquiescence by an owner who sees 
another spending money on the owner's property w i l l confer t i t l e on that other where 
^e, to the owner's knowledge was under the mistaken b e l i e f that the had t i t l e , or 
I I 
would as a r e s u l t of his expenditure obtain i t . The tenant was unsuccessful i n the case 
£iince the landlord did not have the requisite knowledge, nor the tenant the requisite 
b e l i e f . However the principle of law now seems to have gained some acceptance. (See l a t e r ) , 
];t i s clear that a r i g h t of action exists to compel performance of a representation as 
botnotes: 
\±- (1806) 12 Ves 78. 
2 / l 8 l l ) 18 Ves "328. 
73 c f Alderson v Madison and Wakeham v Mackenzie (ante) 
74 (1858) 25 Beav 72. 
75 (1861-73) A l l iS R 38Uj UO.De-GF:& J 517-
76 P e t t i t : Squi-ty & the Law of Trusts 1966 p66. 
77 1866 LR 1 HL 129. 
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to t i t l e , or intention to create t i t l e , to land, i f the representee had spent money on 
the strength of the representation. .1 would suggest that the proposition i s capable 
of generalisation, and that expenditure of money on the f a i t h of the representation i s 
merely evidence upon which the Chancellor may act i f he considers that but for his 
intervention an inequity would occur. And ju s t as expenditure of money alone w i l l not 
lead i n e v i t a b l y to the operation of equity, so i n a proper case presumably a court 
of equity or i t s successor w i l l not hesitate to apply the principle where there has 
79 
been no isuch expenditure. Wakeham v Mackenzie was a case i n which r e l i e f was given. 
The declared basis for r e l i e f was the existence of part-performance, but as Jackson 
80 
suggests the condition that equity would not relieve save where the promisee had 
acted to his detriment became confused with the similar principle that the Statute of 
Frauds could be circumvented only where there had been p a r t i a l performance of the 
asserted obligation. The same a r t i c l e convincingly argues that t h i s requirement.was 
further confused with the contractual requirement of consideration, with the resultant 
p e t r i f i c a t i o n of a most useful t o o l . 
Footnotes: 78 Ramsden v Dyson i s j u s t such a case, as I have indicated. See also the Victorian 
case of Brand v Chris Building Society (l957 )VR625 i n which a defendant paid a 
builder to construct a house i n a s i t e which he believed to be the s i t e he had 
purchased, but which i n f a c t belonged to the p l a i n t i f f . The p l a i n t i f f at the 
material time had no knowledge of the mistake, and i n no way contributed to the 
defendant's b e l i e f . Thus the defendant was not able to c a l l i n aid equitable 
pr i n c i p l e s , not even the powerful embryo of unjust enrichment, presumably because, 
i n medieval terminology, he had not done that which i n good conscience lie ought 
not to have done. Defendant was u t t e r l y responsible. 
p 1968 IWLR 1175. 
i]0 Estoppel as a Sword 81 LQR 8U. 
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Me must now look to the period a f t e r l873j to discover, not whether equity may s t i l l 
bear children - though as the et h i c a l component of the law there would seem to be no 
reason why i t should not - but whether there i s any nourishment to sustain one which, 
I have argued, maintained an uncertain existence p r i o r to that date. 
i l l 
111:1 
To state that the fusion of I873 was merely procedural insofar as i t affects the 
submissions made so f a r i s not to der^ the influence of procedure on substantive law. 
However, the principle was already almost three centuries old, -Uiat i n the event of a 
disagreement equity should prevail over common law. Section 25 of the 1873 Act did not 
change the s i t u a t i o n , but, i n enabling a l l courts and judges to dispense equity the Act 
exacerbated certain confusions already apparent i n the Court of Chancery"l" The era 
surrounding the Tramways decision, with i t s glbony preoccupation with stare decisis, 
was not conducive to r e c t i f i c a t i o n of these confusions, since this necessitated a 
frank appraisal of the role of the judge i n the lawmaking process^ Despite t h i s , 
however, i t may be possible to f i n d leeways s u f f i c i e n t to provide a 'slim catena of 
authority' f o r a wider proposition than Lord Denning's. 
The common law positi o n i n 1873 uiay he deduced from a number of cases: i n Ogle v Earl 
Vane^ a forebearance case, the defendant was not able to reduce damages payable by him 
by reason of p l a i n t i f f ' s acceptance of a l a t e r delivery date at the defendant's request, 
and f o r the defendant's benefit. There seems nothing inconsistent here with the much 
l a t e r case of Rickards v Oppenheim^ for Vane was ultimately i n default. Had he performed 
at the l a t e r date, i t seems unli k e l y that p l a i n t i f f , having agreed to delayed performance, 
could have succeeded i n an action f o r damages, although the judgement of Willes, J 
might suggest t h i s . 
Footnotes: 
1 See the analysis of Coles v Pilkington L R 19 BQ 1 7 I I by Malius, V C: ' I f the 
conduct of one person induces another to a l t e r his or her conduct, t h i s w i l l make 
a binding contract.' The consideration which he discovers i n that case i s perhaps 
not that which a contract lawyer would recognise, though he i s i n good company i n 
mistaking Hammersley v De Biel for a case on contract. 
London Street Tramways v LGC (1898 )AC 37.5 . I n particular the judgement of 
Lord Halsbury i s depressing. 
3 As to the English a t t i t u d e generally see Jaffe (ante), 
i; (1868) LEIIII QBD 272. See also Hickman v Haynes(l875)LR 8CP598. 
(1950) 1 A l l iB R U20. 
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Two cases involving companies. Re Bahia & San Francisco Railway Co^ and Hart v 
7 
Fronting and Bolivia South American Gold Mning Co merely estop a company, having 
accepted a person as a shareholder, from denying his status as such; i n other words the 
defendant i s prevented from denying a representation of f a c t upon which p l a i n t i f f has 
g 
r e l i e d . Knights v Wiffen i s harder to f i t i n t o t h i s category. A corn merchant sells a 
quantity of barley to one Maris, who resells a part to the p l a i n t i f f before himself 
taking delivery - before i n f a c t the defendant com merchant separates the consignment 
from his stock. The defendant promises to put the goods on the l i n e to p l a i n t i f f on 
receipt from him of a forwarding note. After receiving payment from p l a i n t i f f , but 
before paying the defendant. Maris goes bankrupt, and the defendant refuses to deliver • 
to the p l a i n t i f f . P l a i n t i f f ' s action i n trover i s successful. Prima facie the defendant's 
promise to deliver i s a representation of intention which the p l a i n t i f f r e l i e d on by 
taking no steps to secure immediate delivery, but the doctrinal d i f f i c u l t y i s overcome 
t y seeing the representation as one of f a c t ; namely that the defendant has separated 
the consignment from the bulk and holds i t to the p l a i n t i f f ' s order. On the facts t h i s 
ljudgement i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y satisfactory, but i t indicates quite clearly that 
Blackburn, J f e l t obliged either to hold the representation out of f a c t , or f i n d f o r 
the defendant. 
^!his common law position was adopted t y Lord Selborne, LL i n the Citizens' Bank of 
]k)uisiana/ and the New Orleans Canal & Banking Co v F i r s t National Bank of New Orleans? 'The found tion of that doctrine (of equitable estoppel) which is... ot l i k e l y to be 
cleparted from by t h i s court i s t h i s , that i f a man dealing with another for value makes 
• itatements to him as to existing facts.. .without.. .which the party.. .would not enter 
j.nto the contract.. .he.. .shall be compelled to make them good. But those must be 
statements as to existing facts.' The facts were that the New Orleans bank, having 
I'ema.tted funds to a Liverpool bank, drew b i l l s on the Liverpool bank and sold them to 
I'ootnotes; 
(1868) m i l QBD 581;. 
(1870) LR>iSxch 111. 
(1870) L R V QB660. 
(1873). L R VI HL352. 
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the Louisiana bank. I n order to encourage the apparently reluctant Louisiana bank, 
reference was made to the funds held i n Liverpool, and a promise was made specif i c a l l y 
to appropriate a part of these funds to the b i l l s sold. This was not done. Subsequently 
the New Orleans bank went bankrupt, a receiver was appointed, and i t was to him alone 
that the Liverpool bank would agree to pay the funds which i t held. The Louisiana bank 
asserted unsuccessfully that there had been an equitable assignment of that portion of 
the funds equal to the value of the b i l l s : or, i f not the receiver, as successor to the 
New Orleans bank was estopped from denying the specific appropriation necessary to 
create an equitable assignment. 
A d i f f e r e n t finding would have been quite incor^jatible with commercial understanding 
and convenience'!'^ To have conferred p r i o r i t y upon the assignee i n these circumstances 
would have altered the nature of negotiable instruments. Squally, to have enabled the 
assignor to achieve p r i o r i t y f o r the assignee through a promise 'followed by no action -
to bind other creditors by such a promise - would i n i t s e l f be inequitable. I n these 
circumstances the decision i n Hammersley v De Biel (ante) was not urged with any force 
^by counsel f o r the appellant, nor was i t even referred to by Lord Selborne, who 
participated, four years l a t e r , i n Hughes v Ifetropolitan Ry^ "*" a decision much more i n 
Line with Hammersley v De EiLel. and contrary i n s p i r i t to the Citizens' Bank of Louisiana. 
In Hughes, wherein Denning, J found authoriiy f o r his 'new equity', the term equitable 
3stoppel was not used, nor were there cited the cases to which I have referred. Instead, 
[.ord Gaims r e l i e d on an inscrutable ' f i r s t principle of equity.' Far, however, from 
suggesting that t h i s i s a new equity, or that Jorden v Money and The Citizens' Bank of 
ouisiana have so r e s t r i c t e d the old one as to render i t inefficacious, the law as to 
: representations may be seen to have been quite . f l u i d . The foundation i n 1865 of the 
jouncil incorporated i n I87O as the Incorporated Coiancil of Law Reporting for England 
and Wales, together with the amalgamation of the courts of co-ordinate j u r i s d i c t i o n i n . 
;rootnotes: 
i o Not that the House i s incapable of upsetting commercial understanding - or that of 
lawyers.cf Derry v Pe9k(l889)1U Ap Gas 337 with Storey on Equity Jurisprudence 
(1866) 751 et seq. 
2[l 1877 2 Ap Gas h39. 
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the Supreme Court of Judicature were followed t y a congealing of j u d i c i a l i n i t i a t i v e , 
the climax of which was the Tramways (ante) dictum of I898. I t may have been a conscious 
or unconscious wish on the part of the House to preserve a fragment of the wider equity 
by asserting i t s q u a l i t a t i v e pecxxliarity i n Hughes. Their Lordships may have noticed 
the clash between the p r i n c i p l e i n Hammersley v De Biel and that of The Citizens' Bank 
of Louisiana and t h e i r respective predecessors. At any rate with hindsight we may observe 
th a t there was a clash, and that i n an era i n which the need for • certainty was 
12 ' 
constantly expressed, a f l e x i b l e equitable doctrine was unlikely to survive i n t a c t 
13 
when equity i t s e l f had f o r some years evinced a concern for certainty. I t .is an 
ind i c a t i o n of the paramount u t i l i t y of the equity that i t survived sp'far as i t 
affected r e a l property and waivers of existing contracts. I n t h i s emaciated form we may 
see i t presently i n operation and - though t h i s does not exist s u f f i c i e n t to support a 
wider principle of equity - for this-reason i t i s convenient to treat Hughes v 
^fetropolitan ^y as a Watershed. 
111:2 
r 
The p l a i n t i f f i n Hughes v Metropolitan I ^ " * ^ served on the defendant compaiy a notice 
^0 repair, ,In reply the defendant referred to the shortness of the remaining term and 
queried, the usefulness of carrying out the repairs, suggesting instead, terms f o r 
surrender. The landlord's s o l i c i t o r indicated that althpugh the terms were extravagant, 
more r e a l i s t i c ones might be acceptable; he reiterated the need for repair. No further 
csommunications were exchanged, and the company carried out the repairs, but outside 
•ihe six months allowed from the date of the o r i g i n a l notice'!^ The question that arose, 
"iherefore, was whether the landlord could f o r f e i t the lease. He had clearly not 
]i'ootnotes: 2 See Abel-Smith & Stevens: Lawyers & the Courts ppl23 et seq. 
X3 See Lord Eldon i n Sheddon v Goodrich, 8 7esl4.8l at pU87. ' I t i s better that the law 
should be certain than that every judge should speculate upon improvements.' 
i l i Moral reprehensibility is not necessary. James L J's finding that the les s o r ' l u l l e d 
the defendants to sleep, i n t e n t i o n a l l y l u l l e d them to sleep u n t i l i t was too late 
f o r them to do the repairs' was disapproved. See Wilmott v Barber LRl5 Gh 96 at 
PI05 per Fry, J. 
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represented a f a c t - namely that the time allowed for repair was extended - for that 
would be straining ttie circumstances to f i t a conception'!'^ ^ his conduct, however, he 
may have represented an i n t e n t i o n not to enforce the notice u n t i l a reasonable time 
a f t e r the breakdown of negotiations. This was Lord Cairns' ' f i r s t p r i n c i p l e , ' one 'upon 
which a l l courts of equity proceed, that i f parties who have entered i n t o definite and 
d i s t i n c t terms involving certain l e g a l results - certain penalties or legal forfeiture"^-
afterwards hy t h e i r own act or with t h e i r own consent enter upon a course of negotiations 
which has the e f f e c t of leading one of the parties to suppose that s t r i c t legal rights 
under the contract w i l l not be enforced, or w i l l be kept i n suspense, or held i n 
abeyance, the person who might otherwise have enforced those rights w i l l not be allowed 
to enforce them where i t would be inequitable having regard to the dealings which.have 
17 
taken place between the parties."' 
The Chancellor having f i r s t entered the le g a l arena as one who comes between the subject 
jand his s t r i c t r i g h t s i n law where to allow him those rights would be against conscience, 
i t i s scarcely surprising to see Lord Gaims, L C doing j u s t ttiisj what i s surprising, 
however, i n the l i g h t of conventional wisdom, i s that a statement of an intention should 
be w i t h i n the purview of conscience i n a 19th centuiy court of equity. This writer's 
Footnotes: 
l5 On^ . the lawyer's tendency to do t h i s , see Jiiering on the Conceptualist's Heaven 
I discussed; Stone: Legal System p226; translated ( i n part) i n 11 Pol Sc Q 307. 
This does not seem to be an unduly nice point: the period i s delimited by the 
r i g h t to enforce. I f the appellant has represented that the period i s i n fact 
extended, he i s indicating an inte n t i o n not to enforce t h i s r i g h t , at least, for 
a time - such time as may be reasonable i n the circumstances. 
See Carr v LMWR (l875) LR10GP317. 
Espley V Wilkes LRVII Exch 298 (estoppel t y deed). 
Hart V Frontino and Bolivia South American Gold Mining Co I£LY Exch 111. 
lj7 (1877) 2 App Gas i;39 at pliU8. 
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hypothesis seema to be supported, on t h i s view of the case. No particular e f f o r t was 
made to disguise the support given to the statement of intention, nor was any apology 
offered f o r not following Jorden v Money, or the l i n e of common law cases'!"^  Instead the 
decision i s consist>ent with there being i n existence an equitable principle such as we 
have urged. 
Having discussed the case i t i s perhaps opportune to suggest that the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
encountered l a t e r as to the tiemporary or permanent nature of the equity whose ori g i n 
18 
Denning, J ascribed to Hughes are hard to understand. I t may be that they are 
engendered by a misconception of the nature of the equity. Common lawyers, whose 
subject i s rooted h i s t o r i c a l l y i n iihe immutabilities of real property, are given to 
casting one eye upon e t e r n i t y , and a principle whose longevity i s governed according 
to common sense, equity and fairness may be indigestible. 
The same year, at Durham Assizes, Stephen, J dealt shortly with an attempt to gain a 
19 
| l i f e i n t e r e s t t y means of an estoppel. Here a housekeeper was induced to remain i n 
service and to forbear to sue for past wages owed to her l y the deceased i n return for 
||iis promise to confer on her a l i f e i n t e r e s t i n his form after his death. His intention 
was implementied to the point of his making an improperly executed w i l l , but 'to say 
ihat Alderson's heir-at-law i s estopped by Alderson's conduct from denying the v a l i d i t y 
(bf the i r r e g u l a r l y attested w i l l would be to repeal the Statute of Wi l l s . . . .' Instead 
Stephen, J was content to invoke the better-established doctrine of part-performance 
20-21 
and to use his own tierminology, 'repeal' the Statute of Frauds, finding i n the 
housekeeper's forbearance s u f f i c i e n t to serve as consideration f o r a contract. He 
clsapproved Lord St Leonards' dissenting judgement i n Jorden v Money, and, as we have 
jiuggested, mistakes Hammersley v De Biel f o r a case of contract, 
i'ootnotes: 
1,8 See the Tool Metal case and the authors cited i n r e l a t i o n to i t (post). 
19 Alderson v Madison (I88O) 5 £x D 293. 
2|0 'Decorous disregard' might be more appropriate. See Spencer v Hammerde (1922) 
2AG 507 at •ip5l9, c i t e d Megarry & Wade 2nd Ed p555. 
2tl cf 11:1 n 2A. Again, resistance to estoppel to prevent 'repeal' of the w r i t i n g 
requirements. 
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22 I n the House of Lords Lord Selbome predictably adopts the same stance i n r e l a t i o n 
to estoppel as he did i n F i r s t National Bank (ante) but disagrees with Stephen J as to 
the existence of part performance s u f f i c i e n t to prevent the Statute of Frauds from 
23 
applying. The decision i s inconsistent with that i n Hughes, which was followed i n 1888 
i n the Court of Appeal?^ We have noted the inconvenience accoii?)lished by the decision 
2 5 
i n Foakes v Beer as w e l l as the weaknesses which undermine i t . Insofar as i t i s 
26 
based on Pinnel's Case i t i s worth repeating that the inchoate condition of the law 
of contract i n the early 17th century provides l i t t l e i n the way of foundation. Further, 
27 
the r e l i a b i l i t y of Coke's Reports has recently been questionned, and the 'horse, hawk 
28 29 or robe' f i c t i o n over-ruled. I t seems unsatisfactory to argue, as T r i e t e l does, that 
the Hughes equity i s merely suspensory, f o r Lord Caims nowhere suggests that his 
f i r s t p r i nciple i s temporary of necessity^*^ and Lord Selbome makes no attiempt to 
distinguish Hughes on t h i s or any other ground. Foakes v Beer, i n short, t e s t i f i e s to 
there being two l i n e s of authority: the Hughes pri n c i p l e , despite Lord Chancellor 
Selborne's opposition to i t , looks back to" Hammersley v De Biel and i t s ancestors i n 
equity, w h i l s t Foakes v Beer looks to Pinnel's Case and Jorden v Money. As I have 
Footnotes: 
(22 1883 8 App Gas 467 
I Over-ruling Sevart, V C i n Loffus v Moore (I863) 3Cliff592 and disapproving 
I Hammersley, upon which Stuart, V C r e l i e d . 
23 The decision seems almost unnecessarily harsh, f o r i n the circumstances the w i l l 
would surely have suffered as a w r i t t e n memorandum: Re Holland(1902) 2ch360 at p383-
The forbearance could have amounted to consideration had the court wished. As to 
specific r e f e r a b i l i t y , see M & W 2nd Ed p559 & Note 7i;. 
kk Birmingham & D i s t r i c t Land Co v LNWR(1888)U0 Ch D 268. 
5^ (188U)9 App Gas 605. 
16 (1602)5 Co Rep 1170. 
27 See Baker: New Light on Slade's Case'. 1971 CLJ51. Also comment i n Lloyd: 
Jurisprudence 3rd Ed p70i| n8. 
28 D & G Builders v Rees(1966)2QB 617. 
29 Contract 3rd Sd pl05. 
30 See the remarks of Lord Denning M R i n W J Alan v El Nasr (post)(1972 )2 A l l E R 127. 
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suggested that the l a t t e r i s , i n s p i r i t , since i t i s by no means a clear decision, more 
consistent with common law principles than with equity, there i s l i t t l e significance 
i n i t s having arisen on appeal from the Court of Appeal i n Chancery. 
Accepting that a smaller sum may not discharge an obligation to repay a larger sum l e n t , 
which seems a not unreasonable interpretation of Foakes v Beer, we f i n d the equitable 
enforcement of promises of i n t e n t i o n sheltering i n hostile circumstances behind prior 
31 3? negotiations. I n Birmingham & D i s t r i c t Land Co v London and North Eastern Railway Go 
the appellant occupied land under three separate leases which contenqjlated that building 
would commence before the expiration of a certain tierm. I t became known that the 
respondent company was seeking statutory powers to purchase land, possibly some part 
of that occupied t y tihe appellant. To continue wi t i i the intention to bu i l d was 
inappropriate since even were the respondents to purchase other land, the proximity of 
a railway would a l t e r the class of house i n demand. At the suggestion of the landlord's 
agent, therefore, and i n conformity with t h e i r own best interests, the appellants 
suspended t h e i r operations.The respondents duly purchased some of the landlord's 
Droperty, subject to the appellants' building lease, and the question of compensation 
arose. I t was the contention of the appellants that calculations should be on the basis 
of subsisting building agreement, whilst the respondents r e l i e d on the expiration of 
•ihe term w i t h i n which building should heave taken place. The appellants claimed, on the 
authority of Hughes v Metropolitan Ry (ante), that the landlord had t y his conduct i n 
jidvising the suspension of building promised not to i n s i s t on his s t r i c t legal rights 
j i t the end of the term. As his successor, and with notice of the leases and the 
agreement to suspend b u i l d i n g , LNWR were t h e r e f o r e bound by the promise: compensation 
T,ias to be assessed as i f the lease subsisted. Persons with 'contractual rights against 
cithers (who) induce t y t h e i r conduct those others...to believe that such rights w i l l 
not be enforced or w i l l be kept i n suspense or abeyance for some particular time.. . w i l l 
r.ot be allowed by a court of equity to enforce the r i g h t s u n t i l such time has elapsed 
Bootnotest 
3p. 1877 2 App Cas i;39 at plii;7 per Lord Cairns, L C. 
32 1888 ho Ch D 268. 
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without at a l l events placing the parties i n the same position as they were i n before.'-^-^ 
Whilst denying that Hughes applies only to cases of f o r f e i t u r e , Bowen, L J attempted 
to t i e i t to situations involving waiver of pre-existing contractual rights. He did 
not i n the Birmingham case refer to estoppel, but was three years l a t e r , i n Low v 
Bouverie"^^ to declare that 'estoppel i s only a rule of evidence. l o u cannot found an 
action upon an estoppel.. . i t i s only important as being a step i n the progress towards 
r e l i e f on the hypothesis that the defendant i s estopped from denying something he has 
said.' Clearly he i s defining something d i f f e r e n t from the Hughes pri n c i p l e , since he 
makes no attempt to r e s t r i c t estoppel to contractual situations, as he was at pains to 
do i n the e a r l i e r case^^ Might the Hughes-Birmingham phenomenon, therefore, not.support 
a cause of action? 
I t i s helpful to see Plimmer v Mayor etc of Wellington i n the l i g h t of Hughes and 
Birmingham, bearing i n mind p a r t i c u l a r l y the role which equity assumed i n those cases, 
of preventing the exercise of legal r i g h t s . This recalls the negative method by which 
the doctrine of the t r u s t came to be recognised. John Plimmer had i n l8i4.8 moored a hulk 
on the foreshore at Wellington, and with the Crown's consent used i t as a wharf and 
store. At the Provincial Government's suggestion i n 18^6 he b u i l t an extension and more 
buildings, to accommodate imomigrants for whose use of the f a c i l i t y the Government paid 
Plimmer. During a reconstruction of the harbour he retained a temporary access from his 
wharf, to the shore by means of a gangplank, and i t was not u n t i l I878 that the 
Provincial Government indicated by a l e t t e r from the Secretary of Customs that the 
wharf was without the 'sanction or authority of the Government.• ' I f t h i s , ' says the 
j j u d i c i a l committee's decision, 'was meant to apply to the whole wharf i t i s at variance 
37 
•with the whole preceding history of the case.' 
Footnotess 33 1888 kO Ch D 268 at p 287 per Bowen, L J. 
3U 1891 3 Ch 82 at pl05. 
3^ Though without the concurrence of Lindley L J i n Birmingham. 
36 1881; 9 App Gas 699. An appeal to the Privy Council from a decision of the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal on a case stated. 
^7 At p707. 
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Subsequently the land was vested i n the Corporation of Wellington by Statute, and i n 
due course ejectment proceedings were brought by the Corporation against the occupiers. 
The Public Works Act of 1872 set up a Compensation Court, and provided for the payment 
of compensation to 'every person who immediately before the date of the... (Vesting Act) 
had any estate or in t e r e s t in...the lands vested i n the Corporation.' I t i s worth noting 
the proviso to section of the Public Works Act that 'in ascertaining.. .the t i t l e of 
any claimant to compensation the Compensation Court shall not be bound to regard s t r i c t ' 
le g a l r i g h t s only but...any claim which the Compensation Court may consider reasonable 
and j u s t having regard to a l l the circumstances,' for i t was s u f f i c i e n t to enable the 
Committee to take a wide view of the expression 'interest i n land.' 
The Committee noted the policy of the Provincial Government before 186?, which was not 
to b u i l d i t s own landing stages for immigrants but to use those already i n existence 
i n private hands - a policy responsible f o r the Government's encouragement to John 
Plimmer to extend his wharf i n 1856. I t was t h i s encouragement which rendered ' 
inequitable the ejectment of the occupier without compensationt and presumably the 
r e p e t i t i o n of t h i s practice, leading to a number of ambiguous occupations of the foreshore, 
inspired the proviso to section k of the condensation statute. Reading the case i n i t s 
context thus, rather than Ramsden v Dyson (ante) i t was the Statute that l e t i n regard 
Cor fairness and equity which f a c i l i t a t e d Plimmer's claims. An unfortunate lack of 
c l a r i t y i n the f i n a l paragraphosffi^ judgement read by Sir Arthur Hobhouse has perhaps 
ijonfused l a t e r discussion of the case: 'their Lordships have no d i f f i c u l t y i n deciding 
that the equitable r i g h t acquired by John Plimmer i s an interest i n land carrying 
39 
(;ompensation under the Acts...' Speculation on the status of his interest i n land i s 
jDointless since the Statute i s not concerned only with ' s t r i c t legal r i g h t s . ' Leave 
•iiside the vesting Act of 1880 and the only interest i n land i t i s useful to postulate 
:.s that possessed by the Provincial Government. I t would be inequitable to permit the 
J l e t t i n g up of t h i s l e g a l t i t l e to deprive without compensation the occupier who had 
4"ootnotess 
8 At p 708. 
9 At p709s the emphasis i s mine. I n other words, equily requires that he be brought 
w i t h i n section I4.. 
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been encouraged by the owner to spend money on the property^f''^ Ramsden v Dyson would 
require that the Government had knowingly exploited a mistaken b e l i e f by Plimmer that 
he possessed the freehold!^'" and there i s no evidence that i t did so. The Hughes and 
Birmingham cases are more apposite^^ and I , submit that attention to them confers 
Footnotes-: 
i|.0 c f the support l e n t by early equity to the cestui que, use as against the 
That the beneficiary must now have an interest i n land (Settled Land Act 1925) i s 
hardly the point. Suggestions that a beneficiaiy under an equitable estoppel must 
have an i n t e r e s t i n land are misguided f i d e l i t y to analogy. We have here a similar 
but newer equity. 
i ; l Or had represented to him that a specific interest would be conveyed to him -
e g, i n the case, a lease for years to a tenant at w i l l . 
i|.2 Though see the two common law cases cite d i n Plimmer a Winter v Brockwell (1807) 
8 Bast 308, and Liggins v Inge (I83I) 7 Bing 68ai\ I n the former, having assented 
j to his neighbour's construction of a skylight p l a i n t i f f could not, without 
affording compensation to the defendant, require him to remove i t , even though i t 
prevented the p l a i n t i f f from receiving fresh a i r through his own window. I n the 
l a t t e r the defendants lowered a r i v e r bank by ten feet and b u i l t a weir, depriving 
p l a i n t i f f ' s father of some of the flow to his corn m i l l , but with his consent. 
Ser,jEaait Merewethaiii argues (at p687) ' I f the grantee be led into expense by the 
licence, his remedy i s i n equity and not at law,' but Tindal, C J considered not. 
'...the operation e f f e c t of the licence after i t has been completely executed by 
the defendants, i s s u f f i c i e n t without holding i t to convey any interest i n the 
water to relieve them from the burden of restoring to i t s former state what has 
been done under the licence, although i t has been countermanded (p691). ' 
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greater coherence than more recent confusions!^'"^ 
Having thus considered the 'watershed' cases and suggested that what we observe i n 
action i s equity acting t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n r e s t r a i n t of l e g a l r i g h t s , and having indicated 
that motivating t h i s r e s t r a i n t i s the need to redress a balance destroyed t y a 
representation by the promissor. We should also note the nice nature of the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between f a c t and opinion. The cases which we have already explored serve to i l l u s t r a t e 
the casuistiy required to conceptualise fact and intention and place them i n separate 
compartmentss these cases do not atteinpt to distinguish on r a t i o n a l , but on h i s t o r i c a l 
grounds. I t i s not suggested, for example, i n Jorden v Money, that efficacy on the one 
hand, or j u s t i c e on the other, dictate the distinctions merely, i t i s said, authority 
does so7 
Between fact and opinion, I submit, a greater gap exists, than between fact and 
i n t e n t i o n ^ That a man intends to bring about a state of a f f a i r s i s a fact, though i t 
would benefit a p l a i n t i f f l i t t l e to prove merely the fact that an intention existed. 
Similarly, that a man has an opinion that a state of a f f a i r s exists, however unreasonable 
Footnotes: 
14.3 See Binions v Svans ( l a t e r ) . Mrs Evans should be able to either j o i n the vendor-
licensor by means of a third-party procedure, so as to make assertion of legal 
t i t l e to eject her a breach of contract: or raise an equity i n her own favour, to 
prevent the Binions' le g a l r i g h t s ever being used unconscionably at her expense. 
Had they not bought with knowledge of her occupation, the position i s similar to 
that of a purchaser of registered land subject to a short lease. However, the 
point i s that Mrs Evans does not need an interest i n land. And see Cerbin (supra) 
ii6LQR12. See also Crane: Estoppel'Interests i n Land 3 I Conv (NS)332 ( l a t e r ) . 
I+2A Logically and with equal lack of pragmatism one could argue that lawyers are 
prepared to countenance an estoppel where a statement about the past has been 
• made, and additionally where a state of a f f a i r s has been denied. S t r i c t l y , 
neither can be a representation of an existing f a c t , 
i l l See Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance (1920) 28 CLR 30^, at p32U (post). 
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his opinion, i s a f a c t . Departing from l i n g u i s t i c analysis, an examination of t h e i r 
effects suggests that reasonable reliance i s more l i k e l y upon a statement of intention 
than upon a statement of opinion. A statement that a man w i l l b u i l d a house, or w i l l 
confer peaceful possession, may well be acted upon, whilst a statement that a man thinks 
that a house exists ought to provoke an interested party to discover for himself 
whether i t does. 
The answer to a potential insurer'rs question 'Are you. temperate?' may have been an 
Ii.3A 
opinion. 'There are facts innumerable,' said Lord Watson, 'which can be ascertained 
only by a t e s t of opinion, but they are none the less facts i n law, whatever they may 
|be i n a metaphysical sense.'^^ Thus the insured was taken to have misrepresented a 
Imaterial f a c t , and the policy was avoided. I n Smith v Land & House Property Corporation^^ 
a property i s described as 'satisfactory' by the vendor, whilst the experience of the 
Ipurchaser who refuses to complete i s that i t i s quite the reverse. ' I t i s material to 
Dbserve that i t i s often f a l l a c i o u s l y assumed that a statement of opinion caimot 
Involve a statement of act...¥here the facts are equally well known.. .what one (party) 
isays to the other i s frequently...an opinion. (This) is...a fact about the condition 
i f a man's mind.. .but.. . i t i s of no consequence what the opinion i s . But i f the facts 
are not equally w e l l known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by one who knows 
best involves...a statement of material f a c t , for he impliedly states that he knows of 
facts which j u s t i f y his o p i n i o n ^ I n other-words, what i s important i s the effect which 
i.he statement has on the other party, insofar, presumably, as t h i s i s i n the circumstances 
u s t i f i e d . 
footnotes: 43A Though Lord Blackburn thought not. Bearing i n mind the evidence that the insured 
drank rather more l i q u o r than his fellow town councilors he was no doubt j u s t i f i e d 
''"^'irl-^avoiding 'metaphysics.' 
li5 Thomson v Meems 1881; 9 Ap Cas 67I: a Scottish Appeal. 
I|6 1881; 28 Ch D 7. 
147 See also per Bowen, L J i n Edgington v Fitzmaurice 29 Ch D h^9 at pl;83: 'There 
must be a mis-statement of an existing fact, but the state of a man's mind i s as 
much a f a c t as the state of his digestion.' 
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fencer-Bower & Turner, i n discussing the supposed fact-intention disparity, admits 
that 'there are very few assertions of intention which ingenious casuistry cannot 
plausibly t r e a t as involving promises^ and very few promises from which a representation 
of existing capacity and readiness to perform an engagement cannot with eqiaal p l a u s i b i l i t y 
be i n f e r r e d . ' The energy spent i n exposing such ingenuity may be c r i t i c i s e d when the 
result''has been i n margr cases to leave Just expectations disappointed.' 
111:3 
I t i s c l e a r l y i n the interests of any society that f a i r dealing should receive 
encouragement, and as the common run of transactions becomes more complex, so the 
conception of f a i r dealing must expand. I f barter and immediate exchange for cash are 
the p r i n c i p a l forms of trading then society's wellbeing requires that .both goods and 
currency be what they appear to be, at the p e r i l of the person presenting them. When 
exchanges of promises and the buying of future goods become usual, and when an 
increasingly specialised society necessitates reliance on data provided by experts, 
bhen i t becoiTBs increasingly v i t a l to encourage r e l i a b i l i t y by compensating those who 
suffer from the lack of i t . These are not the 'fine-spun speculations of visionary 
U9 
• Jieorists,' but the basis upon which decisions must be founded i f the law is to 
i i a i n t a i n c r e d i b i l i t y , ' . . . i t may be that judges are no better able to descem what i s 
J'or the public good than other experienced and enlightened members of the community, 
t u t that i s no reason for t h e i r refusing to entertain the question and declining to 
cecide upon i t . ' ^ " ^ Exari)les p r o l i f e r a t e , of j u d i c i a l value-decisions, articulated and 
c therwise^"'' 
l i e have already suggested that the law's laggard response to developing commercial 
52 
n.orality has contributed to the decline i n l i t i g a t i o n i n the coxxrts -upon the subject, 
footnotes 148 Estoppel by Representation 2nd Ed para 31. 
il9 per Lord Halisbury i n Janson v Driefontein Consolidated Mines(l902)AC h^h at pl;91. 
50 Per Pollock, C B i n Egerton v Earl Brownlow (1853 )1HL Cas 123 at pl5l. 
5L For a recent example see the comments of Blom-Cooper & Drewry on Morgan v Tate 
& Lyle(l955)AC21 i n Final Appeal (1972) p325. 
5^ See C i v i l J u d i c i a l S t a t i s t i c s 1971 Table A Grand i;982 cited Zander: Cases & 
Materials on the English Legal System p5. 
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There are those social demands upon the system which, when thwarted d i r e c t l y , reappear 
i n d i r e c t l y when l e g i s l a t i o n does not come to the rescue.'^ Over-subtlety leads to 
entanglement w i t h doctrine and a respectable motive i s discredited t y use of the maxim 
about 'hard cases.'. 
We have noted that equitable regard, f o r promises has to some extent taken refuge behind 
the waiver s i t u a t i o n ; but we have also submitted that the essence of the equity 
remains. An hypothesis viewing law as an adjustment of interests^^ might obviate for 
certain l i m i t e d purposes the need for a d i s t i n c t i o n between public and private law: 
s i m i l a r l y an investigation i n t o the recognition of promises might question f o r certain 
purposes the claim that the law of real property i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from other 
branches of law i n modem times. Why should the policy of the 1925 property l e g i s l a t i o n , 
for example, enjoy paramountcy over the.necessity f o r protecting a deserted spouse?.-^ 5 
The history of the common law i s a history of the law of property - primarily of real 
Footnotes: 
P3 AS i t did following Perry v Peek (1889) ll; App Cas 337: 'this unfortunate decision 
(Palmer's Company Law 21st Ed plO) was modified t y the Director's l i a b i l i t y Act 
1890'. And Rookes v Barnard(l961i)AC 1129. 
See Stone: Social Dimensions of Law and Justice pl6U et seq; Human Law & Human 
Justice pl75« Some of the State's claims may seem less urgent i f viewed as the 
claims of individuals to legal recognition of interests. This i s not to enter 
the debate between sociologists and psychologists as to whether society i s 
something q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from the aggregate of those who compose i t , on 
which -I-: confess t o t a l ignorance. 
As i n IjPB V Ainsworth(l965)AC 1172. On the question of social necessity and the 
property l e g i s l a t i o n see Goodman: Adverse Possession ^3 MLR 281, p a r t i c u l a r l y p28l-2 
though clear l y he i s taking i n t o account the need for certainty. How does the 
positi o n of a purchaser d i f f e r , however, i f he unknowingly buys land l o s t through 
adverse possession, from i f he buys land subject to an equity? 
The answer may be that multiplying the hazards i s undesirable, but no I would 
argue social necessity. 
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property - with a n c i l l a r y concernsl^ but t h i s merely r e f l e c t s the p o l i t i c a l power of 
property owners. Today we might reverse our p r i o r i t i e s , or change them to suit our 
convenience. Not only i s change necessary, but an extension of j u r i s d i c t i o n , to which 
57 
j u d i c i a l resistance i s considerable. 
With these suggestions we can examine the cases after Plinmier as far as -High Trees 
A number of cases r e s t r i c t the courts' j u r i s d i c t i o n over promises. To Deny v Peek I 
have adverted^"*" the result here was so bla t a n t l y unfortunate at a time when accumulations 
of c a p i t a l by means of public subscriptions to separate legal persons were becoming 
v i t a l to the conduct of commerce that l e g i s l a t i o n was soon procured to avoid the 
H O 
decision's e f f e c t upon representations by companies. Ijiowe v Bouverie belongs to the 
protracted hlsttry of l i a b i l i t y f o r negligent mis-statement. A representation was made 
t y the trustee of a fund to a po t e n t i a l creditor concerning incumbrances on the 
interest i n the fund held ty the potential debtor. Relying on the representation the 
p l a i n t i f f l e n t Admiral Bouvenie a sum of money on the security of the interest, afterward 
iiscovering that there were incumbrances on the interest prior to his own, of which the 
defendant trustee had 'forgotten' at the time of the representation. The merits of the 
judgement are hard to f i n d . Estoppel was not applicable, i t was held, because the 
defendant had not promised that there were no incumbrances; he had instead forgotten 
ihose which defeated the p l a i n t i f f . Bowen, L J's d e f i n i t i o n encompasses common law 
estoppel upon which 'you cannot found an action... ( i t ) i s only a rule of evidence... 
important as being one step towards r e l i e f on the hypothesis that the defendant i s 
footnotes: ^6 See Milsom: H i s t o r i c a l Foundations p88 '...the economic basis of society was 
agrarian.' I t may be an exaggeration, however, to say that 'today we think of the 
ownership of...a great a g r i c u l t u r a l estate as being something l i k e the ownership 
of a motor car.' 
^7 On t h i s see: Donoghue v Stevenson( 1932)AC5t3(dissenting Judgements) 
Grant v Australian K n i t t i n g Mills(1936)AC85 at pl07 per Lord Wright. 
Also Jones v Padavatbon(1969)1 WLR 328 
cf. Jfe£gittv.Merritt(l970) 2 A l l E R 76O. 
The danger perceived i s that of overburdening the legal system. 
50 1891 3 Ch 82. 
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^ 59 
estopped from denying the t r u t h of something he has said.' Kay, L J, considering 
Piggott V Stratton (ante) which was cit e d f o r the p l a i n t i f f declared i t to be 'a clear 
case of estoppel.' :j^r f a i l to see how i t can be w i t h i n Bowen, L J's statement, and, 
bearing i n mind Bowen's position i n the Birmingham case^^ i t i s clear that i n t h i s 
l a t e r statement his mind was addressed to the common law doctrine of estoppel on the 
one hand, and Derry v Peek on the other, 
[ i n neither Chadwick v Manning^'fnor Lala Beni Ram & Another v Kundan L a l l et a l ^ ^ were 
the Hughes cases c i t e d or discussed. A representation of intention was held to place 
the defendant under no l i a b i l i t y i n the f i r s t case. I n the second, f i v e tenants took a 
lease from a banker of a piece of land for the purpose of operating a saltpetre factory 
thereon.- The appellants acquired the land from the bankers, thus becoming the landlords, 
and f a i r l y soon a f t e r t h i s the saltpetre manufacture was discontinued, several 
structures including a temple being b u i l t on the land instead. More than t h i r t y years 
i f t e r acquiring the land the appellant lessors served a notice to q u i t and to remove 
•jhe buildings from the land. The tenants appealed from an unfavourable decision by the 
Munsiff of Hathras, to the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh, who found i n t h e i r favour.'...the 
evidence,' he said, 'shews i n the most unmistakeable manner that not only did the 
o r i g i n a l lessees (lessor, presumably) not object to the enclosing of these buildings 
v'hen they were being erected, and stood by, but that by continuing to receive the rents 
j'rom the lessees even a f t e r the erection of the buildings, and even though the 
saltpetre factory f o r which the land was l e t had ceased to exist he sanctioned the 
lessees' doing so. His successors are therefore equitably estopped from now suing for 
5"ootnotess 5 9 At pl05. 
60 See his remarks i n Bentsen v Taylor (1893 )2 QB 283: 'Did the defendants by t h e i r 
acts or conduct lead the p l a i n t i f f reasonably to support that they did not intend 
to t r e a t the contract f o r the future as at an end on account of his f a i l u r e to 
perform the condition precedent' (the enphasis being mine )• 
61 1896 AC 231. See also perhaps, Cooke v Ingram (1893) 68LT 67I. 
6i2 LR X i v i lA 58 (1899). 
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the lessees' ejectment.' I n support of his contention, the subordinate Judge, upheld: 
i n the High Court at Allahabad, cit e d Gopi v Basheshwar^^ Interestingly the judges i n 
India connect equitable estoppel, which resembles what we have seen of equitable 
promise-enforcement i n the Hammersley v De Biel cases, with a Dilwyn v Llewellyn-
Ramsden v Dyson s i t u a t i o n . The Judicial Committee does not share t h i s view. The 
judgement read by Lord Watson regrets the reliance i n India upon 'the loose and inadequate 
statement of the mile of equity reported i n Gopi v Basheshwar.' 
Insofar, however, as the Committee r e l i e s upon Ram^den v Dyson, i t seems misled. An 
equitable remedy appears i n the Committee's view r e s t r i c t e d to situations i n which the 
owner refrains from preventing another who i s expending money on the owner's land 
•under the mistaken b e l i e f that the land i s his own property.' The House was prepared 
I i n Ramsden to enforce a representation of intention by the landlord to grant a lease 
to a tenant at w i l l , i f the tenant had expended money i n reliance upon the representation. 
|0n the facts, however, i t was decided that no such representation had been made. Neither 
Ihere, nor i n the l a t e r . Privy Council, case of Plimmer v If e l l i n g t o n , which was not 
considered by the Committee i n the instant case, could the party seeking the r e l i e f 
'lave reasonably believed that he was the owner. 
Further, ' i f such representations had been made' ( i n Ramsden) ' . . . I do not f i n d that 
1 
the noble and learned Lord indicated any opinion that...they would not have been 
i 
s u f f i c i e n t to show the terms of a contract which might be enforced i n a court of equity.' 
The said learned Lord may have had the good reason fo r not so indicating that contract 
was not i n contemplation at the time by the court or the parties. As with Hammerslgy V 
De Bi e l , so wi t h Ramsden v E^rson, the decision could have been reached upon contractual 
p r i n c i p l e s ' ^ but was not: yet the temptation remains, to attempt to squeeze an 
ijnfamiliar remedy int o a f a m i l i a r form^' notwithstanding that t h i s exercise u n f i t s i t 
Footnotes: 
63 Cited at p60. 
.-6k WN (1885) 100. 
65° See the d e f i n i t i o n of consideration i n Currie v Misa Q-876 )LR Exch l53 
cf Gore v Van der Lann (I967)2QB31. 
6|6 See the phraseology adopted Ijy Malins, V C i n Coles v Pilkington (I87U) LR19 Exch 17U. 
He enforces an in t e n t i o n to make a g i f t but adopts contractual terminology. 
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f o r i t s purpose. 
I n G ¥hitechurch Ltd v Cavanagh, Cavanagh supplies goods to Innox, a f i r m substantially 
controlled by Raymond, who processes them and supplies them to the appellant company. 
Innox i s indebted to both, but only the appellant has security. Cavanagh, fearing that 
Raymond's schemes to repay are i n f a c t t r i c k s to avoid or postpone repqyment, obtains 
from the French courts ( i n whose j u r i s d i c t i o n both Innox and a branch of iKhitechurch 
Ltd are) an 'opposition' which i n effe c t 'lays an embargo' on the business of Innox 
u n t i l l i f t e d . 
Such an imposition on Whitechurch's supplier commends i t s e l f to neither Innox nor 
•Hhitechurch. Raymond's proposal i s to provide Cavanagh with security by transferring 
to hiin shares which Raymond holds i n Whitechurch Ltd. Whitechurch Ltd's secretary, one 
|Wells, described as Raymond's 'instrument' c e r t i f i e d two transfers which were executed 
by Raymond. There was l a t e r a meeting between Cavanagh and George Whitechurch, the 
managing director of the appellant company, at which the l a t t e r examined the c e r t i f i e d 
transfers and said '...these transfers are i n order. The secretary has, I see, c e r t i f i e d 
68 
bhem.» Gavanagh l i f t e d his 'opposition,• having, as he thought, obtained his security. 
Unfortunately, Raymond had acted fraudulently i n executing, and Wells i n c e r t i f y i n g , 
•the transfers. There were no shares. Nonetheless Cavanagh claimed the r i g h t to be placed 
on the company's Register of Shareholders on the basis either of the representation 
made by Wells on behalf of the company, or that of Whitechurch himself. 
JLS to the f i r s t , the court held that a transfer c e r t i f i c a t e i s merely a mechanism for 
i share-dealing, and that the company gives the secretary authority only to acknowledge 
receipt, and not to promise to register the transferee. A secretary had been described 
as a 'humble' servant of a compaiiy whom 'no person can assume has any authority to 
]'epresent anything at a l l , ' and whose statements are not 'necessarily to be accepted 
69 
as trustworthy without further inquiry. ' Given t h i s climate, Cavanagh was unlikely to 
Footjiotes: 
d7 1902 AC 117. 
68 At pl29. 
49 Bamett v South London Tramways (I887) 13 QBD 8 l 5 at p8l7 per Lord Esher cited 
Charlesworth's Coii?)any Law 9th Ed p225. P T 0 
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succeed on the secretary's representation. Even the managing Director's representation 
d i d not bind the company, either because he had no authority, or because the representatioi 
' i f i t i s arQTthing...(is)...a promise de future, which cannot be an estoppel.' 
The position as to c e r t i f i c a t i o n of transfers seemed curiously unsatisfactory, and i s 
71 
now contained i n l e g i s l a t i o n Lord Robertson's judgement asserted that whilst the 
managing director had no authority to bind the coii¥)any by his representation, the 
secretary may have had: but that Cavanagh had not acted to his detriment. He had merely 
withdrawn his 'opposition' and t h i s would not have done him any good anyway. After tithdrawing i t and finding himself without shares as security f o r the loan to Raymond, i s position was exactly as i t had been before. 
:t seems almost to be a matter of policy on the part of the courts to f i n d no-one 
72 
responsible f o r actions carried out on behalf of a compar^y, and t h i s may perhaps be 
through a misunderstanding of the e f f e c t of corporate personality. To concentrate on 
bhe contractual r i g h t s of Cavanagh was to ignore the possible inequity which might have 
irisen - and to which Hughes would have provided a solution consistent with the 
qui table t r a d i t i o n .'I have sketched - had Whitechurch Ltd attempted to achieve p r i o r i t y 
cjver Cavanagh as Raymond's creditor before another solution, alternative to the transfer 
f shares, had been reached, so as to give Cavanagh security. 
I n contrast w i t h these cases which deny a l l e f f e c t to representations which cannot be 
anatysed contractually, i s another l i n e , beginning, f o r the purpose of our survey post-
73 ' 
-iJughes, with Tabor v Godfrey i n 1895' Here the p l a i n t i f f and his neighbours each 
occupied a house i n a terrace owned by the landlord. I t was intended by the landlord 
t l a t there should be an unmetalled access road running the length of the terrace and 
j aining the public highway at both ends. P l a i n t i f f ' s lease included a small garden and 
Fpotnotes: 
7 3 See on t h i s , the l a t e r case of Ruben v Great Fingall Consolidated(1906 )AC li39. 
71 See now Coii?)anies Act 19U8 s 79. 
7;? For a s l i g h t l y more j u s t i f i a b l e refusal to estop a company from denying t i t l e see 
Guy vWaterlow (1909) 25TLR515 
7 i (1895) 6U LJQB 2ii5. 
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a r i g h t of way w i t h the other tenants, over the access road. I n fact, his garden was 
so extended as to encroach upon the access road, bisecting i t , since his house was i n 
the middle of the row, 'and, although the lease excludes i t , yet by the way-in which 
the landlord has permitted him to occupy the encroachments ( i t ) must be taken as 
7l 
included i n the demise.' The landlord had by his acquiescence represented that he 
jwould not exercise his l e g a l r i g h t s to eject the tenant and was prevented from suing 
either for an injunction or damages for trespass. Consideration was not provided by the 
tenant so as to bring the case w i t h i n the pale of contract,. and there does not appear 
to be a question of adverse possession, although the period exceeded twelve years, 
75 
since the p l a i n t i f f did not occupy the land solely f o r his own benefit! 
Fenner v HLake concerns a tenant from year to year of a Lady Day holding who wished, 
i n December, to surrender with e f f e c t from midsummer. The surrender was accepted by the 
Landlord, who then, i n reliance upon i t sold the property with possession from mid-
summer. The tenant was estopped from disputing that he did not hold under the new 
agreement. Being o r a l , t h i s agreement contravened the Statute of Frauds. "iWhat did the 
ienant represent? He cannot have asserted the v a l i d i t y of the agreement i n the face of 
S'ootnotess Per Charles, J. . 
'l^ According w i t h the solution proposed by Goodman: Adverse possession of land -
Morality & Motive 33MI<R 281 at p283i to the anomaly that a tenant who encroaches 
on his landlord's land does not acquire the fee simple, except that the consent 
here i s implied and not express. There would be no point i n awarding the tenant 
here so small a p l o t of land i n fee simple; indeed i f one assesses the u t i l i t y 
of adverse possession i n terms of maximising land use, the doctrine would have a 
malign influence and thus a counter-productive application to Tabor v Godfrey. 
cf on adverse possession by the tenant not raising a presumption that i t forms a 
part of the tenancy, Hastings v Saddler(l898)79Kr 355 (tenant of St Mary's Island, 
Northumberland occupying gardens on mainland belonging to the landlord). 
76 1900 IQB 1;26. 
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77 the Statute, f o r a representation of law does not found an estoppel! Nor can he have 
represented as f a c t that the new lease by operation of law replaced the o r i g i n a l one, 
surely, i f t h i s operation of law i s based upon the tenant's being estopped: for what 
then bases the estoppel? The better view, i s that he represented his intention to 
leave i n midsummer, and not to r e l y upon his s t r i c t l e g a l rights under the o r i g i n a l 
lease. I n other wards the court i s giving ef f e c t to the equity. 
I n May V B e l l e v i l l e an equity i s enforced against a purchaser. Two properties, one 
tenanted, one owned by a vendor who sel l s one and retains the tenanted one. He sells 
subject to r i g h t s of way enjoyed over i t by the tenants of the retained property, but 
the conveyance i s not executed. The defendant, as successor i n t i t l e of the purchaser 
under the conveyance containing the r i g h t s cannot i n s i s t on his s t r i c t legal rights 
and avoid the r i g h t s of way: the purchaser was put upon inquiry concerning the rights 
referred to i n the conveyance, and thus so was the successor. She must therefore be 
tield to have had constructive n o t i c e l ^ 
Two years l a t e r the waiver pr i n c i p l e i s extended to a case i n which the promissor has 
80 
no authority to waive r i g h t s . A husband on separating from his wife subscribed to a 
deed providing f o r payment by him to a trustee on behalf of the wife, and allowing the 
musband, a f t e r twelve months, to give notice to the trustee to pay a reduced sum. I n 
i'act he n o t i f i e d his wife's s o l i c i t o r s that he could no longer pay, and the wife waived 
the condition of notice to the trustee. The court held that the waiver operates to bind 
•the wife so that she may not i n s i s t on receiving payments, nor can she sue for the 
arrears, f o r by f a i l i n g to not give notice to the trustee the husband had acted to 
t i s detriment. 
A case i n which a licence to occupy was i n effect converted i s A-G for the Prince of 
l a l e s V Collctn.-.;.,^  The defendant's gradfather owned land i n Cornwall i n which the Duchy 
Footnotes: 
7|7 Spencer-Bower & Turner p36, and the cases cited. See Creswell v Jeffreys (1912) 
i 28TLRU. 
78 1905 2 Ch 605. 
7 ? Having been exercised by the tenants for 35 years, they were s u f f i c i e n t l y defined. 
80 Macnaghton v Paterson(1907)AC U83. 
81 1916 2KB193. p Q 
^3 
of Cornwall owned the mineral r i g h t s . He occupied a house b u i l t i n connexion with certain 
mining operations on his land, and the defendant occupied i t after him, spending large 
sums so as to convert and eialarge i t . The alterations were known to lo c a l agents of 
[the Duchy of Cornwall who made no move to i n t e r f e r e , and as a result the Duchy was 
1 
estopped from asserting t i t l e to the buildings. 
Three cases follow which do not relate to land, but extend the Hughes principle and 
i l l u s t r a t e the use of equity to r e s t r a i n legal r i g h t s . Lord Reading, L J i n Panoutsos 
V Raymond Hadley Corpn of New York^^ found an implied waiver on the part of a seller 
who accepted payment, fo r the shipment of f l o u r , by unconfirmed banker's credit though 
the contract stipulated a confirmed banker's credit. I t was not u n t i l the seller found 
i t d i f f i c u l t to perform the contract - he had requested an extension of time for a 
P-ater shipment - that he sought to escape from his obligations, as a s t r i c t legal 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the contract would have allowed, t y pointing out the buyer's 
f a i l u r e to open a confirmed credit. I t was held that reasonable notice must be given 
before the s t r i c t terms of the contract could be complied with, i n order to give the 
I 
)3uyer time to comply. The waiver amounted, i n short, to a representation that the 
seller did not intend to r e l y on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r term of the contract, at least u n t i l 
j j f t e r reasonable notice of a contrary intention, 
ji'ootnotes: 02 1917 2KBI473. See also The l f i y ( l 9 7 ^ 78. 
^3 I assume a d i s t i n c t i o n between law and equity which does not exist. Perhaps a 
better expression of the d i s t i n c t i o n would be 'formal' as against 'ethical,' but 
i f i t i s borne i n mind that t h i s i s what i s meant a terminological departure from 
fa i t d l i a r shorthand usage may be avoided. The I873 reforms meant that Law and Equity 
ceased to have separate i d e n t i t i e s . The j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Chancellor insofar as 
t h i s related to the positive concepts necessitated t y Equity's negative r e s t r a i n t 
upon the exercise of the common law ri g h t s passed for the most part to the 
Chancery Division, but inse r t i o n i n t o formal law of an eth i c a l component i s now 
the task f o r a l l courts, and i t i s hoped that use of 'equity' does not result i n 
'bewitching' either iryself or others. 
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In Ayrey v B r i t i s h Legal and United Provident Assurance Co^^ a wife sued as executrix . er husband had taken out a l i f e policy with the defendant, and had described himself 
n the proposal form as a fisherman. The degree of r i s k was greater i n fact, because 
.e was also a member of the Navy Reserve. He had t o l d the l o c a l manager of t h i s , and 
the manager had continued to accept premiums u n t i l 19l6, when the husband was drowned, he suggestion that the contract was varied, the assured having submitted a new. offer 
3n new terms subsequently accepted when the manager received the next premium was 
|i'ejected, since the manager had no authority to make contracts on behalf of the compai^, 
f but i t i s not necessary i n order to hold the company l i a b l e to the p l a i n t i f f to regard 
OH 
i;he d i s t r i c t manager as having made a new contract,' instead 'the...question...is 
Vfhether the company led the p l a i n t i f f to believe that they did not intenii to treat the 
86 
<; ontract as at an end.' The company was l i a b l e i n the absence of a contract because 
v i t h the knowledge imputed to i t through i t s agent i t continued to accept premiums, and 
could not therefore r e l y upon the s t r i c t terms of the contract. I t i s sometimes 
88 
assumed that the Hughes p r i n c i p l e , being suspensory, must also be teroporary. Clearly, 
m the nature of Ayrey's case the remedy must be longer l a s t i n g . 
89 
I n Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co I t was a-term of the Insured's contract 
o|,insurance that he should n o t i f y the company, wi t h i n f i f t e e n days of the occurrence 
O i l a f i r e , of the particulars of his loss. Failure could v i t i a t e the policy. A further 
t^rm provided that i f the claim were not adjusted the company could take possession 
of. the fire-damaged property, but without Incurring any l i a b i l i t y . The Insured provided 
d e t a i l s of his loss outside the f i f t e e n day period and was asked to reimburse them 
bocause the f i r s t documents were not i n order. The company went int o possession of the 
property and negotiations took place between the insured and the company. Ultimately the 
Footnotes: 81. 1918 I K B I 3 6 . (Divisional Court). 
85 Per Lawrence, J pli;0. 
i 




I f the agent had gained the knowledge wh i l s t helping the assured to f i l l i n the 
proposal form i t would not have been j^iptted to the company: Newsholme v Road 
Transport General Insurance (1929 )gKB 356. 
See, f o r example, the a r t i c l e s t y Professor Wilson, cited e a r l i e r . 
(1920) 28CLR305. On appeal from the High Court of Australia, (1922)AC ShX, sub nom 
Yorkshire Insurance Co v Craine. P T 0 
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conpany refused to accept l i a b i l i - t y vjider the policy. The High Court of Australia 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between a pure statement of intention which i t considered would not be 
binding, and a statement of present inte n t i o n together with a present act, which would 
suffice to estop the company from denying l i a b i l i t y . 
On appeal, the J u d i c i a l Committee f e l t that by taking possession the company had 
signalled not a present intention'but a f a c t , namely that the claim was recognised as 
v a l i d and that a l l that remained uncertain was the amount payable. I t was f e l t safer 
to r e l y upon t h i s representation than upon the one made at the time when the company 
•returned the particulars of claim with an i n v i t a t i o n to resubmit corrected particulars, 
even though the o r i g i n a l submission was l a t e : t h i s was seen by the Committee as, i f 
anything, a representation of an inten t i o n to consider the claim. Their Lordships . 
iecided that such a representation would not bind the company, and thus r e l i e d upon 
bhe company's occupation to estop i t from denying having accepted l i a b i l i t y , 
irhe committee's analysis i s scarcely more satisfactory than that of the High Court of 
Australia. I n t h e i r e f f o r t to avoid binding the company by a representation of intention 
the l a t t e r invented a d i s t i n c t i o n which admits that statements of fact may derive t h e i r 
^bstance and form from the extent to which they indicate an intention about the future, 
and that any attempt to divide the legal effect of a statenrant of fact from that of a 
statement of i n t e n t i o n and at the same time reconcile law and r e a l i t y sinks one int o 
90 
a! quagmire of semantics. The former body seems to have been driven to abandon the 
Flootnotess 9|D See Spiers v McCully (1925) NZLR 385. Builder contracts for the supply of materials. 
The supplier, aware of the builder's shaky finances, asked the owner of the 
pot e n t i a l house to guarantee payment: he did so, the house was b u i l t and on being 
passed by the owners the supplier sent a b i l l for £92. The owner then settled with 
the builder, who duly became bankrupt. The supplier sent a fresh b i l l to the owner. 
The High Court of New Zealand held that the supplier was estopped, having submitted 
one b i l l , from accepting that i t was normal practice to submit a separate b i l l f or 
joinery. ¥as t h i s a representation of fa c t that the account was settled? I f so, 
does t h i s state of a f f a i r s not derive i t s substance from the intention which i t 
implies not to submit fresh b i l l s ? 
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classical dogma that the court should give effe c t to the intention of the parties: a 
term of the cpntract provided for occupation of the insured's premises by the insurer 
without the l a t t e r incurring l i a b i l i t y . 
91 
The p l a i n t i f f i n Bums v Dilviorth Trustee Board sought a perpetual injunction to 
prevent the defendant from using land other than as a recreational area. The defendant 
had shewn on a plan an int e n t i o n to use 23 acres of land withi n the c i t y of Auckland 
as a 'recreational reserve,' and i t was i n reliance upon t h i s that the holders of 
nearby l o t s had taken leases from him. The designation was a statement of fact, but 
th i s was meaningless without an intent i o n that the area should continue to be reserved 
f o r t h i s purpose yet 'The r i g h t of a lessee to restrain an owner from departing from 
92 
his plan i s based either upon an implied contract or upon estoppel by representation. 
P l a i n t i f f succeeded. 
These two cases may be contrasted with what seems conceptually a 'half-way case's 
93 
[Metcalfe v Boyce. A policeman became the quarterly tenant of a house, and received a 
grant to assist with payment of the rent. I n 1912 the police authority, Somerset County 
jCouncil, decided that the Chief Constable should become the tenant, and that constables 
should occupy houses as servants of his instead of as tenants on th e i r own account. 
Thereafter no rate demands were sent t o the defendant. Demands for rent he took to the 
Police Office from whom he received the sums payable and duly handed them to the estate 
o f f i c e of his landlord. No w r i t t e n assignment was made, but the landlord knew of the 
("ootnotess ;?1 1925 NZLR i|.88 - a case arising out of the Torrens system of re g i s t r a t i o n . See also 
Bank of New Zealand v D i s t r i c t Land Registrar 27 NZffi 126. Also Dabbs v Seaman 
(1925)36 CLR538. P l a i n t i f f claimed that the plan, together with the words on a 
transfer of land to him by the defendant's predecessor i n t i t l e amounted to a 
representation that she had a r i g h t of way. Held, i n t e r a l i a , (Higgins J 
dissenting) that p l a i n t i f f had been misled, not by a statement of fact since the 
way was impassable, but by a statement of future intention to provide a way. 
^2 Per Reed, J at p5o5j Piggott v Stratton cited. 
93 1927 1KB758. 
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change, and i t was held that the constable was estopped from denying i t . Thus 'the 
p l a i n t i f f can r e l y upon a surrender or assignment t y act or operation of law s u f f i c i e n t 
9li 
to s a t i s f y the Statute of Frauds.' 
The case i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the 'minesweeper' p r i n c i p l e : the Chief Constable asserts 
that the a t t r i b u t e s of tenancy belong to him and seeks to exercise them against the 
defendant. The l a t t e r i s estopped from setting up as a defense that he i s the tenant. 
I t i s not the 'Cause of action which i s provided by the estoppel but merely the means 
of acheiving success. Metcalfe v Bo:^ pce i s a 'halfway' case because although the estoppel 
95 
arises from a statement of f a c t , t h i s statement derives i t s substance from an 
96 
operation of law. The surrender i s not effected by w r i t i n g , and, as McKinnon indicates, 
s a t i s f i e s the Statute of Frauds by reason of the performance of the parties. Conventional 
analysis, using a shorthand terminology masks the real nature of what has happened, 
which i s that the tenant has stated that he w i l l i n the future no longer claim the 
att r i b u t e s of tenancy. Both parties act i n reliance upon that state of a f f a i r s , based 
on a statement of in t e n t i o n . 
There i s nothing to prevent the courts from allowing a statement of intention to base 
an estoppel i n one circumstance - for example where a surrender or assignment i s deemed 
97 
by operation of law - but semantic confusion should not prevent recognition of r e a l i t y , 
98 
although i t seems to have done so. I n Canadian Pacific Railway v R the Judicial 
Footnotes: 
9h Per McKinnon, J at p76ii . The Judge f e l t that the pleadings i n effect asserted 
an estoppel on the defendant's part, though they did not say so. 
95 Using 'Statement' widely so as to include conduct amounting to acquiescence. 
96 See Cheshire. Modern Real Property 9th Ed pU38-9. 
97 See also, perhaps, Rodenhurst Estates vW H Barnes Ltd(l936) 2 A l l E R 3: agreement 
for an assignment operating to prevent the assignee from denying l i a b i l i t y to pay 
rent to the landlord, who had consented to the assignment. The agreement to assign 
i s binding i n the same way as a contract - i t evidences a binding intention to 
create a s i t u a t i o n which would be achieved by a deed. 
9Q 1931 AC lah-
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Committee stated that 'the foundation upon which reposes the r i g h t of equity to 
intervene i s either contract, or the existence of some fact which the legal owner i s 
99 
estopped from denying.' Lord Tomlin's d e f i n i t i o n two years l a t e r presents estoppel 
as a representation, or conduct amounting to a representation^^*^ intended, to induce, 
and i n f a c t inducing a course of action on the part of the representees the two kinds 
of representation are not distinguished. Four years a f t e r that, i n 1937 Simraonds, J 
gave e f f e c t t o a promise concerning future conduct, though without mentioning the 
doctrine of estoppel'!"'^ "'" 
' 10? 
Re William Ebrter Ltd involved a company the governing director (one Fontannaz) of 
which secured a resolution that no fees were to be paid to the directors from f i r s t 
October 1933 u n t i l the company was i n better f i n a n c i a l circumstances, when a contrary 
resolution might be passed. For t h i s forebearance on the part of the directors there 
I was no consideration but 'the resolution was intended to induce the company to take a 
certain coiirse of action... ( i t ) was not an act of benevolence... (but was).. .intended 
to induce the compaxiy to enter transactions and to incur obligations which, but for 
that resolution i t might not have done.' Following Fontannaz's bankruptcy the company 
resolved to go in t o l i q u i d a t i o n . Fontannaz's trustee i n bankruptcy sought to prove for 
the fees foregone by him af t e r the date of the resolution, but he was unable to do so. 
The reasoning seems more i n l i n e with the dictum i n Greenwood v Martin's Bank than 
d t h that of CPR v R. 
m more cle a r l y , i n Salisbury v Gilmore]"'^-^ the court found for a tenant who had 
l e l i e d upon a representation by his landlord that at the termination of the tenancy the 
premises would be demolished. As a r e s u l t the tenant had not complied with the covenant 
Footnotess 9 9 I n Greenwood v Martin's Bank(l933)AG5l at p57. 
100 The curious argument was raised that the silence of the husband might not found 
an estoppel against him. The e f f o r t s to r e s t r i c t the doctrine seem to r e l y at times 
on flimsy and i r r a t i o n a l pretexts. 
10]j The d i r e c t o r s ' action i s classed as 'a waiver of claims'. 
132 (1937) 2 A l l S R 361. 
ip3 <19ii2) 2KB 39. 
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to repair contained i n his lease Section 18 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 allows 
damages for such a breach, equal to the diminution i f any i n the value of the reversion. 
Damages are not recoverable where the repairs would be made valueless hy reason of 
st r u c t u r a l alterations or, of course, demolition'l"^^ Here the landlord had changed his 
|mind about demolition because of the outbreak of war, so that the repairs did i n fact 
a f f e c t the reversion's value. Cousel f o r the tenant. Denning K C, urged the Hughes 
pri n c i p l e upon the court. Goddard, L J found the case 'of great s i i i ? ) l i c i t y ' and f e l t 
t 'unnecessary to consider many of the interesting matters that were discussed before 
105 
us' i n finding i n favour of the tenant. MacKinnon, L J alone oiscussed the dictum of 
Bowen, L J i n Birmingham, and distinguished the supposed Jorden v Money principle. He 
recognised that case as binding, but did not think that i t 'avails to prevent the 
tenant from re l y i n g on the pr i n c i p l e stated by Bowen, L J.. .merely because.. .the word 
^'intention' ' was used. Again the a r t i f i c i a l i t y of the d i s t i n c t i o n was raised. ' I f one 
says ' I am growing old and .-dQ not intend to l i v e long' ,' MacKinnon reasoned, 'in 
'orm one states an intention, i n substance one states a melancholy fact. 
he analogy with the condition of mortality i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y apposite, though of 
ciourse the dysfunctional nature of the semantic argument i s i l l u s t r a t e d . Clearly the 
court was requiring the landlord to stand by his representation of intention once the 
tenant had r e l i e d upon i t . Neither the landlord nore the tenant can have understood by 
the landlprd's representation that i t was i n substance a comment upon the i n e v i t a b i l i t y 
of a demolition at the hands of the landlord, or that i t was merely a statement of fact 
about the landlord's state of mind at a point i n history with no implications for the 
future. 
Footnotes: 
ibU See Gibson's Conveyancing 19th Ed p398-9. 
105 The t h i r d judge. Lord Greene, M R found for the defendant on other grounds. 
1,06 A statements ' I am growing old and intend to commit suicide' would be more useful. 
Following the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Jordan's Case, reliance upon 
t h i s would not defeat an action by the maker of the statement against a promissee 
who had acted to his detriment. Following Salisbury v Gilmore, surely a d i f f e r e n t 
conclusion would be reached. But perhaps public policy would intervene. 
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107 I n I9I46, Humphreys, J gave e f f e c t to a promise made hy a landlord to accept a lower 
rent by preventing him from having the arrears. The tenant, who ran a dancing school 
i n the premises, indicated to the landlord that, since wartime conditions prevented her 
from continuing to do so, either he must accept a lower rent, or she must go. He 
accepted her o f f e r of one h a l f of the amount provided for i n the lease, and she over 
time paid, quite v o l u n t a r i l y , more, u n t i l the o r i g i n a l rent level was attained. The 
court viewed the case as one of estoppel. Again the representation was i n essence a 
statement of future intention. 
Two Commonwealth cases, Svenson v Payne and Canadian & Dominion Sugar Corporation v 
I09 
Canadian National S S Lines en^shasise the need fo r 'precise and unambiguous' language 
on which to found an estoppel. The l a t t e r case, appealed to the Judicial Committee, 
contains a statement stressing the application to estoppels of common law principles. 
Neither, on the facts, j u s t i f i e s the intervention of equity to re s t r a i n the exercise of 
leg a l r i g h t s , and since the promissee was i n both cases unsuccessful they are merely 
negative authorityP"^ 
Footnotes: 
107 Buttery v Pickard(l9ii6)M52. 
108 , (I9i;5) 71CLR531. 
109 (l9i;7MC U6. 
LIO ,,In Svenson a tenant f o r l i f e granted a lease. The remainderman did not realise that 
she had any present remedy. However, on the tenant-for-life's death she applied for 
equitable r e l i e f , overcoming an alleged estoppel based on her previous i n a c t i v i t y . I t 
was held not to be unreasonable that she had not done anything e a r l i e r because, i n t e r 
a l i a , the tenant f o r l i f e was at the time of the grant healthy with a 'considerable' 
l i f e expectancy. From the remainderman's point of view i t was reasonable to suppose 
either that he was prepared to take the r i s k of the tenant's early death, or that he 
had insured against such r i s k . I t was on the evidence of the tense that the court 
• decided not to exercise i t s discretion under the Eamsden v Dyson princi p l e . 
S i m i l a r l y Canadian & Dominion Sugar formed on the evidences the appellants f a i l e d to 
convince the Judicial Committee that the respondent had made an-'unqualified 
statement' as to the good order of the sugar on i t s receipt on board ship. 
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Before considering the High Trees case, i t seems appropriate to make some concluding 
remarks about the e a r l i e r cases; the extent to which Denning J radically altered the 
existing law may then be apparent. 
I s h a l l i n the next chapter suggest the necessity f o r redrawing the boundaries of legal 
categories, depending upon the purposes of the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Already i t i s clear 
that the c l a r i t y of the principle that equity w i l l r e s t r a i n the exercise of legal rights 
suffers or prevails, not always according to the merits of the case, but according to 
the category i n t o which f o r other purposes, a case f i t s . Companies enjoy an astonishing 
immunity from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , f o r example, at the hands of the judiciary. 
) f the two l i n e s of authority that we suggested emerged from the 1875 l e g i s l a t i o n , the 
Line r e f l e c t i n g the common law view of estoppel and promise-enforcement enjoys exclusive 
attention at f i r s t . The Hughes and Birmingham cases are consigned to t o t a l obscurity 
i n t i l rescued by Denning as counsel f o r the defendant i n Salisbury v Gilmore (ante). Only 
•the climate of TJttar Pradesh seems to have stimulated j u d i c i a l imagination s u f f i c i e n t l y 
•io see a useful connexion between Hammersley v De Biel (ante) and Dilwyn v Llewellyn. 
I n c r i t i c i s i n g the conclusion of the judges i n Lala Beni Ram's Case, the Judicial 
Committee seem, as we have submitted, to have misunderstood Dilwyn v Llewellyn. Not 
u n t i l almost the turn of the century i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of a non-contractual obligation 
lecogniseds and even aft e r t h i s e f f o r t s are made to adjust r e a l i t y so as to support a 
lonclusion that representations ,of i n t e n t i o n do not create l i a b i l i t y . Following Tabor y 
Godfrey recognition of claims against promissors are h a l t i n g l y met, but with no consistent 
assertion of a p r i n c i p l e . 
The achievement of Denning, J i n Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House 
L[td"^^ was i n his recognition that a connexion existed between the old cases of Ikghes 
a i d Birmingham, and the then recent cases of Re William Porter and Salisbury v Gilmore. 
I ideed, the judgement must r e l y f o r i t s authority upon the general rule established -
tiough scarcely always consciously - i n these previous decisions, for the stateinent of 
Fjaotnotess 
I L l 19i;7 KB 130. 
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•J 
law r e l i e d upon subsequently, and a t t r i b u t e d to the case by the leading text-writers, 
112 
was obiter. The facts of the case are too w e l l known to warrant detailed rehearsal, 
but b r i e f l y , a block of f l a t s was l e t by the lessor company to a subsidiary company, 
the defendant, i n 1937. Before the block was f u l l y tenanted, wartime made l e t t i n g 
l i f f L c u l t and as a r e s u l t the defendants were unable to pay the agreed rent from t h e i r 
p r o f i t s . Following discussion with the p l a i n t i f f lessors the rent was reduced by half, 
ijhich sum was paid u n t i l 19i;5. I n that year p l a i n t i f f company's receiver, who had been 
appointed i n 19hl, discovered the arrangement, concluded, perhaps, that i t was not 
l e g a l l y binding, and claimed the f u l l rent, together with the arrears. The proceedings 
:Ln the High Court were i n the nature of a tes t case, i n which p l a i n t i f f claimed arrears 
only i n respect of the l a s t two quarters of 19ii5. Since the entire block was l e t at 
lihis time i t was clear that the raison d'etre of the arrangement was gone, and the 
p l a i n t i f f succeeded i n his action. 
Ilqually clear was Denning J's a r t i c u l a t i o n of the principle according to which the 
promise could be enforced: 'a promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon 
and i n f a c t acted upon, i s binding so far as i t s terms properly apply. ''^'^^ The cases 
Which we have examined suggest that there was nothing new i n the principle, but 'by... 
19i|6 orthodox opinion had become so hardened i n the v|ew that gratuitous promises were 
n^ver enforceable and that only bargains constitute contracts that orthodox lawyers 
cbuld not believe that Denning J's dicta could be sound law. '"^ 
Footnotes: 1|.2 cf Hedley ly-me v Heller (196I4. )ACi4.65. See, i n r e l a t i o n to that case the statement 
by Heuston: Salmond on Tort l5th Ed p265-6. ' I t would be pedantic and absurd to 
dismiss as obiter the f u l l y considered judgement of f i v e law lords delivered 
a f t e r hearing eight days of argument.' 
I t would seem equally absurd to dismiss Denning J's ex tempore judgement delivered 
a f t e r a much shorter hearing. 
1I3 19U7 KB 130 a t PI36.• 
11.U Atiyah: Consideration i n Contracts - a fundamental restatement 50. 
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IV 
I indicated i n the foregoing chapters ny adoption of the view that the law consists, 
i n part anyway, i n the conferment of recognition upon claims asserted by individuals 
or groups^ I t was suggested t h a t one such de facto claim was to have promises recognised 
and enforced i n p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, and that equity anciently went further i n 
recognising such claims than the common law. During the nineteenth century there was 
greater approximation between equity and common law, but nevertheless there emerged 
af t e r the major reforms of iii e period two d i s t i n c t attitudes to the promise, and two 
li n e s of authority. That which I characterise as equitable maintained i t s t r a d i t i o n a l 
role as such, by refusing the enforcement of s t r i c t legal rights contrary to a promise 
made and acted upon: I consider that the eqixity maintains i t s role yet. 
The claims theory of law becomes central when one asserts that i n order to satisfy the 
2 
requirement of j u s t i c e , legal recognition may be given i n inappropriate or inconvenient 
terms so as to avoid doctrinal c o n f l i c t s which would force the decision i n the other 
direction'? We have encountered cases i n which i t seems that promises have been enforced 
i n a way which does not involve the court i n unfamiliar or overly adventurous concepts, 
and i n order to impose a meaningful unity upon cases J believe to be founded upon the 
'broad p r i n c i p l e of equity' i t i s necessary to see whether policy or expedience allow 
us to ignore the t r a d i t i o n a l boundaries between legal categories, and' to question some 
asstimptions made wi t h i n those categories'^" Legal c l a s s i f i c a t i o n takes place i n order to 
Footnotes: 
L See i n t e r a l i a Stones Social Dimensions of Law and Justice pl69 et seq. A 
u t i l i s a t i o n of such a 'model' i s White: Lawyers and the Enforcement of Rights, i n 
Social Needs & Legal Action 1973. There i s a discussion of the justice of 
recognising claims i n Rawls' A Theory of Justice, 1972, Chapter 1 Justice as Fairness. 
I ^ t h i s i s meant the i n s t i n c t i v e reaction i n favour of one or other party. 
) De La Bere v Pearson(1908)lKB280 i s a good example. 
t c f Schon's Reith Lectures November 1970 i n which he argues i n favour of functional 
categories. He considers that, i n Government categories become most r i g i d after 
they have been useful. His examples include the Ag r i c u l t u r a l Extension Program, 
contimaed a f t e r the achievement of enormous a g r i c u l t u r a l surpluses. For problems 
i n l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n see Jolowicz (ed)s The Division and Classification of Law. 
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solve p a r t i c u l a r problems and the classes should owe t h e i r continued existences to 
t h e i r continued capacity to solve those problems. To the extent that they do not have 
t h i s function, lawyers should b u i l d new models, with new classes. Indeed t h i s process 
i s recognised, f o r example i n the class Labour Law, which embraces contract and t o r t s 
as w e l l as new material. Trouble results when the old classes f a i l to be s u f f i c i e n t l y 
f l u i d i n t h e i r new contexts, for example where a t r a d i t i o n a l regard for freedom of 
contract^ does not y i e l d to the r e a l i t y of consumer-manufacturer relations, or contracts 
of employment^ Failure to adopt new views may well be related to the reluctance to 
denystify- the law, both being due to 'the f a i l u r e on the part of ordinary men to 
realise that the forms of law and human socieiy were at bottom merely human artefacts, 
not natural necessities but things made t y men, and hence things that could be unmade 
F.Q'otnotsst^ : ' 
5 See Friedraann: Law i n a Changing Society 2nd ed pll9. The Changing l o l e of 
Contract. Jolowicz op c i t . 
6 Americans seem more prepared to take a fresh and more en?3irical look at categories: 
See Childres& Spitz: Status i n the Law of Contract hi NlUffi 1. 
Germans too, perhaps, at a more r a r i f i e d l e v e l . See Rehbinder: Status, Contract & 
the Welfare State 23 Stanford LR9iA. ' I t i s easy to see why i n an age of many 
transactions.and therefore of increasing interaction, the importance of intention 
and w i l l i n tiie doctrine of l e g a l transactions i s steadily reduced i n favour of 
protection of reliance.' (p952). Just as for Tawney Religion and Capitalism 
produced a unique ethos, so I venture the suggestion that the law of contract i s a 
function of an entrepreneural state. I t s - e t h i c i s now obsolete. Friedmann (The 
State & the Rule of Law i n a Mxed JEconony) provides an analysis of Public, or 
State, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n modern economics of the Anglo-American kind, and we have 
recently seen massive interference i n the area of missiles, drugs and aero engines 
by the s t a t ^ , contrary to the s p i r i t of the market, which inspired the law. I f the 
i , law i s to be e f f e c t i v e l y i n control i t must recognise new developments, and I 
suggest that the head of 'public policy' i s inadequate for t h i s purpose. 
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7 and remade.' 
Hitherto, and perhaps to an extent even now, the old categories have absorbed the new 
to a remarkable degree. Thus equity i s subsumed i n t e r a l i a w i t h i n the law r e l a t i n g to 
r e a l property, and the law r e l a t i n g to contracts, though t h i s i s not to suggest that 
i t has not transformed both. But w h i l s t the unique character of interests i n land as 
recognised i n English law imposes the need for a separate law of real property, i t 
should not be assumed that the claims which shaped the law - the claims of the 
conveyancer and the claim to the a l i e n a b i l i t y - must forever take precedence over a l l 
other possible claims. Similarly, w h i l s t common law contract embraces the theory of 
the bargain, t h i s does not argue that a l l voluntarily-assumed relationships (as opposed 
to relationships such as Lord Atkin's 'neighbour' relationship which i s one imposed by 
law) must be governed as i f there were a bargain. Finally, f o r our present purposes, 
the welfare state and the mixed econoity are both concepts which involve increased and 
increasing p a r t i c i p a t i o n by administrative agencies i n society. This participation i s 
authorised by statutes and regulations, which allow wide discretion i n the cause of 
f l e x i b i l i t y . Refusal to allow such an agency to f e t t e r i t s e l f , and s t r i c t control by 
jmeans of the u l t r a vires doctrine, are both recognition of claims to restrain the 
a c t i v i t i e s of offshoots of the administration for the public benefit. But there i s 
another claim which needs to be considered, and that i s the claim to compensation or 
protection of the misled promissee who has altered his position i n reliance upon a 
promise made by the agency. A t t r i b u t i n g to a contracting party knowledge of what i s 
Intra vires the company with which he contracts, on the basis of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
Inspecting documents lodged at Companies House, may be ra t i o n a l - although the Jenkins 
p. _ - - . ~ - . . 
FootaoteSS • 1 ; - . .• r 
.^ . •• Hart: • Bentham & the Demystification of the Law.-36 MLR2. Also much confusion 
doubtless results from the lawyer's technique of adapting an old word to f i t a 
new concept so that i t carries much of i t s former meaning with i t . 
^ See Westminster Corpn v Lever Finance ( l a t e r ) ; Robertson v Min of Pensions ( l a t e r ) . 
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Committee doubted i t : pretending that an individual has notice of the precise powers 
of a central or l o c a l government body i s unrealistic and unjust, by reason of the 
volume of p r i n c i p a l and delegated l e g i s l a t i o n and the areas of discretion, what i s 
accomplished i s the reverse of what i s sought; a charter i s given to such bodies to 
act irresponsibly and to stand on the creating instrument as a defence. 
I n the following survey of the post-High Trees cases, then, I shall not divide the 
cases t r a d i t i o n a l l y according to t h e i r subject matter, but instead attiempt to see how 
they f i t i n t o the pattern of the 'broad principle of equity.' Clearly we have to consider 
whether the area of law i n question requires special treatment, on the facts, where 
special reference i s made, for example to the need for consideration, to the policy 
t h a t land should be alienable without equitable .fetters unforseen i n 1925^ or to the 
necessity f o r restraining administrative agencies, I sh a l l attempt to assess such 
reference on i t s merit. 
The early cases often show Denning, J carefully nurturing the principle 'with proper 
•parental concern,'"^"^ avoiding stretcluing i t 'too far.'•'""'• A result of an English 
12 
•tendency noted, i n t e r a l i a , by Abel"Smith and Stevens to settle 'many things..by 
custom and convention. ..iwhich i n other countries would be settled by some enactment 
or j u d i c i a l decision' has been that noticed by Blom-Cooper and Drewrjy, i n t h e i r study 
Tootnotes: ' Report of the Company Law Committee Cmnd 17ii9 (1962). Paras 35-ii2 cf the suggestion 
(Megarry & Wade 2nd Sd pl067) that ' i t i s unreasonable to allow a purchaser to 
purchase over an equitable owner... i n possession who has f a i l e d to register an 
estate contract.' See also Maudsley:Bona Fide Purchasers of Registered Land 
36 Mm 25. Also see Laus The Ultra Vires Doctrine & the European Communities Act 
1-972. Guardian Gazette 28.3-73 at p9. On the d i f f i c u l t i e s of s9, i n particular the 
requirement that the transaction sought to be enforced must have been decided 
upon by the directors, see Farrar & Fowler i n 36MLR270 at pp27l4./5. 
10 Stone: Social Dimensions p26l. 
11 Combe v Combe (I95l) 2KB215/220 cited op c i t . 
12 Lawyers and the Courts p i . 
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13 of the House of Lords: the law develops slowly, uncertainly and idiosyncratically. 
Foot Clinics(I9l;3) Ltd v Cooper's Gowns'*^  might have eased the fears of those who saw 
Denning J's e a r l i e r decision as a voyage of discovery. A lease given statutory v a l i d i t y 
under the Validation of Wartime Leases Act 19i4ii which allowed either party to give 
one month's notice i n w r i t i n g after the conclusion of the European war, was followed 
by a l e t t e r from the landlords that 'so far as we can see at present there i s no reason 
why you should not continue t i l l the expiration of your lease i n December 19i;7 when 
our own lease expires.' The landlords then gave one month's notice to qu i t i n August 
19ii6. The notice was upheld, not on tiie ground that the earlier l e t t e r was i n law 
incapable of binding the landlords, but on the basis that i t s terms did not show i t to 
be a promise intended by both sides to be l e g a l l y binding. I n Ledingham v Bermejo 
Estancia Co"^ ^ a loan was made to Mie company to enable i t to continue i n business, and 
interest was waived ' u n t i l such time as the conpany i s i n a position to pay.' The 
|coir¥)any did continue i n business, but for twenty-two years the interest was unpaid"''^ 
u n t i l f i n a l l y the company went int o l i q u i d a t i o n . . Atkinson, J held that the creditor's 
ri g h t s to arrears of in t e r e s t was extinguished, consideration had been provided, f o r 
•the loan had purchased the continuance of the con?3any. Prima facia the case f i t s i n t o 
the orthodox doctrine of contracts so when the consideration f a i l e d , the arrears of 
In t e r e s t became payable. However, i f t h i s i s so i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see why the court 
:relied upon Re William Porter (ante) and High Trees. I n the former, Simonds J makes no 
footnotes: 
:|.3 Final Appeal p291. Referring to the law of 'obligations' the authors state 'The 
abiding impression of House of Lords decisions over the period of study i s how 
. infrequently major issues...come up for decision.. .the Law Lords have been starved 
of work that might have produced c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the law.' 
:h (19U7)KB507. 
15 (19ii7) 1 A l l E R 7ii9. 
16 Although int e r e s t payments were credited to Mrs Ager i n the company's books, and 
thus presumably debited elsewhere, creating no false impression to potential, 
t h i r d - p a r t y creditors. I n any event, see Atkinson J's analysis of the meaning of 
the agreement at p75lF. 
P T 0 
78 
20 mention, i n his short judgement, of consideration, and i t was the l a t t e r case which 
launched Denning, J i n t o his role of arche-typal heterodox. 
The answer may be that a l l three cases, and i n addition the Scottish case of Caimcross 
17 18 V Lorrimer, stress the purpose of the agreement. I n Ledingham, Atkinson, J says 'the 
whole object of the loan was to enable and induce the company to carry on.' He refers 
to ffi.gh Trees, a t t r i b u t i n g to the lessors the sentiment: 'The whole idea was to enable 
19 
you to carry on when you had empty f l a t s . ' William Porter Ltd was 'ent i t l e d to assume 
that the directors would act i n accordance with the provisions of the resolution, they 
21 
had passed, and woiild not claim remuneration u n t i l a further resolution was passed,' 
because i t could not follow the purpose of the resolution without making such an 
assumption. The resolution would be meaningless i f i t were not binding, and t h i s i s the 
reasoning permeating these cases. A party who takes advantage of such a promise must, 
i n an age of transactions, be able to r e l y on i t , but i t i s Procrustean, not to say 
ci r c u l a r , to move from t h i s (the submitted premise upon which the cases r e l y ) to the 
conclusion that i f the promises were to be binding tihere must have been consideration. 
From being an ingredient which, with others,may render a promise binding, consideration 
becomes tha t which must have been present i n a l l circumstances i n which a promise has 
peen held to bind a promissor, ••Without handing language and usage over to Fowler, i t 
ijtiay be convenient to rescue words from Carroll's Humpty-Duii?)ty. 
22 
[?he decision i n Couchman v H i l l has appended to i t by the editor of the Incorporated 
iSociety's Reports a note. Scott, L J, reading the judgement of the Court of Appeal 
held that although the catalogue excluded a l l relevant l i a b i l i t y for goods sold at an 
j'ootnotes: :.7 (1860) 3Lr 170. 
1.8 (I9hl) 1 A l l S R 7i;9 at p 751F. 
19 I b i d P752G. 
2 0 Except i n r e l a t i o n to West Yorkshire Darracq v Coleridge (1911) 2KB326 upon which 
Simonds J does not r e l y . 
2|l Re William Porter (1937)2 A l l S R 36I at p36i4A. 
22 (19U7) KB 55U. 
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auction sale, the p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d to recover damages t y reason of an oral 
guarantee given by the vendor wh i l s t the goods were i n the ring but prior to t h e i r sale. 
The editor suggests that such a promise by a purchaser could n o t ' i f i t s l e g a l i t y were 
challenged, be upheld J' since bidders at an auction have a r i g h t to suppose that they 
23 
b i d on equal terms.' Such r i g h t i s either very insubstantial on the facts of the case, 
or i s unviolated: as counterpart to the bidders' r i g h t , presumably the vendor and the 
auctioneer have a duty to avoid making the terms unequal. I f the duty were not met, 
91 
damages for i t s breach would be d i f f i c u l t to measure, f o r even i f the argument that 
a l l parties s t i l l b id on equal terms, (the agreement affecting the rights of a 
p a r t i c u l a r bidder i f he should be successful) i s rejected, the loss to the other bidders 
i s problematic. P l a i n t i f f here might have been prepared to bid more, knowing of his 
special position v i s a vis the vendor on being successful, but t h i s does not assist 
with the assessment of what each of the others may have l o s t . 
To avoid d o c t r i n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which may or may not be r e a l i s t i c , such as whether i t 
i s consistent with the approach of the courts to auction sales that one bidder should 
be makiiag a d i f f e r e n t o f f e r to the auctioneer, unknown to the others, i t might be 
possible to see the representation made by the vendor as a representation not to enforce 
bertain terms of a contract even should a contract be made on those terms?^ 
^ similar case, that of Walker v Walker, involved the lease of a f l a t under a standard 
Footnotes: 13 At P560. 
Ik Presumably the breach would not be i n contract see Harris vNickerson (l873) 
2R8QB 286. The general a t t i t u d e of the courts to exclusion clauses i s one of 
h o s t i l i t y , so that presumably i n the absence of any fraudulent rigging of the 
auction i t seems unli k e l y that an agreement which depends for i t s effect on the 
ordinary outcome of tihe auction sale, would be avoided. 
ikA - cf City of Westminster Property v Mudd (1958) 2 A l l E R 733 at p7U2 I per Harman J. 
;?5 (I9ii7)l77 LT 20U. 
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form of lease which made no reference to an agreement alleged by the tenant to have 
been made between himself and the p l a i n t i f f comparer that he should have the use of two 
additional rooms i n which to s t a r t his property. Somervill, L J, decided, on being 
s a t i s f i e d by the defendant's evidence, that the company should not have an injunction 
to prevent the tenant's use of the rooms. The oral agreement relat i n g to the rooms 
might be enforced either by means of r e c t i f i c a t i o n of the lease or by implying a 
c o l l a t e r a l warranty, the court held. I n both t h i s and the previous case, the resu l t i s 
'that the o r a l agreement should be read with the w r i t t e n instrument so as to form one 
[comprehensive contract, ^ ^and i t may seem pedantic to analyse the reasoning i n terms of 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between law and equity. I ' suggest that where continuity and convenience 
of outcome are compatible i n the single case, and especially where regard for past 
forms points a p r a c t i c a l way for the future, attention to history may be worthwhile. 
^hus, accepting Hohfeld's view^^ 'the so called legal rule i n every such case (of 
^ c o n f l i c t between equity and law) has...only an apparent validity-and operation as a 
matter of law. Though i t may represent an important stage of "thought i n the solution 
of the problem, and may also connote... important p o s s i b i l i t i e s as to certain other 
closely-associated (and v a l i d ) j u r a l relations, yet as regards the very r e l a t i o n i n 
which i t suffers d i r e c t con?)etition with a rule of equity, such c o n f l i c t i n g rule of law 
28 
i s pro tanto of no greater force that an unconstitutional statute.' I t would be 
flootnotes: 2|6 Cheshire & Fifoot 8th Ed pl09. 
27 Hohfelds The Relations between Equity and Law 11 Mich L Rev 537 that 'there i s . . . 
a.;, .marked.. . c o n f l i c t between equitable and legal rules rel a t i n g to various j u r a l 
r e l a t i o n s : and whenever such c o n f l i c t occurs the equitable rule i s i n the l a s t 
analysis paramount...' (p5Mi). 
2j3 P5U+. Note that there i s nothing inconsistent involved i n urging, on the one hand 
the u n i t y of law and equity, and on the other, the u t i l i t y of seeing f i r s t legal 
r i g h t s , and secondly equitable restraints which may be placed upon them: i t i s 
merely 'a stage of thought.' 
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possible to see the le g a l r e s u l t of the agreements i n Gouchman v H i l l and Walker v 
[Walker resting upon the w r i t t e n contracts, but being subject to the equitable rule that 
a representation 'intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon and. . . i n fact acted 
29 
upon' should bind the representor. As w e l l as providing greater symmetry i n Walker, 
setting up an equity as an alternative to the equity of r e c t i f i c a t i o n i n achieving the 
jdesired r e s u l t , such an analysis avoids the murky waters of intention to which Cheshire 
finds i t necessaiy to r e f e r ^ ^ 
I t i s not suggested that this was the l i n e of reasoning followed i n either case: merely 
that both are result-oriented decisions, and that the same result might have been 
achieved with greater benefit f o r both past and future by the use of the equity, ffy-
i n i t i a l postulate concerning the need for the equiiy of promise-enforcement i s supported 
•by these cases. 
p?wo cases involving representations by the Grown were heard i n 19U8: T e r r i t o r i a l Amy 
f^ lv Nichols^"^ and Robertson v Ministry of Pensions'?^ I n the f i r s t , the Court of Appeal 
accepted that the Rent Restriction Acts did not apply to the Crown, and that the 
t e r r i t o r i a l Arny, which had issued a rent book indicating tenancy rights under the Acts, 
attracted 'the contagion of the Crown's immunity.'"^"^ The question was raised whether 
ihe immunity was i n any way undermined by the representation made to the tenant by the 
;.ssue of the rent book, and the court r e l i e d upon a dictum of Bowen, L J i n Low v 
Itouverie (ante) that 'the language upon which an estoppel i s foiinded must be precise 
£,nd unambiguous, '•^ ^ finding that the rent book, when combined with a l e t t e r from the 
].essor stating the tenancy's terms (which were inconsistent with the Acts) clearly, was 
riot a s u f f i c i e n t l y precise representation. Bowen L J's dictum implies that the promissee, 
I'ootnotes: 
p Rickards v Oppenheim (19^0) 1 A l l B R 1;20 (see l a t e r ) . 
0 Cheshire & Fifoot 8ed pl09. 
j l l (I9i;9) 1 KB 35 ( T e r r i t o r i a l & A u x i l i a i y Forces Assoc of the Go of London v Nichols) 
32 (I9h9) 1 KB 227. 
33 (I9h9) 1 KB 35 at phh per Scott, L J, who read the judgement of the court. 
3li (1891) Ch 82 at pl06 c i t e d op c i t p^O. 
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the tenant, acted unreasonably, since i t must surely be so, to act upon a representation 
which i s not free of ambiguity. The unarticulated object of the court i s to rescue 
from i n j u s t i c e one threatened by i t , but a condition of the court's action i s that he 
sh a l l have done a l l that he reasonably should have done-?^ The test sounds l i k e an 
equitable one, and i s variable according with where the court considers that risks 
ought to be placed. 
An argument advanced by counsel f o r the Amy i s worth examining fo r i t s apparent logic, 
that i s , that i f the statute does not bind the Crown d i r e c t l y , estoppel cannot make i t 
do so. I n p r i n c i p l e of course, estoppel has exactly the effect of enabling that to be 
accomplished which, but for a representation by the promissor could not be accomplished. ' 
Et i s d i f f i c u l t to see why the necessity which allows the Crown to claim an immunity 
3y statute should operate to prevent the Crown from apparently waiving i t s immunity, 
and even i f i t does, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see why l i a b i l i t y i n damages i s not incurred: 
i'ootnotes: 
•}5 cf the equitable maxims concerned with laches, 'clean hands' etc. 
i 6 Associated w i t h t h i s contention i s the suggestion, to which more weight was 
attached, that the representation was one of law and not of fact. The a p p l i c a b i l i t y 
of the Rent Acts to the Crown may w e l l be a matter of law, but the question of 
whether the Act applied to a pa r t i c u l a r dwelling i s surely out of fact. To argue 
that X does not have the at t r i b u t e s necessary to own property may be to argue a 
matter of law: i f X stood l y and allowed I to s e l l goods as Y's he could not 
generally assert his own t i t l e against the purchaser, for he would be taken to 
have made a representation of fa c t despite the legal nature of the concept of 
ownership. One suspects that the fact/law dictionary i s t e l i o l o g i c a l . See Birch v 
Pease St Paifers (l9Ul) 1KB6I5 (Reliance placed on a representation of l i a b i l i l y 
I 
under the Workman's Compensation Acts: representation enforced). See also Solle 
V Batcher (post). 
3? See Wroth v Tyler (1973) l A l l E R 897 at p910F, although t h i s arises out of the 
character of the Land Registration Act 1925 s 139(1). 
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the policy of the statutes i s to protect the Crown i n i t s occupation of property, and 
not to leave the subject with no form of redress. 
The second case involved an An^y o f f i c e r who made a claim f o r a d i s a b i l i t y pension to 
the ¥ar Office, i n respect of an i n j u r y sustained w h i l s t on m i l i t a r y service i n 
December 1939. Under a Royal Warrant for Pay of 19hO, authorily to 'accept ( i n j u r i e s ) 
as a t t r i b u t a b l e . t o m i l i t a r y service' was transferred from the War Office to the 
Ministry of Pensions except-where the i n j u r y occurred before September 1939. Nevertheless 
the Director f o r Personal Services wrote purporting to accept the i n j u r y for d i s a b i l i t y 
pension purposes, and, re l y i n g upon t h i s acceptance Colonel Robertson forebore to 
obtain independent medical assessment of his condition, and Xray evidence disappeared. 
Subsequently the Ministry of Pensions disallowed the i n j u r y . 'Is the Ministry of 
Pensions bound by the War Office letter?...They assumed authority over the matter... 
i f a government department i n i t s dealings with a subject takes i t upon i t s e l f to 
assume authority over a matter w i t h which he i s concerned, he i s e n t i t l e d to r e l y upon 
|its having the authority which i t assumes...He does not know, and cannot be expected 
39 
bo know the l i m i t s of i t s authority.' 
J 
Denning, J d i f f e r e n t i a t e s the case from those i n contract. Insofar as the promissee, 
(polonel Robertson had not forebom to secure further medical assessment at the request 
(*)f the War Office 'there i s no consideration given at the time.' Rather 'the case f a l l s 
I 
v/ithin the p r i n c i p l e that i f a man gives a promise or assurance which he intends to be 
iDindir^ on him, and to be acted on by the person to whom i t i s given, then, once i t i s 
cted upon, he i s bound by i t . ' ^ ' ^ 
Footnotes: 8 Se  Fleming: Torts pp319-320. The Crown i s normally l i a b l e f o r the damage caused 
by the negligent acts of i t s servants, except, i t seems, where they are negligent 
i n t h e i r representation of matters concerning Crown Immunity. 
See Denning J's comments i n Robertson v MoP (post) P231 
39 Per Denning J at p232. Neither can the subject be expected to appreciate the 
extent of qu a l i t y of Crown immunity, surely, 
iip P231. 
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The l a t t e r p r i n c i p l e can be seen . at work i n Tankexpresse A/S v Compagnie Financiere 
Beige des Petroles S A. The appellants chartered a ship to the respondents on terms 
that payments should be made at a certain time of the month i n cash, or the ship would 
(be withdrawn. Over the period of hire payments had been made l a t e r i n the month and by 
cheque, and t h i s was accepted by the appellants as performance of the contract. The 
l a t t e r were, not,therefore,'entitled to vary the accepted method of performance without 
f i r s t n o t i f y i n g the respondents i n time to enable them to perform the contract i n 
s t r i c t conformity with the terms of the charter party.'^^ 
I t i s not satisfactory to see. t h i s , or the similar cases back to Hughes as examples of 
the suspensory e f f e c t of the equiiy, because quite clearly the effect so far as the 
action i s concerned, i s not suspensory, but t o t a l . Mhere the response of the promissee 
J i s once f o r a l l , as i n Robertson, the e f f e c t of the representation cannot be undone, 
and the r e s u l t of the equily i s pl a i n . I n the context of a continuing relationship, the 
3quity operates w i t h i n the currency of the representation which has the effect of 
modifying expectations arising out of the relationship. The representation may cease 
to bind the promissor i f the promissee i s given notice, and i f i t i s e q u i t a b l e i n 
1 
a l l the circumstances f o r him to revert to the status quo ante - as i t clearly would 
have been i n .TJie Petrofina, but not i n Robertson - so that i n a subsequent action, or 
perhaps as to a part of a present action, the promissor might be successful. I t i s 
misleading to suggest that his leg a l r i g h t s have been suspended^ they have been 
overriden liy equity f o r as long as required ty equity. 
Footnotes; 
i l l (19U9)AC76. (The 'Petrofina'). 
k2 Op c i t p93 per Lord Porter. 
i||3. i e f a i r . Thus 'adequate protection i s given to suppliers by the requirement that 
the notice should be reasonable. Per Denning, L J Rickards (post) pk2kA.> 
l4x Except i n the d i f f e r e n t sense, as applied by Hohfeld and adhered to here, that 
a l l overriding equities suspend l e g a l rights except where j u r i s d i c t i o n i s 
p a r a l l e l . I t i s to the use of suspensory to note temporary to which we object 
because i t obscures the true state of a f f a i r s . There i s no qualitative- difference 
between the overriding of legal r i g h t s f o r six months and doing so for eternity. 
I n both cases the court i s preventing the promissor from succeeding i n his action. 
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I n Richards v Oppenheim^^ the respondent ordered a chassis and required a body to be 
b u i l t on the chassis ty a par t i c u l a r date. When i t was not b u i l t by that date, he 
continued to press f o r delivery, and by the representation that he was s t i l l prepared 
to accept delivery he waived his r i g h t to repudiate the contract: 'by his conduct he 
made a promise not to i n s i s t upon his s t r i c t l e g a l rights.' ' That promise was intended 
to be binding, was intended to be acted upon, and was i n fact acted upon. '^ ^ The 
Court of Appeal accepted that Oppenheim could not at that stage have insisted upon the 
terms of the contract, and went on to consider whether the notice which he gave the 
dealer of an in t e n t i o n to make time of the essence was reasonable. There having been 
a time-stipulation i n the o r i g i n a l contract, such notice as Oppenheim gave was va l i d , 
and, being four weeks, reasonable. 
|TWO further cases i n 1950 involved the Rent Restrictions l e g i s l a t i o n : Solle v Butcher^"^ 
1 R 
and Welch v Nagy. I n the f i r s t , i t must be relevant that the parties had been partners 
i n an estate agent business, and that i t was the tenant who represented to the landlord 
t h a t a pa r t i c u l a r f l a t was not i n i t s reconstructed form, subject to the l e g i s l a t i o n . 
ho 
The Court set aside the lease on the ground of mistake, and the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the 
J)tatute to the f l a t seems t h i s time to have been regarded as a matter of fact^^'^'^ I t 
lias, on the facts therefore, unnecessary f o r the court to decide whether or not estoppel 
can oust the court from i t s . j u r i s d i c t i o n to decide whether the rent claimed i n respect 
c f any .dwelling house infringes.. .the.. .Act.'^"^ For a number of reasons Bucknell L J's 
I'ootnotes: 45 (1950) 1 A l l S R 1^ 20. But a promise to do, on more favourable terms, what one has 
already contracted to do, i s not i n conventional doctrine, binding: S t i l k v I ^ r i c k 
(1809) 12 comp 317. 
i4|6 Op c i t pU23S • 
1^7 (195O)1KB671. 
US (1950) lKBi;55. 
For the terms suggested ty Denning L J see (1950) IKB67I at p697. 
53 cf T e r r i t o r i a l Amy v Nichols (ante). 
5:L (1950) IKB67I at p683 (per Bucknill, L J) & at p695 (per Denning L J ) . 
5:! p695. 
53 At p688. 
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dictum would not embrace the equity r e l i e d on i n the Hughes cases. Denning i s at pains 
not to subsume the equiiy under the doctrine of estoppel^^ f o r there would be l i t t l e 
point i n pursuing the implications of one doctrine i f i t were subject to precisely the 
l i m i t a t i o n s suffered by another. 
Second, a misconception may have arisen to the extent that the e a r l i e r case of Welch 
V Nagy^^ was r e l i e d on. Here, the defendant became the tenant of furnished premises, 
and, a f t e r some months bought the f u r n i t u r e from the landlord. The l a t t e r liien sold 
the house to the p l a i n t i f f , and purported to s e l l the furniture as well. When the 
tenant wrote to the new landlord excercising his option.to extend the tenancy he 
mistakenly described the premises as 'furnished.« I f the premises, which had clearly 
56 56 become 'de facto' unfurnished, remained 'de jure' furnished, the court would have 
had a much wider j u r i s d i c a t i o n to grant possession, but t h i s would be 'to confer on 
the court by act of one of the parties a j u r i s d i c t i o n (namely an untrammelled power 
to make orders f o r possession of premises i n fact unfurnished) which Parliament has 
57 
Isaid that the Courts shall not have. ' The solution i n the case i s not questioned, but 
I t h e reasoning appears, l i k e much of the reasoning concerned with equitable estoppel, 
or the Hughes p r i n c i p l e , to owe too much to the law of contract. A contract i s 'a 
promise, or set of promises which the law w i l l enforce,' and 'the parties.. .are free 
H O 
bo make t h e i r own rules as to what shall and shall not bind them.' A l l that i s 
•"ootnotes: 51; Robertson v MoP (I9i;9) 1KB227 at p230s 'Those cases are not cases of estoppel i n 
the s t r i c t sense...' Rickards v Oppenheim (195Q) 1 A l l B R i|80 at pi;230s ' I t i s 
a kind of estoppel.' Central London Property Go v High Trees House (19U7)KB130 at 
PI364 ' I f the case had been one of estoppel i t might be said that i n any event 
the estoppel would cease when the conditions to which the representation applied 
came to an end. . . I prefer to apply the principle that a promise intended to be 
binding, intended to be acted on and i n fact acted upon i s binding so f a r as i t s 
terms properly apply.' 
(1950) 1KBU55. 
5j6 Per Asquith, L J at pi|6l 
57 Per Asquith L J at pl46i;. 
5p C h i t t y : Contracts, General Principles 1. 
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claimed f o r the equity i s that i t w i l l rescue one party from the consequence of his 
reliance upon a promise, or an apparent promise. I n contract the 'power of the individual 
to e f f e c t changes i n his legal relations with others i s comparable to the power of the 
59 
l e g i s l a t i v e . I t i s i n fact only a kind of p o l i t i c a l prejudice which causes us to use 
the word law i n one case, and not i n the other. '^ '^  As delegated legislature must not 
exceed an empowering statute, so the law-making power of individuals must not be 
allowed to contravene statutes dealing with the subject matter i n question. When a 
person seeks the r e l i e f of the equity, he does not assert that the parties reached an 
agreement, and, whether or not t h i s 'law' i s one which they were competent to make, 
the courts must enforce i t . He says instead that he has been led into a particular 
position, and he asks the court to help him out of i t . I t was not his desire that he 
should be i n the present position. 
Thus, i n Welch v Nagy, had the parties agreed to treat what were i n fact unfurnished 
premises as furnished, so as to confer a broader j u r i s d i c t i o n upon the court, they 
could not have enforced the agreement. Instead the landlord has been induced to 
undertake certain obligations on the basis that certain facts were true. I f they were 
true, the court would have had an enhanced j u r i s d i c t i o n over the tenancy. 'Why could the 
court not preclude the tenant from denying the t r u t h of the facts i n an appropriate 
case, i f f a i l u r e to preclude him would r e s u l t i n an injustice? 
|As i n the Robertson case^ i t seems that the courts are committed uncharacteristically 
to r e s t r a i n t upon freedom. I f contracts i n excess of statutes are enforced, then the 
•purpose of the statute - indeed the whole concept of l e g i s l a t i o n - i s gone: but i f a 
statute obstructs a remedy and leads to inequity i n doing so, no purpose i s served. 
Footnotes: 
59 P a r t i c u l a r t y i n the U S where Parliamentary sovereignty i s unknown. Increasingly 
i n the U K, where l e g i s l a t i v e power, w i l l have to be used i n conformity with 
, i ! E C policy or face annulment i n the European court. 
^0 Fuller, Consideration & Form kl Golum Law Rev 799 at p807. 
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This has been recognised i n other cases^ "'' 
I n Perrott V Cohen^^ the Coxirt of Appeal construed the occupation by a tenant of 
certain lavatories not included w i t h i n the lease as a representation by him that they 
were w i t h i n the demises 'The p r i n c i p l e i s that a man who gets i n by reason of being 
tenant, must take land as under his o r i g i n a l take.'^^ The landlords acquiesced i n the 
tenant's conduct, and at the termination of the lease brought an action against the 
tenant on the repairs covenants. The tenant was bound l y his o r i g i n a l -representation, 
f o r 'the representation was i n e f f e c t a promise or assurance, that the terms of the , 
lease should apply to the adjoining piece (of land)...and i t i s binding on the principle 
which I endeavoured to state i n Central London Property Co v High Trees House (ante).'^^ 
I t should be noticed that the tenant-promissor i s the defendant, and that his promise 
i s being enforced at the behest of the landlord-promissee. Aside from the representation, 
p l a i n t i f f has no cause of action, except perhaps i n quasi-contract. For t h i s reason i t 
Footnotes: 
61 See White, & Tudor: Cases i n Equity 8th e d i t i o n p86 et seq (cases on the Statute of 
Frauds). Also Birch v Pease & Partners ( l9ijl) 1 A l l E R 331;: Workmen's GoiT?)ensation 
Act 1925 51i3* 16 provided that where a workman on entering employment falsely 
denied having suffered from a disease, compensation was not payable. With 
knowledge of the false statement, the compaiiy paid compensation. The court upheld 
the 'claim by the workman to continued payments. Also Kingswood v Anderson (1963) 
2QBI69 though here reliance i s placed upon another statute. See also Hamam Singh 
V Jamal Pirbhai ( l 9 5 l ) AC688. Different codes, r e s t r i c t i n g rents of respectively, 
dwelling houses and business premises. The Privy Council decided that where the 
premises were •m±xed;i' the court must, choose, the more, appropriate c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
The action of the party ousted the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the parties as to one of these 
codes. Moreover i t was a l e t t e r from the tenant's s o l i c i t o r which gave the court 
j u r i s d i c t i o n under the l e g i s l a t i o n applicable to statutory tenancies. (p699). 
62 (1950) 2 A l l E R 939. 
63 At p9ii,l per Somervlll, L J, c i t i n g Charles, J i n Tabor v Godfrey (ante). 
6U At. p9i;3 per- Denning, L J. 
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i s surprising to f i n d Denning L J, i n Combe v Combe^^ asserting that the High Trees 
'principle does not create new causes of action where none existed before'^^ 
Here, following the pronouncement of a decree n i s i the promissor promised to pay his 
former wife £100 annually, a f t e r deduction of income tax. She pressed for payment, 
but without success, and, af t e r more than six years brought an action on the promise. 
At f i r s t instance '^me, J found i n her favour, but was reversed on appeal. Consideration 
was thought to be necessary to support the promise, unless i t was being used as a 
defence, or as 'a part of a cause of action but not a cause of action i n i t s e l f . ' I n 
none of the cases r e l i e d on by the wife 'was the defendant sued on the promise, 
67 
assurance, or assertion as a cause of action i n i t s e l f , ' Denning L J said, apparently 
68 
ignoring Perrott v Cohen. 
I f i t h Conibe v Combe the c r e a t i v i t y inspired by the High Trees decision seems to have 
reached i t s zenith. We have seen that although the equity has had a continued existence 
Footnotes: 
65 (1951) 2KB215. See Attyah: Consideration p5l. 
56 I b i d at p219. 
57 I b i d p220. 
58 I t would be possible to i n t e r p r e t Perrott v Cohen more narrowly, though none of 
the judges seems to have done so i n Combe v Combe, and re s t r i c t e d to matters 
concerning landlord and tenant. See Cohen, L J's judgement (Perrott v Cohen (1951) 
IKB705 at p709. 'fffer doubt was whether the equitable principle on which the judge 
arrived at his decision was r e a l l y applicable to the facts as he found them. 
Fortunately I am not compelled to reach a conclusion on that point because (of) 
Tober v Godfrey' (ante). 
See Denning L J's judgement, at p710: ' I know that t h i s looks l i k e creating an 
estoppel almost as i f i t were a cause of action i n Rickards v Oppenheim, the case 
cited as authority l y Denning, L J. 
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since 1875, f o r much of t h i s time i t has been submerged. High Trees represented a 
renewed a r t i c u l a t i o n of a necessary p r i n c i p l e , but because on the facts t h i s declaration 
of p r i n c i p l e was obiter i t was some time before the 'kind of estoppel' could be asserted, 
openly and with confidence. Except f o r those who view the decision i n i t s proper context, 
and have regard f o r the basic pr i n c i p l e that a man mast keep his word and compensate 
those who not reasonably led astray, the phenomenon i s surprising and the reaction of 
the Court of Appeal i n Combe v Combe merely moderate. 
[The Court could not easily uphold both the wife's claim and the doctrine of considerations^^ 
70 
We have suggested that both e t h i c a l and pr a c t i c a l requirements point to the adoption 
of the equity, and are of the view that the t r a d i t i o n a l dogma within h i s t o r i c a l subject 
boundaries should j u s t i i y themselves when they c o n f l i c t with i t . That the law ought to 
8l 
|ericourage men to keep t h e i r promises unless there i s some positive contraindication 
71 
[does not seem extravagantly i d e a l i s t i c ! Whether any such contraindication exalts the 
consideration doctrine when c o n f l i c t occurs i n Combe v Combe may be answered by 
iFootn'otes:,-- •. .• . -'^ 9 Although courts have performed more d i f f i c u l t feats. See Gore v Van der Lann (1967) 
A l l g R 360. See also T r e i t e l 3rd ed p57 et seq, especially ppl08-ll6. 
70. See introduction. 
71 I n p a r t i c u l a r Rawls' r a t i o n a l l y self-interested man would doubtless stipulate 
i 
I such a lega l approach from behind his v e i l of ignorance. See Rawls: A Theory of 
Justice. See also, b r i e f l y , Runciman: Relative I^zioration & Social Justice, for an 
attempt to context ju s t i c e i n society. 
81 See Atiyah: Consideration i n contracts - A fundamental restatement 5l« He suggests 
that Combe v Combe achieved a f a i r solution,-upon the facts and cites Denning, L J 
i n support of his own conclusion, that the case 'decided nothing more than t h i s , 
that an act or forbearance which naturally and forseeably follows from and i n 
reliance on a promise i s not a consideration for'the enforcement of the promise 
what the j u s t i c e of the case does not require that i t should be'l p52: the 
i t a l i c s are h i s ) . 
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72 
approaching the l i t e r a t u r e i n the l i g h t of Fuller's analysis. Commentators have 
stressed the importance of the role played by consideration i n the enforcement of 
promises - notably, to adopt Fuller's terminology concerning the function of legal 
for m a l i t i e s , the evidentiary, cautionary, and channelling tasks performed. There i s no 
73 
reason to suppose that only consideration can perform these tasks i n the context 
generally, nor, in. the case of Combe v Gombe was the suggestion made that the husband's 
promise had been incautiously made, was vague, or that i t had not been made at a l l . I t s 
existence, and the wife's reliance upon i t were accepted. A l l that consideration could 
have bestowed on a contract was i n fact provided by other means, but because consideration 
7^ 
i t s e l f was unsung the promise could not be upheld. That the wife had, i n reliance on 
the promise, forebome to sue, was, no doubt quite r i g h t l y , held not to be consideration 
7l 
[because she could not have so bound herself i n advance. 
Footnotes: 
|^72 F u l l e r : Consideration & Form kl Col L Rev 799. See also Wrights Ought the Consideration 
Doctrine to be Abolished from the Common Law? k9 H3:v:ard Law Rev 1225; Harrison: The 
Reform of Consideration CCXIV IQR237; Gardiner; An Inquiry into the Principles of 
the Law of Contracts 14.6 HLRl, at p9, but p a r t i c u l a r l y pp22-i4.3; linger: (the conservative 
view) |;ntention to create le g a l Relations, Consideration, & Mi t u a l i t y 19MLR96. 
"^ 3 See the proposals of the Law Revision committee Sixth Interim Report (1937) Gmd 
5UU9 J & Ha»i.sdnoii.: The Reform of Consideration SMI/ for a c r i t i c i s m of the 
more rad i c a l proposals. 
See the cominent of Henderson: Promissory Estoppel & Traditional Contract Doctrine 
78 Yale L J 3U3 at p3U7: ' I t i s easy to forget that while reliance may i n some 
instances be essential to bargain theory, bargain i s not essential to reliance theory, 
•j'Though i t t y p i c a l l y accompanies bargain transactions, conduct i n reliance occurs i n 
a variety of forms & degrees and may well be induced independent of the making of a 
bargain.. .But the f a c t that reliance coincides with bargain i n some cases tends to 
p u l l i t w i t h i n the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n a l l cases.' 
7j5 '...Consideration i s too f i r m l y f i x e d to be overthrown by a side-wind' per Denning, L J 
i n Comhe v Gombe (l95l) 2KB215 at p220. P T 0 
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I am not concerned farther w i t h the application of the ordinary rules of contract to 
t h i s case, except to regret that a benefit de facto conferred could not be seen as 
s u f f i c i e n t support f o r a return promise, even though by the nature of the situation i t 
could not have been assured u n t i l the operation of the Limitation Act. 
I venture a suggestion, but one which could not r e a l i s t i c a l l y be urged upon the courts. 
Rather, I perceive dimly from study of the pragmatic accretion of decisions through 
which change occurs i n English judge-made law, and more especially from observation of 
the l e g a l system as a whole, an a l t e r a t i o n i n emphasis. Hence forward, I submit, t h i s 
a l t e r a t i o n may be seen being accomplished i n the courts t y means of our equity i n i t s 
varied guises. Just as the process which comes to be known i n Norman England as Covenant 
i s said to be the product of a society (and p a r t i c u l a r l y of a caste i n society) which 
77 
attaches a special significance to questions of honour and a duty to keep one's word, 
so the binding nature of a bargain-contract i s a product of a society placing unusual 
emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c self-expression. The bargain-contract enables a person, an 
[entrepreneur, to improve his position vis a vis other members of society, and ultimately 
7ft 
to e x ploit his superior economic efficiency. Capitalism l e f t unchecked leads to monopoly. 
Footnotes: 76 See Corbin: Non-binding promises as consideration 26 Col L Rev 550 at p557 'The 
dictum that both parties to a b i l a t e r a l agreement most be bound or neither i s bound 
i s inveterate'- though t h i s i s admittedly not supported t y 'an exhaustive study of 
the cases.• 
Note that i n an executory contract, the f i r s t promise caimot be binding u n t i l the 
promissor has received the second. I f the f i r s t promise i s subject to a condition 
precedent i t i s not very d i f f e r e n t from the promise i n Combe v Combe: i t i s not 
binding u n t i l the condition i s f u l f i l l e d , any more than Mrs Combe's promise before 
the operation of the statute. 
77 Hazeltine: The Formal Contract of Early English Law 10 Col Law Rev608 on the 
Anglo-Saxon o r i g i n of the formal promise. 
V8 See Rehbinder: Status, Contract & the Welfare State 23 Stanford L Rev9ia. Also Weber: 
Law i n Econoiry & Society (ed Rheinstein) p301. 'The Formal Qualities of Modern law' 
where he discusses the commercial stamp placed upon transactions and the 'demands 
f o r a 'social law'...directed against the very dominance of a mere business morality.' 
(p309). P T 0 
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and contract as the paradigm of laissez-faire capitalism becomes unworkable except 
79 
subject to r e s t r a i n t . A new social departure i s made v i s i b l e by the welfare state: 
there i s the recognition that l e g a l duties of support are owed by individuals w i t h i n 
the community to one another. Covenant and the bargain-contract are called into being 
by the demands of a par t i c u l a r era, and i n the same way a new principle i s i n the 
process of being constructed by the present. 
The new p r i n c i p l e , which has to give e f f e c t to the concept of interdependence 
inevitably c o n f l i c t s w i t h the bargain-contract and may usefully be dated from 1932, 
when i t was necessary to overthrow the ' p r i v i t y of contract fallacy* i n order to set up 
8o 
the ^neighbour t e s t . ' I t s transactional implications have to be found expressed i n 
the old terminology. 
Footnotes: 
79 e g the Taft-Hartley Act and the Renegotiation Act i n the U S. I n t h i s country 
Statutory Restraints include the Race Relations Acts, the Rent Acts and the Hire 
Purchase Acts. Also the remedies given to consumers as an adjxinct to the 
criminal process (a method deplored t y Pollock f o r i t s implications, i n what's 
i n a Name? (1956) Grim L R792,* the Distinguishing Mark of a Crime 22MIRi;95, who 
f a i l s , w i t h respect, to note the return to a less laissez f a i r society which th i s 
use of the criminal courts symbolises). See Stone: Social Dimensions Chapter 15-
95 
[word misleads^ unless reference i s made to the context!!^ 
I n the following year Brrington v Errington^ was decided. For his son and daughter i n 
law to l i v e i n , a father bought a house i n his own name. He obtained a mortgage i n 
order to buy i t and remained l i a b l e to meet the repayments, but he handed the repayment 
book to the daugher-in-law, saying that the house was a present to the couple, and that 
i t would become t h e i r properly provided that they met the repayments. He died, and i n 
the same year his son l e f t the daughter-in-law, and went to l i v e with his mother. The 
mother, as executrix of the father, sought possession from the daughter-in-law, and 
the question was, therefore, what int e r e s t the daughter-in-law had i n the properly. 
Denning L J was s a t i s f i e d 'that the couple were licensees having a permissive occupation 
short of a tenancy but with a contractual r i g h t , or at any rate an equitable r i g h t to 
remain so long as they paid the instalments.'^ 
Again, the d i f f i c u l t y was to safeguard the daughter's entitlement without conferring 
on her an absolute t i t l e free of the obligation to meet the mortgage repayments 
'which would be quite contrary to the ju s t i c e of the case.'^ At common law a licence 
could be revoked at the licensor's w i l l i n despite of any contract. This position i s 
ho longer the case and 'since the fusion of law and equity no court i n t h i s country 
would refuse a p l a i n t i f f i n WoodTs"^  si t u a t i o n the remedy fo r which he asked. '^  I n other 
^ords the grounds of the r e l i e f which the licensee may claim are equitable, and 
Footnotes: 
See Pears: Wittgenstem 58. An assertion i n ordinary factual discourse i s a 'gross 
move.' I m p l i c i t i n any complex proposition are many elementary propositions by 
which the complex proposition i s understood or misunderstood. 
i|A The attempt to understand licenses by reference to a conceptual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s 
i n our view misguided. See: London Borough of Hounslow v Twickenham Garden 
Developments Ltd. (1970) 3 A l l BR 326. They must be seen i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r 
efficacy. 
(1952)1 A l l S R li;9 . 
I b i d pl5i;. 
I n Wood V Leadbitter 13 M & W 838. 
ffiinter Garden Theatre case (ante) pl91 per Viscount Simon. 
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V:l 
Since the chief advances i n the use of the equity i n the next period under consideration 
are to be found are i n r e l a t i o n to r e a l property, i t may be useful to begin t y re f e r r i n g 
to Foster v Robinson^ a case predating Combe v Conibe (ante) t y some months. 
A farmworker occupied a farm cottage at a low rent. I n 19i|.6 he was no longer able to 
work whereupon the farmer, his landlord, indicated that he could continue to occupy the 
cottage rent free f o r as long as he l i v e d , l/hen he died, his daughter, who had been 
l i v i n g w i t h him i n the cottage for nine years, took out l e t t e r s of administration and 
sought to remain i n the cottage. What became of her i s of no importance here, save 
insofar as her f a t e , which was the issue before the court depended upon the r i g h t which 
her father had had conferred upon him i n 19U6. Evershed, M R did not consider whether 
there was a tenancy at w i l l , but preferred the view 'that the tenant was e n t i t l e d as 
[licensee to occupy the premises without charge for the rest of l i i s days.' Moreover, ' I f • 
jthe landlord, having made the arrangeiiBnt, sought to revoke i t , he would be restrained 
ty the court from doing so.' 
The problem facing the court was to accept that the landlord's gratuitious promise was 
jDinding on him, but avoid doing so by creating an interest i n land to which his 
illaughter might succeed. By using the concept of the licence, not only was t h i s 
( d i f f i c u l t y overcome, but the promise i t s e l f seems to have gained a force i t could not 
otherwise iiave achieved i n the absence of consideration. " I emphasise the mere 
.3Tistrumentality of the licence i n giving ef f e c t to the promise, since the use of the 
iootnotest 
(1950) 2 A l l S R 3h2. See the remarks of Sir Raymond Evershed, M R at p3U6H. 
See Cheshire: A New Equitable Interest i n Land? 16MLR1J Crane: Estoppel Interests 
i n Land 31 Conv (NS) 332j Maudsley: Licences to Remain on Land 20Conv (NS)28l. 
Winter Garden Theatre v Millenium Productions (l9li8)AG173 was referred to, but 
foremost i n the court's mind i n the present case was whether the surrender of the 
tenancy by operation of law would suffice to remove the property from the Rent 
Rest r i c t i o n Acts. I n that case the licence had been created by an undoubted contract. 
P T 0 
96 
Denning L J's statement that 'this infusion of equity means that contractual licences 
9 now have a force and v a l i d i t y of t h e i r own and cannot be revoked i n breach of contract' 
i s misleading, f o r i t i s not the contract which makes the licence irrevocable, but, 
wider than contract, the terms upon which the r i g h t basing the licecce, are conferred. 
These terras might be contained i n a g i f t j otherwise Foster v Robinson cannot be 
explained. 
I n Ferris v Weaven"^ *^  the husband l e f t his wife, i n I 9 I 1 . I , i n occupation of the former 
matrimonial house, and l i v e d apart from her. He promised that ' I w i l l carry on paying 
on the house providing you do not annoy me. '"'"^  She complied by not seeking maintenance 
payments from him. Then i n 1951, the husband wished to dispose of the house and sold 
i t to his brother-in-law for a nominal consideration, which he did not i n fact receive. 
The p l a i n t i f f , the brother-in-law, sought possession from the wife. The court held 
that he was not e n t i t l e d to possession because the wife had a licence to remain i n the 
house: the licence was conferred by the husband's promise^ and the husband's promise 
|was gratuitous, f o r the only return by the wife was a forebearance to 'annoy' him. This 
:an only mean that she forebore to sue for maintenance, and since she could not i n law 
12 
30 bind herself t h i s could not amount to consideration for the husband's promise. 
] l e a r l y , to the extent that the case r e l i e s on Bendall v McWhirterP and to the extent 
that Bendall v McWhirter'^"^ has been overruled by the unfortunate decision of the House 
Footnotes: Errington v Errington (ante) at pl55G. 
j.0 (1952) 2 A l l S R 233. See also Webb v Paternoster, Palm 71 cited Tudor: Leading 
Cases i n Real Property etc i|th ed p805. •Where the owner of a dominant tenement 
authorises the owner of a servient tenement, although only by parol, to do some act 
thereon, the e f f e c t of which w i l l be to prevent the future enjoyment of the 
easement, i t w i l l be extinguished'. - i e irrevocable, 
l l I b i d p23i;B. 
112 See Combe v Combe, and the discussion ante. Atiyah does not seem to take t h i s point. 
13 (1952) 1 A l l E R 1307. 
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of Lords i n NPB v Ainsworth'}^ i t cannot remain an authority. However, i n the l a t t e r case 
the bank took t y reason of a 'valid transfer,' whilst the brother-in-law i n Ferris took 
by v i r t u e of a 'sham sale'"}^ Moreover, there seems to have been no licence i n NPB v 
[Ainsworth, but a 'mere equity against anyone but a purchaser for value without notice,' 
and neither a registrable nor an overriding i n t e r e s t ^ ^ 
17 
The facts of Hopgood v Brown were that two adjacent plots of land were conveyed to 
one Turner by two conveyances, neither of which precisely defined the boundary between. 
jSventually the defendant held the southern portion, and the northern portion was held 
by a company controlled lij the defendant's father, of which the defendant was a director. 
E^ r agreement with the company, the defendant b u i l t a garage, one wall of which would 
inevitably form a boundary between the plots. I n fact ' i t i s not possible to imagine 
19 
that along straight l i n e s . ' and the garage encroached several feet on to the northern 
iplot. P l a i n t i f f , as the company's successor, was estopped from claiming a wedge-shaped 
piece of the defendant's garage by the compary's agreement with the defendant. 'An 
assignee of a lease i s estopped by the deed which estops his assignor.' ' I t would be a 
jirery odd thing i n the law of any countiy i f A could take, by ai^y form of conveyance a 
;reater or better r i g h t than he who conveys i t to him. • FootnoteSI 
(1965) AC1175* I n NPB v Ainsworth the mortgagee had no actual notice of the 
occupancy. 
45 I b i d pl223 per Lord Hodson. Curiously Lord Hodson admits that the wife i s 'not a 
person who needs any licence from her husband to be where she has a r i g h t to be as a 
wife.' (pl223). Had she been a licensee, she might perhaps have been able to take 
advantage of the p o s s i b i l i t y that 'the l i s t of exceptions i s not closed' of 
licences binding on t h i r d parties. 
16 •-• For an equity overriding a Statute of Registrations. See White v NeayloE (1886) 
IIACI7I. The Act f a i l e d to avoid oral contracts creating equities. 
17 (1955) 1WLR213. 
1|8 Per Mansfield C J i n Taylor v Needham (I8IO) 2 Taunt 278 at p283 cited (1955) 
1¥LR213 at p231. 
1^ (1955) 1 MR 213 at p217 per Lord Evershed, M R. 
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The case i s not especially controversial, except that the company's successor i n t i t l e 
seems to have been bound by the company's representation to the defendant although 
from the t i t l e deeds he would, on purchasing the property, have had no indication from 
the plan of the encroachment. For the company 'did not make any express statements... 
(but) they did by t h e i r conduct impliedly represent that the defendant could safely 
20 
|proceed to b u i l d as he planned. • That the purchaser i s bound by a representation 
21 
|of t h i s kind i s not i n a l l circumstances so easily acquiesced i n . 
22 
Plasticmoda Societa per Azioni v Davidsons (Ifanchester) Ltd was a sale of goods 
case. The defendants agreed to s e l l a quantity of cable strippings and to ship them 
i n two instalments. Payment was to be by confirmed l e t t e r of credits Shipment was 
ielayed and a time extension agreed, but the l e t t e r of credit was extended only for 
,30 tons 'because we have the feeling that you need more time than expected.. .and i t 
• jould be of no sense to l e t our money laying f o r several months at the D i s t r i c t Bank 
23 
Ha l t i n g that the material be ready f o r the shipment or wouldn't.' I t was clear that 
ihe buyer was prepared to increase the l e t t e r of credit. There was a long period of 
delay and evasion by the Snglish s e l l e r , and f i n a l l y the buyer sued. I n defence the 
f e l l e r claimed that i t was the buyer who was i n breach of contract for f a i l u r e to supply 
the agreed l e t t e r of credit. The Court of Appeal had no d i f f i c u l t y i n finding that 
''ithe s e l l e r by his conduct l e d the buyer to believe that he would not i n s i s t on the 
cr e d i t being established u n t i l the s e l l e r had t o l d the buyer that the goods were ready:' 
that i s , the defendant had led the p l a i n t i f f to believe that he would not i n s i s t on 
his s t r i c t l e g a l r i g h t s . I t i s an example of Spencer-Bower's 'minesweeper pr i n c i p l e . ' 
FootnotesJ 20 I b i d at p230 per Morris, L J. 
2}. An i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the case to the e f f e c t that the wedge-shaped piece of land 
_was simply not conveyed begs the question as to why i t was not. The answer to 
t h i s clearly l i e s i n the representation made by the company pri o r to the 
conveyance, which brings us back to Mansfield's point. 
2^  (1952) I I I Rep 527. 
2:\ I b i d at p531. 
2ii I b i d at p538 per Denning, I . J. 
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25 S i m i l a r l y , i n Tool Metal Manufacturing Co v Tungsten E l e c t r i c Co compensation 
payments were suspended. •::!SWE\ acquired certain patents from the Osram company. TB^ O 
was observed to be i n breach o f these patents, and negotiations followed, with the 
re s u l t that .TEGO was permitte'd-to continue operation, but subject to a quota. Any 
production i n excess of the quota was to be accor^^anied by compensation payments to 
TMMj'i!;, agreed not to enforce the agreement for compensation payments. . TECO took the 
view that compensation payments were thereafter 'washed out,' claiming that i t had 
entered the f i r s t agreement w i t h TMM3 under the delusion fostered by TMMD that TECO 
was being treated i n the same way as other licensees of TMM), and that these were the 
best terms commercially possible f o r TMM3 to grant. TECO issued a w r i t agains TMTC 
on t h i s basis, and i n t h e i r counterclaim TMKD plea,ded 'the defendants do not wish to 
enforce payment of compensation i n respect of deliveries made after 31st December 1939 
but before the end of h o s t i l i t i e s w i t h Germany'^^ TECO's action was unsuccessful. 
Insofar as the counterclaim asked f o r compensation a f t e r that time, the t r i a l court 
|and the Court of Appeal applied Hughes and the Birmingham case, the only disagreement 
^etween them being as to the manner i n which the suspensory period could be brought 
bo an end. Since t h i s l a t t e r point was not before the court, the 195U Court of Appeal 
f e l t free to disregard the e a r l i e r court's discussion. Romer, L J, i n whose judgement 
the others concurred, f e l t that mequivocal notice was required ' i f the old terms were 
27 28 
bo be enforced again according to t h e i r l i t e r a l provisions.' He cited CPR v R and 
29 
itoH'' V Bel l o t ! t i f o r the proposition that ' "Whether any and i f so what r e s t r i c t i o n s 
footnotess 
?5 (1951;) liJLR862 (CA), (1955)lWLR76l (HL). The f i r s t action and subsequent appealbby 
TECO reported at (1950) 69RPC108 was on the question of misrepresentation by Krupps, 
the former owner of TM^ C. The second action and two appeals by TMMC were for claims 
by TMM3 of compensation. I t became relevant then, although i t had not been so before, 
to decide when the suspensory period had been ended. 
is (195U) 1WLR862 at p870. 
2:7 I b i d at p878 per Romer L J, c i t i n g Somervill, L J i n ' p r e v i o u s appeal. 
2 8 (1931) AC Um. 
219 (1910;) KB 298. 
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e x i s t on the power of a licensor to determine a revocable licence.. .depend(s) on the 
circumstances of the case,' The notice must be 'reasonable.' 
The House of Lords f e l t that the counterclaim was su f f i c i e n t notice. Viscount Simonds' 
view was t h a t equity did not require express notice that the period of 'indulgence' 
was over, especially since TMM3's attitu d e 'could not surprise the respondents, who 
had not hesitated to bring against them a serious charge of fraud.'^^ Further, ' I do 
not wish,' he said, 'to lend the authority of t h i s House to the statement of the 
principle which i s to be found i n Combe v Combe (ante) and may well be f a r too widely 
stated...I woiild not have i t supposed, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n commercial transactions, that Jmere acts of indulgence are apt to create r i g h t s , '•^•'' I t i s as doubtful whether he would sanction the creation of rights t y such means i n non-commercial transactions, 
however, as i t i s curious that he should so interpret Combe v Combe (ante). 
32 
[Gordon maintains that the suspensory effec t of the waiver was not given the authority 
Footnotess 30 (1955) 1WLR760 at p76ii. 
31 This quotation from Viscount Simonds seems to form the i m p l i c i t centrepiece of 
D M Gordon's a r t i c l e at (1963) 01^22% at p25l. Neither the a r t i c l e nor the 
comment by Simonds i s p a r t i c u l a r l y satisfactory. Gordon's main contentions seem to 
be that courts have ignored the High Trees princ i p l e ; that High Trees owes nothing 
to Hughesj and that to support the concept underlying High Trees i s " next door to 
being 'Fundamentalists, whose creed i s that a l l statutes and law books should be 
scrapped and replaced by the Bible.' (p260). Presumably the same c r i t i c i s m can be 
le v e l l e d against eqiiity as a whole i n i t s origins, and against Donoghue v Stevenson 
f o r i t s discussion of neighbours. 
Gordon f a i l s to understand the nature of the legal processj there i s no necessary 
connection.between High Trees and Hughes, but t h i s i s not the same as saying that 
there cannot be a connection.(See Stones Legal System & Lawyers' Reasonings). 
32 Op c i t p2J49s 'In the r e s u l t a l l the courts made assumptions as to rights that may 
not have existed, and against r i g h t s that probably did exist, simply because those 
were never canvassed by successful parties.• 
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of the House because i t was not disputed before the Houset he overlooks the p o s s i b i l i t y 
that i t was never questionned because i t s binding nature was a part of commercial 
'\ 33 
mores. The assumptions made by a l l three courts are s u f f i c i e n t to ensure the survival 
of the Hughes pr i n c i p l e and i t s application to the debtor-creditor relationship, at 
least so f a r as i t remains a 'minesweeper' and does not presume to be a 'capital unit.'"^^ 
Having ended the previous section with the hunting effec t of Combe v Combe (ante) we 
discussed i n t h i s section the extent to which the decision i n Combe was consistent with 
that of Ferris v We a vena i t i s therefore apt to end t h i s section tsj considering Ward 
V %-ham^^ and i t s possibly l i b e r a t i n g e f f e c t . I f we approach Combe and Ward v ^ham 
without a p r i o r i , l e g a l conception we f i n d a qual i t a t i v e s i m i l a r i t y . The facts of Ward 
V i^ yham are that an unmarried couple had a c h i l d , and when i t was about h years old 
the father turned the mother out. The c h i l d was for a time looked after by a neighbour, 
but then the father consented to the mother's having the c h i l d : he was to pay £1 a 
week to the mother provided that she looked af t e r the c h i l d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . She 
promised to do so, but l a t e r both married and the father ceased the payments. The 
mother sued on the father's promise to make the payments and the father argued lack 
of consideration, the National Assistance Act 19U8'^ ^ placing upon a mother the duty 
37 
Df maintaining an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d , 
footnotes: 33 See Wilson: A Reappraisal of Quasi-Estoppel (1965)GLJ93 at p l l 3 . Also, ante. 
Introduction. 
See also l y l e - M e l l ^ v Lewis (1956) 1 A l l B R 2ii7 (CA) p l a i n t i f f granted a license 
to manufacture a r t i c l e s which he had patented, to the defendants. The defendants 
did so, remitting to p l a i n t i f f the sums due under the licence from time to time. 
They then repudiated l i a b i l i t y , p l a i n t i f f sued f o r the sums unpaid, and the 
defendants were estopped from denying, as they sought to do, that the a r t i c l e s 
wMch they manufactured were covered by the licence. 
5 (1956) 2 A l l S R 318. 
3|6 s i;2. 
37 Presumably the term i n the contract requiring the mother to allow the ch i l d to 
choose wi t h whom she would l i v e would be unenforceable: Hunphreys v Polak (1901) 
2KB385. 
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Denning, L J, wit h the agreement of Morris and Parker, L J J, based his decision i n 
favour of the mother on the e x p l i c i t assumption that a promse to perform an existing 
obligation i s consideration. Whilst Combe involved a promise which chould not bind 
the promissor, so Ward v i^ham involved a promise to do something which the promissor 
was already bound to do. I n other words, both promises are inefectual to a l t e r the 
status quo. They do not add to the promissor's burdens; she has given away nothing 
i n return f o r the promise which she i n turn has received. I t i s as d i f f i c u l t to share 
Atiyah's approval of the reasoning as i t i s easy to concur i n welcoming the result. 
For the mother's promise to maintain the c h i l d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i s l e g a l l y onerous only 
only i f one sta r t s w i t h that which one i s required to prove, namely, that the promise 
' 38A i s l e g a l l y binding, enforceable by the father. I f the promise i s not actionable at 
the s u i t of the father, there i s no burden on the mother. Implied i n the decision i s 
the i n i t i a l presumption that the mother's promise i s binding,' that the father's promise 
39 
i s binding, and that either w i l l provide the promissee with a cause of action. 
Footnotes5 38 Atiyah: Introduction to the law of Contract 2nd ed p69. 'The statutory duty of 
maintaining the c h i l d i s only designed to deal with the duty of supporting the ch i l d 
as between the mother and the state, not as between the mother and the father, 
hence the mother's promise i s , as between her and the father, a detriment to her, 
and a benefit to him.' 
.38A s U2 of the I9U8 Act does not give a r i g h t of action other than by the Board to 
recover public money expended i n support of the persons described i n subsection 1. 
39 Parker & Morris, L J J f e e l that the terms of the l e t t e r iir?)ose an extra duty upon 
the mother, namely that of keeping the c h i l d happy and well looked af t e r . How 
convincing and r e a l i s t i c an extra burden i s this? See 72IdQRi;90. We cannot see how 
performance of a duty can constiute consideration by analogy with a b i r d i n the 
hand. Surely the b i r d i s already i n the hand i f a duly to perform exists - unless 
the performance i s d i f f e r e n t i n kind, when there must be a new contract. 
The other of Cdrbin's arguments cite d i n the Note does not seem relevant to a 
discussion of Ward v ^ ham. I n the non-commercial setting of the case there was no 
question of the promissee's using her resources elsewhere, and paying damages for 
breach of the duty out of the proceeds. Questions of public policy (see Glassbrook 
V Glams C C (1925)AC27Q) are subordinate, or irr e l e v a n t to the main issue of whether 
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There can be drawn no other conclusion than that the law w i l l permit the enforcement 
of gratuitous promises, but that, having decided to do so must f i r s t assume consideration; 
the l a t t e r may s i t easily or perilously on the facts of the case. 
V42 
I n Morrow v Carty^*^ the p l a i n t i f f successfully bid for a bungalow that was being 
auctioned at Cookstown. He f a i l e d to produce the amount of the deposit, however, and 
asked for an hour i n which to go home and fetch i t . S i g n i f i c a n t l y the property was 
not sold u n t i l more than one hour had elapsed, the defendant's s o l i c i t o r considering 
himself ' i n honour and l e g a l l y bound'^ not to s e l l . Relying on Viscount Simonds' 
i n t e i p r e t a t i o n of Birmingham i n TMM3 v TECO (ante) McVeigh, J decided that even i f the 
p l a i n t i f f had returned w i t h i n the hour the defendant would not have been bound to s e l l 
the bungalow to him, f o r 'nothing was done by the vendor's s o l i c i t o r or t y the vendor 
to cause tlie p l a i n t i f f to a l t e r his position to his detriment. '^ ^ I n case this ground 
should prove unsatisfactory, McVeigh, J added that p l a i n t i f f ' s disingenuousness 
f o r f e i t e d his r i g h t to equity: he had not merely to go home to collect the deposit, 
but also to e f f e c t a sale of his stepfather's farm.'...Can he be heard to invoke the 
aid of equity?' The prin c i p l e i s only allowed i n where i t would be 'unjust' to allow 
1 "3 
a party to i n s i s t on his s t r i c t l e g a l r i g h t s . ' 
I t seems quite clear that the f i r s t objection might not have been f i n a l had the second 
been met."I''- have argued that the essence of equity remains ethics, and that i t 
functions by restraining the enforcement of s t r i c t legal r i g h t s ; t h i s makes the second 
objection c r u c i a l , and quite independent of the f i r s t . On the basis of the reasoning 
which; I rejected i n r e l a t i o n to Ward v E^ h^am, and bearing i n mind the reference to 
advantage to the proraissor i n Hughes^ a case for the promissee could surely have been 
sustained. I t was without doubt an advantage to both the vendor and his auctioneer 
not to have to r e s e l l the property: they might have received less favourable offers. 
Footnotes: 
ko (1957) Ni nh. 
ig. I b i d pl80:19. 
k2 I b i d pl8l:23. 
k3 I b i d , pl82:27. 
kh Lord Blackburn at (1877 2 App Cas i;53, c i t e d (1957) NI 182:39. 
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P l a i n t i f f ' s was, i n short, a b i r d i n the hand. 
The t h i r d objection, too, i s f a r from f a t a l to the p l a i n t i f f ' s cause. The argument 
that equitable estoppel i s a shield only, and not a sword may be met by asserting that 
the p l a i n t i f f seeks specific performance of the contract whilst the defendant i s 
estopped from r e l y i n g i n his defence, on the o r i g i n a l terms of the contract. 
Thus the authority of Morrow v Carty may be narrower than i t seems, prima facie, to be. 
A l i b e r a l view was taken by Harman J i n City of Meistminster Properties v Madd!f^  The 
defendant antique dealer had l i v e d i n the basement rooms below his shop during the war, 
as a safeguard against f i r e . He was granted a lease f o r three years, with a covenant 
not to use the premises f o r any but business purposes, nor to do anything which might 
cause the premises to be brought w i t h i n the Rent Acts. On his application for a 
renewal there was some disagreement over the r e s t r i c t i v e clauses, but the court 
accepted defence evidence that the landlords agreed to delete some part of them, and 
tha t i n effec t there was a promise to the tenant that i f he executed the lease, no 
attempt would be made to enforce the'shop-only' covenant against him. '...but for 
the promise made he would not have executed the lease but would have moved to other 
premises available to him at the time...There was a clear contract acted on by the 
tenant to his detriment, and from much the landlords cannot r e s i l e ' ^ ^ 
Harman, J cites Re William Porter (ante) i n support of his conclusions here however -
and i n r e l a t i o n to Cairncross v Lorimer, a case r e l i e d upon i n Porter i t i s even more 
30 - what i s being emphasised i s not consideration proper, but reliance upon a 
:representation, the r e s u l t of which i s that the promisee has put himself into a 
disadvantageous position. This i s 'the doctrine.. .which i s to be found. . . i n the laws 
) 7 
of a l l c i v i l i z e d nations,' and t h i s , we consider to be the underlying reason for 
the decision. The creation of the c o l l a t e r a l contract i s unnecessary f o r i t neither 
f i t s t r a d i t i o n a l nineteenth century contract dogma, nor accomplishes i t s objectives 
I 
Footnotesa 
i 5 (1958) 2 A l l E R 733. 
k6 I b i d p7 U3A. 
U7 I b i d C. from Cairncross- (l860) 3LT130 per Lord Campbell, L C. 
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simply i n the present century^^ 
1x9 
A gratuitous act was performed i n Schneider v Sisovitch; P l a i n t i f f was injured, 
w h i l s t i n France, by the defendant's negligent driving, and her husband was k i l l e d . 
Her Brother-in-law and his wife flew out to render her assistance. ' I f she had said 
at the time: ' i f you help me and save me the expense of h i r i n g services I w i l l repay 
you your fares' there would have been a legal l i a b i l i t y to pay'^° and damages would 
unarguably have had to include an appropriate sum for t h i s : a f o r t i o r i i f she had 
actually hired help. Paull, J held that ' s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s not the be-all and end-all 
of a tortfeasor's l i a b i l i t y ' ^ • ' ' Damages ought to include payment for services 
gratuitously rendered where the acts were reasonable and necessary as a result of the 
tortfeasor's action, and where the p l a i n t i f f undertook to pay the volunteer. The 
52 
tenor of Ifegarry's Note i s c r i t i c a l , f or 'English law has always drawn a s t r i c t 
l i n e between acts done i n return for a promise and acts done voluntarily. '^ "^  l e t the 
thaw of t h i s r i g i d , g l a c i a l approach i s to be welcomed insofar as i t accords with 
r e a l i t y : the expense was incurred, and as a re s u l t of the tortfeasor's a c t . I t was not 
unreasonable, and therefore to shield the tortfeasor or his insurers behind a 
tech n i c a l i t y seems quite u n j u s t i f i e d . The implications f o r the equity which forms our 
subject may seem s l i g h t , but we may discern i n Schneider the direction i n which the 
warmer currents are t r a v e l l i n g . 
Footnotes: 
8^ Whilst i t may 'enable substantial j u s t i c e to be done' (Cheshire & Fi f o o t : Contact 
8th ed p56) i t does so w i t h some sacrifice of convenience and r a t i o n a l i t y . Suppose 
that Mr Madd had after examining the lease revealed to the landlord that he was 
l i v i n g on the premises, and the landlord had promised not to enforce the covenants. 
Mr Madd might as a r e s u l t have put himself to considerable expense and d i f f i c u l t y , 
but the promise would have been gratuitous and thus unenforceable. 
Quaere whether the oral v a r i a t i o n i s enforceable insofar as i t s objectives seem 
to be to defeat rent r e s t r i c t i o n l e g i s l a t i o n . 
Ji9 (1960) 2WLR169. 
;;o I b i d at pl7U per Paull, J. 
$1 I b i d pl76. 
2 76LQRI87. 
3 I b i d at pl88. Quaere substitution of ' i s ' f o r 'ought'? P T 0 
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The expression i n which Devlin J puts his solution of Parker v Clark^^ owes much to 
Hammersley v De B i e l (ante), to the necessity for compensating p l a i n t i f f for his 
reliance upon the defendant's representation. I t i s a non-commercial situation, and 
one i n which bargain was not foremost i n the parties' minds. An old couple who l i v e d 
i n a large house i n Torquay suggested that a younger couple come to l i v e with them. 
As an inducement sharing of the expenses was to be on a basis favourable to the younger 
couple?^ Amid l a t e r acrimony,i jjhen the sum was offered, i t was refused?^ The p l a i n t i f f s , 
the younger couple, had indicated that the contemplated move to Torquay would 
necessitate the sale of t h e i r Sussex cottage, and i n response the defendants promised 
to make up f o r t h i s by leaving a share i n the Torquay house to the younger wife. 
Devlin, J found that the sharing arrangement was expected to l a s t u n t i l the defendants' 
deaths, but i n f a c t the relationship became strained and p l a i n t i f f s were forced to 
move out. I n reliance on the defendants' representations p l a i n t i f f s had l e n t a 
substantial part of the proceeds of the sale of t h e i r cottage to t h e i r 
daughter, to enable her to buy a f l a t , so that t h e i r position became d i f f i c u l t . 
IjThere i s no doubt that between the couples there was a contract. What i s s t r i k i n g i s 
57 
the reliance upon Synge v Synge/. and Hammersley, and the phraseology adopted, which 
suggests that an animal i s being considered whose t e r r i t o r y merely overlaps that of 
jontract. I n Synge a 'proposal of terms was made as an inducement to the lady to 
HO 
inarrys' i n Hammersley v De B i e l , Baron De Biel was promised a sum of money by his 
;^iture bride's father, and, following the promise, the marriage took place. The word 
59 
'inducement' i s rar e l y used i n r e l a t i o n to contracts. Generally an offeror wishes 
";o exchange a commodity which he possesses f o r one possessed by the offeree: i n no 
footnoteSt 
I'k (1960) 1 A l l E R 93 see plOO. 
5:5 I b i d p97D. 
f 6 I b i d p99A. 
5 7 (1891;) 2QBl;62. 
5 8 I b i d at pl;69 per Kay, L J. 
59 Except i n r e l a t i o n to misrepresentation, perhaps. 
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sense can, say, a vendor be said to receive the purchase money as a compensation f o r 
his loss, and the subs t i t u t i o n a l remedy of damages represents for the p l a i n t i f f a sum 
equivalent to that which he would have had had there been no breach, not a coii?)ensation 
f o r loss of what he once had^^ Damages reflect-accurately the nature of the situation. 
I n Parker v Clark what the p l a i n t i f f expects i s not an advantage, but that which w i l l 
reveal that i t i s not a case of contract proper: i t i s framed that way merely i n order 
to place i t w i t h i n the known forms of action^'^'^ Again we are faced with a bewitchment 
by words. 
The case of Chalmers v Pardoe^"^ supplies an example of the f l e x i b i l i t y of the equity. 
A F i j i a n Native Land Trust Ordinance prohibited the dealing i n assignment or sub-letting 
of property i n a native land area except with the consent of the Native Land Trust 
Board - the lessor. The respondent was the assignee of a lease held of the Board, who 
enabled the appellant to construct a house on a part of the respondent's land, on the 
Footnotes: 
60 I n an action i n t o r t , p l a i n t i f f seeks compensation f o r i n j u r y to an interest of 
which he was possessed. The value of what the victim has l o s t may of course be 
assessed by reference to what he would have done with his asset, e g i n j u r y to a 
pianist's hands by negligence of tortfeasor, or loss of an opportunity to get a job 
at an interview at which the v i c t i m would have displayed his expertise. I n contract 
he seeks compensation from the other contracting party f o r loss of that which the 
other contracting party promised to render him. One would thus expect that damages 
i n contract should be confined w i t h i n a narrower framework; and they are. cf 
Hadley v Baxendale (l85i;) 9 JBX 3iaj Heron I I (1969)1AC350 with Wagon Mound (No 1) 
(1961) AC 388j Re Polemis (1921) 3KB560. See Lawson: Remedies i n English Law 
ppl02 et seq. Perhaps one could say without too much oversimplification, that 
..damages i n contract look forward,. w h i l s t damages i n t o r t look backwards. 
O^A cf De l a Bere v Pearson (1908) 1 KB 280 with Hedley E^rme (196U) AC li65j and see 
the comments of Lord Denning M R i n Letang v Cooper (1965) 1QB232 at p239. 
41 (1963) IWLR 677. 
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understanding that the respondent would apply for permission to sublet to the appellant; 
or else he would surrender his lease and enable the Board to l e t the land to the 
appellant. 
The r e s u l t of a quarrel between the parties was that the respondent refused to do 
either, and the appellant claimed on the basis of 'the general equitable principle 
that, on the facts of the case, i t would be against conscience that Pardee should 
r e t a i n the benefit of buildings erected by Chalmers on Pardee's land so as to become 
a part of that land without repaying to Chalmers the sums expended by him i n t h e i r 
erection^^ Sir Terence Donaldson, reading the judgement of the Judicial Committee 
agreed, consistently with cases cited, notably Unity Finance v King, and Plimmer v 
Wellington, that 'unless there i s some special circumstance which precludes i t , equity 
woTold intervene to prevent Pardee from going back on his word and taking the buildings 
'for nothing.' However, there was a dealing i n the land which had not had the p r i o r 
consent of the Board, and for that reason the equity would not operate. Since the 
appellant did not have 'clean hands' i n the matter, i t was not unconscionable to 
v: 
allow the respondent to benefit. He could not e n l i s t the aid of equity i n an attempt 
to- do what was unlawful^^ 
.Smother case before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council i s less than free 
from ambiguityt Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayi v R T atscoe (Nigeria)^^ 'The d i f f i c u l t y . . .stems 
l..from the fa c t that the equitable defence was never expressly pleaded.'^^ The 
^^ootnotesi 
^2 I b i d at p68l. 
63 I b i d at p68U. 
4it Indeed, although i t was not suggested by the Privy Council, as a s o l i c i t o r Chalmers 
must be taken to have been aware of the Ordinance. The manoevre seems to have been 
designed to avoid i t s e f f e c t and purpose - notably to prevent land from being 
purchased by those who did so i n order to bu i l d without the consideration of the 
Native Land Trust Board. 
65 (196U) IWLR 1326. 
66 I b i d at pl330. 
P T 0 
109 
appellant bought a number of trucks from the respondent under a hire purchase agreement. 
They were not e n t i r e l y satisfactory and the respondent agreed not to i n s i s t on 
payment of the instalments w h i l s t they were 'withdrawn from active service.' Although 
the report i s not clear, i t appears that the instalments were not paid even aft e r 
the trucks had been repaired, so that the l e t t e r suspending the obligation could hot 
be r e l i e d upon to provide an equitable defence to the action for payment. 
Since the facts r e l i e d upon indicate either the appellant's lack of clean hands, or 
at least his f a i l u r e to support his allegations, the comments of Lord Hodson, reading 
the judgement of the Board, must be taken to be obiter insofar as they relate to the 
equity. His i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Hughes principle i n the l i g h t of TMM3 v TECO i s 
innocuous enoughs p l a i n t i f f , he said, must have altered his position i n reliance upon 
I 
iihe representation, and only i f i t i s not possible for him to regain his o r i g i n a l 
I position w i l l the concession made i n the representation achieve permanent effect. 
A more useful case, and i n view of the pleadings submitted to the Judicial Committee 
68 
i n A j a y i v Briscoe, a more authoritative, i s Inwards v Baker. At his father's 
suggestion, the defendant b u i l t a bungalow on a piece of his father's land i n 1931-
liijhen his father died i n 1951, under a w i l l of 1922 (ie before the land had been 
acquired by the father) most of the property was l e f t to the father's mistress and 
the two children of that union. No dispute with the defendant arose, and he continued 
to occupy the bungalow u n t i l I963 when proceedings were commenced to remove him. 
P l a i n t i f f ^ ' r e l i e d upon analysis of the nature of the defendant's interest i n the land, 
which they said was a license. I n order to be irrevocable i t would, they alleged, 
need to be supported by a contract, and since there was no contract here, the licence 
could be, and had been, revoked. As i n e a r l i e r cases i n which acceptance by the cciirt 
of a narrow a p r i o r i conceptualization of the license would have j u s t i f i e d an 
unmeritorious pleading, the Court of Appeal here permitted the equity of the result 
Footnotes: 67 At PI33O. The a l t e r a t i o n of position need not, on t h i s view, be request>ed by the 
promissor. See Atiyah: Consideration i n Contracts: A Fundamental Restatement at 
ppi;6-U7 et seq. 
^8 ,^ 1965) 1 A l l . E R iii;6. 
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to subordinate the tec h n i c a l i t y . Ample authority was available for the assertion 'that 
i f an owner of land requests another, or indeed allows another, to expend money on 
the land under an expectation created or encouraged by the landlord that he w i l l be 
allowed t o remain there, that raises an equity i n the licensee such as to e n t i t l e 
him to stay^^ Further, Lord Denning suggested, not only were successors-in-title such 
as the father's natural sons, bound the equity, but so too would be a purchaser 
wi t h notice. The obvious l i n k w i t h equitable estoppel was recognised by Danckwerts, 
71 
I n Ward v Kirkland, w h i l s t TJngoed-Thomas, J did not take Inwards v Baker 'to establish 
that an incitement or request...was an essential ingredient before the equity can be 
created...as contrasted with standing aside with knowledge of expenditure by a 
72 
claimant' • he acknowledged that such a request would raise the equity. The issue 
before the judge concerned, i n t e r a l i a , the laying of some drains by the p l a i n t i f f 
i n some adjoining land. At the time the drains were l a i d the defendant was tenant, 
and a rector the fee siii?)le owner, of the adjoining land. The rector's consent to the 
tenporary location of the drains was not a disposition which would have required the 
consent of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, but the p l a i n t i f f ' s expenditure constituted 
'the subsequent action which converts.,what i s done int o an equity of which t h i s court Eootnotest 9 I b i d at pi|.l;8G. Per Lord Denning, M R from Ramsden v Dyson (though the remarks were 
of course o b i t e r ) i t seems clear that for the landowner merely to allow a p l a i n t i f f 
to expend money on the land would be s u f f i c i e n t encouragement, unless the landowner 
were ignorant, i n which case he could hardly be said to 'allow' the expenditure. 
See (1866) LR 1HIJ.29 at pllp. per Lord Cranworth. 
1^ 0 I b i d at plU;9I. Whether estoppel or equitable estoppel i s the more apt i t i s 
unnecessary to decide i n view of Ramsden, but i f i t were necessary, the substance 
of the representation by conduct would be of an intention (ie not to disturb), 
cf Piggott V Stratton (ante). 
71 (1966)1 A l l 1 R 609. 
72 I b i d at p625H. 
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73 would take cognizance.' Although the rector could not have granted his irrevocable 
consent without obtaining that of the Commissioners, the same effect as i f he had 
been able to give such consent was realised i n equity once the p l a i n t i f f had expended 
money i n constructing the drains, f o r equity fastens 'on the conscience of the fee 
simple owner.' As successors i n t i t l e , the defendant was.bound l y the consent: 'the 
expense was incurred by the p l a i n t i f f on the- footing and i n the b e l i e f and con-vlction 
that he had permission properly granted by the rector for putting drain there f o r an 
i n d e f i n i t e time...so that the r i g h t t o the equity to have the drains there i s 
75 
permanent.' To o-Tercone the d i f f i c u l t y that the consent related only to the discharge 
of bathwater through the drains, aid not to the discharge of effluent from the two 
water closets i n s t a l l e d by the p l a i n t i f f , the judge refused an injunction to re s t r a i n 
the trespass involved i n the l a t t e r a c t i v i t y on the ground that ' i f a trespass i s 
' t r i - y i a l an in j u n c t i o n may not be granted.' 
The Rams den v DSrson p r i n c i p l e , creating an equity binding a landowner who acquiesces 
77 
i n expenditure by another on his land was extended by Ives v High, beyond Inwards v 
Baker. Here, the expenditure by the other was on his own land, but induced by the 
promise of the adjoining owner's predecessor i n t i t l e that a r i g h t of way would exist 
over the adjoining land. The defendant. High, b u i l t a house on a bomb-site. On the 
Footnotes: 
73 I b i d at p626B. 
1\x c f the Lever Finance case (post). 
75 (1966) 1 A l l E R 609 at p626l. Note, then ( i ) that the promise i s enforced at the 
s u i t of the promissee; and 
( i i ) t h a t the equity affords more than 
mere teirporary r e l i e f . 
This i s the message of t h i s l i n e of 
cases. 
. ' For the-sugg'estion that the development of the enforcement of promises i n this way 
u t i l i s i n g the concept of equity, i s more convenient than the argument advanced by 
Atiyah (see Consideration i n Contracts), see l a t e r . 
6 I b i d at p627B. The judge cite d Armstrong v Sheppard (1959) 2 A l l E R 651 i n support. 
,7 (1967) 1 A l l E R 501;. p T 0 
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neighbouring s i t e one Westgate. began building a block of f l a t s whose foundations 
encroached on High's land. Instead of requiring Westgate to remove the foundations, 
as he would have been, e n t i t l e d to do. High agreed to t h e i r remaining, subject to his 
being allowed access to his house by car over Westgate's land. Westgate sold to Wright, 
who watched High construct a garage on his own land, the only access to which was over 
Wright's land. Wright sold by auction to the p l a i n t i f f s who had knowledge of the 
informal agreement between High .and Westgate. The 'Court of Appeal found i n the 
defendant's favour on two bases; f i r s t t hat of mutual benefit and burdenj^ and second 
that of acquiescence by the p l a i n t i f f . 
From an a n a l y t i c a l viewpoint, a d i f f i c u l t y arises out of the second basis. Any interest 
i n land which the defendant obtained by the informal agreement should, i f i t were to 
bind the p l a i n t i f f , have l^en registered, under the provisions of the land Registration 
79 
|Act 1925. The argument of Lord Denning, M R depends fo r i t s efficacy upon there 
8o 
jbeing 'an equity a r i s i n g out of acquiescence.' I n the words of Danckwerts, L J 
' Mr Westgate acquiesced i n the use of the yard for access and the Wrights stood by 
knd, indeed, encouraged the defendant to b u i l d his garage i n these conditions and 
i 
.?or these purposes. Could aiything be more monstrous and inequitable (than) afterwards 
•;o deprive the defendant of the benefit of what he has done?' The ,'right' possessed 
by High i s not an i n t e r e s t i n land unforeseen by the legislature i n 1925^ but an 
equity which achieves the saiiB end, much as the disposition by the rector i n Ward v 
I i r k l a n d , though not a disposition requiring consents, achieved the same object once sny other finding would produce i n e q u i t y i once the proroissee has reasonably r e l i e d 
i.pon the promissor's representatipn the promissor may not withdraw. 
Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ! i n t e l l i g i b l e i n the l i g h t of, i n t e r a l i a , Hohfeld's analysis 
f the equity-law relationship subsequent to the dispute between Sllesmere and Coke, 
8l 
whose solution was r e i t e r a t e d i n 1875^ renders otiose any search for the precise 
Footnotes1 
78 On the authority of Halsall v Brdzell (1957) 1 A l l E R 371-
7p (1967) 1 A l l E R 501; at p508B. 
83 I b i d at p5l0I. 
81 I b i d at p5li; G. 
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lature of the proinlssee's interest?^ I t i s puzzling to f i n d ¥iim L J remarking that 
•...the promissee...is not asserting any positive r i g h t s , but i s invoking law or 
jquity to af f o r d him procedural protection to avert i n j u s t i c e , * when i t seems clear 
that the promissee i s indeed asserting a positive r i g h t , namely that e n t i t l i n g him 
bo equitable intervention on his behalf. A possible explanation of Winn L J's 
statement i s that the equity that may be invoked i n any particular case depends 
( 3 n t i r e l y upon the circumstances of the par t i c u l a r case: the equity may f a i l the 
])romissee i f he f a i l s equity. That equily works by r e s t r a i n t upon common law rights 
86 
does not make i t less of a positive remedy. 
[^he capacity of the equity to create an obligation outside the context of land 
i,ransactions and i n the absence of a pre-existing contractual relationship i s 
j.llustrated by Durham Fancy Goods v Jacksont as we have suggested, the equity i s 
88 
V ider than contract, and as both Gombe v Combe and D & C Builders v Rees indicate, 
89 
i t i s more f l e x i b l e than the t r a d i t i o n a l doctrine of contract, although, as Atiyah 
argues, the courts find ways which are as effective as that of the equity, of refusing 
Kootnotess 
82 And i n ¥ard v Kirkland the promissee i s the p l a i n t i f f . 
83 See e g D & G Builders v Rees (post). 
84 Supreme Gourt of Judica|ive Act 1875 s 25(11). 
8^ Thus specific performance may be analysed as a re s t r a i n t upon the common law 
r i g h t to tender damages i n l i e u of performance, but nevertheless i t i s regarded 
quite r i g h t l y as the most positive and direct method of enforcing a contract. 
86 cf the use made of another equitable concept, the t r u s t , i n the l a t e r cases. 
87 (1968) 2 A l l S R 987. 
88 (1966) 2 QB 617. 
89 Atiyah: Gonsideration pp5-9. 
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to enforce contracts prima facie v a l i d . I n D & C Builders T Rees, the respondent 
offered and the appellant accepted, a smaller sum i n satisfaction of a contract debt. 
Knowing that the appellant biiilders were i n fin a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y i the debtor had 
threatened't'Q make no payment at a l l i f the sum offered were not accepted, and for 
t h i s reason, Lord Denning, said, the builders were not precluded from enforcing t h e i r 
91 
s t r i c t legal r i g h t s and suing for the balance. 
I n Durham Fancy Goods the p l a i n t i f f s drew a b i l l on the defendants whose 'nomenclature 
at any p a r t i c u l a r point of time was fortuitous and devoid of significance to anyone 
92 
ccncemed.' The company secretary of Jacksons Ltd accepted the b i l l , signing, on 
behalf of the coiapaiiy under the name of 'M Jackson (Pancy Goods) Ltd, Manchester.' 
Before the b i l l had matured the corpany was i n d i f f i c u l t i e s , and the b i l l was 
Footnotes! 
?0 Atiyah refers to the necessity of an 'intention to create legal relations' 
•:. _ _ '". ' '.. "" - the policy adopted by the courts so as to 
leave certain areas, i n Fuller's words 'law-free' e g social arrangements, 
arrangements between husband and wife made during an amicable phase of the 
marriage, cf Balfour v Balfour (1919) with M e r r i t t v M e r r i t t (1970) 
2 A l l E R 760 cf also gdwards v Skyways (l96k)MLR 3h9 with Jones v Padayatton 
(1969) IHLR 328. I n the l a t t e r case, serious i n j u s t i c e seems to have occurred, 
however, precisely because of the inadequacy of the common law, expressing 
i t s e l f through the ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' law of contract, i n f a i l i n g to adapt to the 
pa r t i c u l a r circumstances of the case.. Common law attempts to achieve particular 
-ijixstice'always suffer from t h e i r concealment behind a vest of generality, so 
that the policy and substance of the decision i s misunderstood l a t e r . 
9(1 I n allowing the appellant to r e l y on the so called 'rule i n Pinnel's Case' i e 
applying the common law and ignoring the equity, the majority of the Court of • 
Appeal were i n e f f e c t achieving the same objective, and taking the same attitude 
towards an unmeritorious defence. The drawback of t h i s approach i s the same as 
we have already noticed i n r e l a t i o n to Jones v Padayatton. 
9i (1968) 2 A l l S R 987 at p988 per Donaldson J. 
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dishonoured. '...Neither the p l a i n t i f f s (nor) Jacksons, nor Mr Michael Jackson had 
ever given a thought to section 108 of the Conpanies Act 19U8 if...;any of them had 
even heard of i t . * But, 'exercising t h e i r new found knowledge V of the law,' the 
p l a i n t i f f s sought- to make Michael Jackson personally l i a b l e on the b i l l on the grounds 
that he had accepted i t containing an unregistered variant of his comparer's name?^ The 
p l a i n t i f f s had not objected to the variant, so that although Donaldson J had 'no doubt 
9li 
that he i s l i a b l e to the p l a i n t i f f s.. .because t h i s i s what the Statute says,' he 
sought to prevent the p l a i n t i f f s from enforcing the l i a b i l i t y . He accon^lished t h i s 
by resort to Lord Gaims' ' f i r s t p r i n c i p l e . ' 
Once the essential u n i t y of the Cairns principle and that to be found i n Ramsden v 
Dyson has been recognised, the necessity for a pre-existing contractual relationship disappears, and we suggest that Durham Fancy Goods i s best seen i n t h i s way. I t was 
s u f f i c i e n t , to prevent the enforcement of section 108, that there should be a 
''pre-existing l e g a l relationship.' That the decision should be based upon the equity, 
and that i t should be explained as functioning i n t h i s particular way i s a useful 
heuristic device, but t h i s h e u r i s t i c convenience should not obstruct r e a l i s t i c 
analysis of the equity's substance. I t has substantive e f f e c t , and to view i t other 
than as a substantive doctrine could lead to a r b i t r a r y and uncertain results. 
Section 108 of the Companies Act i s quite clear and does not appear to allow the 
remedy provided f o r the defendant by Donaldson, J. The equity seems to have operated 
Footnotes: 
93 I b i d p990F. 
That variant had of course been placed on. b i l l by the drawer, so that although 
technically M Jackson had accepted i t , he had been i n v i t e d to do so by the p l a i n t i f f . 
Had t h i s not been the case, quaere whether the decision might not have gone the 
. other way. 
^5 The material part, set out at (1968) 2 A l l S R 987 at p989i; i s as follows: (Subs k) 
' I f an o f f i c e r of the company...b) signs...on behalf of the company any b i l l of 
^exchange.. .wherein i t s name i s not mentioned i n the manner aforesaid.. .he...shall... 
be personally l i a b l e to the holder...' 
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outside and against the statute?^ 
97 I n Lever (i^nance) Ltd v Westminster Corporation the appellants submitted a plan 
w i t h t h e i r application for planning permission i n order to b u i l d fourteen dwelling 
houses i n St John's Wood. Permission was granted by the respondent authority on the 
basis of the plan, but s l i g h t variations were subsequently made from t h i s plan, the 
re s u l t of which was that one of the new houses was much closer to some existing houses. 
The amended plan was sent to the authority but was l o s t by them, so that when a 
jielephone c a l l was made to ascertain i f 111e alterations were material the local 
authority servant who answered repl i e d that they were not. Later, the planning committee, 
finding that the alterations were material, refused consent. The Court of Appeal 
decided that the authority was bound by i t s officer's assurance to the appellants: 
go 
[although i t had no power to delegate, i t was bound by the unauthorised statement of 
i t s servant once t h i s had been acted upon by the appellant. 
We have already suggested that the width and d e t a i l of administrative controls renders 
unreal the requirement that an ind i v i d u a l should investigate the regulations authorising 
such controls where an o f f i c i a l gives an assurance which there is.reasonable ground 
jfor acting upon, the assured, or promissee, should not suffer f o r his reasonable 
99 
reliance. This contention receives support from developments i n the sphere of coinpany law. 
Footnotes: 1?6 As, of course, the equity of part performance did i n r e l a t i o n to the Statute of 
Frauds. 
91 (1970) 3 A l l S R U96. cf Norfolk C C v Secretaiy of State (1973) 3 A l l E R 673. 
Planning authority not bound here because error r e c t i f i e d i n time. 
!?8 U n t i l t h i s power was conferred by the Town & Country Planning Act 1968 s6i; the 
authority did not delegate i n w r i t i n g pursuant to t h i s Statute i n any case. 
$9 See the material cited ante. Additionally Farrar & powleB: The Effect of Section 9 
of the European Companies Act 1972 on English Coii?)any Law 36 MR 270. 
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and from Robertson's case (ante), as w e l l as from Lever (Finance) v Westminster. The 
l a t t e r case may decide more than that ' i f an o f f i c e r acting w i t h i n the scope of his 
ostensible authority"^^*^ makes a representation on which another acts, then the public 
authority may be bound by i t . . . ' Lord Denning at least (with the concurrence of Ifegaw, 
L J ) , f e l t that 'considerable reserve' ought henceforth to be placed on the cases 
deciding that an authority 'cannot be estopped from doing i t s public duty. I t 
102 
would be a p i t y i f the case merely 'extended the category of technicalities upon 
which an authority was estopped from-relying, beyond the Mells case, and I suggest 
that herein l i e s the value of Lord Cairns' prin c i p l e . 
Planning l e g i s l a t i o n i s concerned w i t h adjusting c o n f l i c t i n g interests and courts are 
reluctant overtly to enter t h i s arena"^^"^ when controversy appears l i k e l y . I t i s scarcely 
Footnotes: 100 Evidence was given th a t i t i s normal practice f o r minor alterations i n plans to be 
accepted by planning o f f i c e r s , though the o f f i c e r 'should always say " I n ny opinion 
i t i s not material"*(1970) 3 A l l E R i;96 at p^ OOB per Lord Denning, M R. (Hence the 
change accomplished by the 1968 Act). 
:L01 I b i d at p^ OOH. He saw Lever (Finance) as extending ffells v M ,HiL G (1967) 2 A l l E R 
IOI4.I. Here the applicants sought to errect a plant f o r manufacture of concrete blocks, 
and were informed by Leatherhead UDC that since t h i s was within the existing use 
Class, only byelaw consent was required. After the plant was finished an enforcement 
notice was served by the UIX), because the plant was higher than the applicants had 
stated. Held, that the decision that planning permission was not required was 
irrevocable: the authority could be 'estopped from relying on tec h n i c a l i t i e s ' (at 
plOUliF): cf Norfolk C C v Sec of State op c i t n97 per Lord Widgery, C J: HiJhat one 
hopes to achieve i n a si t u a t i o n l i k e t h i s . . . i s that everybody shall end up i n the 
position i n which they would have been had the mistake not been made,' p677F. 
]l02 Evans: Note on Lever (Finance) Ltd 3kMR33^ at p339. 
I 
1)03 Naturally, since i t i s inherent i n the function of courts, they do so, and the 
curious fate of the Race Relations & Immigrant l e g i s l a t i o n at the hands of the 
House of Lorxis indicates that that House i s not averse to imposing i t s views 
despite statutory wording. 
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s u f f i c i e n t to state baldly that developers should not suffer from the mistakes of 
l o c a l authority servants^^^ f o r as a generalisation i t i s as urgent that l o c a l 
residents and others for whose benefit planning l e g i s l a t i o n exists]"^^ should not suffer. 
106 
I f the courts are going to i n t e r f e r e at a l l - and I consider, with Jaffe that both 
courts and le g i s l a t u r e have equal and coextensive responsibility for effective 
lawmaking, and so they should i n t e r f e r e - then they must not be blown by capricious 
eddies and gusts of t e c h n i c a l i t y . An equity i s required which w i l l restrain the granting 
of an enforcement notice except where i t would be ju s t and equitable. Generally, since 
the developer has r e l i e d upon the representations of the l o c a l authority through i t s 
servant, the simplest and cheapest remedy i s to restrain the rights which the local 
authority would otherwise have, but i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to envisage a situation i n 
|which a structure i s seriously deleterious to amenity. The solution i s not to pretend 
107 
|that the merits have changed, or to penalise l o c a l inhabitants, but to remove the 
•offending building and con?)ensate the developer for his loss of profit'l''^'^''^ I t i s 
doubtful i f t h i s degree of f l e x i b i l i t y could be achieved on any but equitable principles 
•jithout the attendant danger of excessive convolutions certain l a t e r to be misunderstood. 
; ^ u a l l y of the present as of the eighteenth century we have suggested, i t i s true 
ihat 'equity l e f t i n t a c t . . . common law rights...and merely made i t . . .impossible to 
])ursue them. ..and was subjecting positive law to the test of morals quite as much as 
Jias natural law. The main difference.. .was that the former refrained from formulating 
ootnotesj :.Oii (1970) 3 A l l iS R h96 at p^OlG per Lord Denning. 
4.05 One looks i n vain, both i n the judgements and i n Bvans' learned note f o r a 
recognition that t h i s i s what planning l e g i s l a t i o n i s about. 
106 Jaffes English & American Judges as Lawmakers. 
107 Assuming that the developer acted on the representation of the l o c a l authority, 
p 
and assuming also, perhaps, that he could not himself have foreseen damage to 
amenily. 
107A As to the measure of damages by way of compensation see Wroth v Tyler (1973) 
1 A l l B R 897 at p921 per Ifegarry J; Grant v Dawkins (1973)3 A l l E R 897 at 
p900, per Goff, J for the equitable rule. 
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i n advance the assumptions on which ( i t ) proceeded' - though system may at times be 
discerned. Both an equitable type of contract and the licence have been used as 
devices for achieving equity between promissor and promissee. More recently the t r u s t 
has been resurrected as an instrument of innovatory j u s t i c e . However, as I have 
ventured e a r l i e r , although for the observer an understanding of the way i n which the 
law i s changing may be gained by the use of s t a t i c concepts, i t should not be assumed 
that the s t a t i c concepts describe the law exclusively. EJy a process of analogy old 
concepts are put to new uses, and at the adventurous extremes, that i s to say where 
change occurs as a single step rather than as many small ones, the process may be 
termed leg a l f i c t i o n . The concepts are tools and as such are subordinate to the end 
we wish to achieve. They do not define or l i m i t the ends sought, but t h i s i s not easy 
to see because the s t a b i l i s i n g factor i s that both the ends and the concepts are 
109 
products of what those who operate the l e g a l system consider that i t ought to be 
ichieving. The lega l mind may be too prepared to f i n d a causal l i n k where there i s 
lone, p a r t i c u l a r l y where t h i s conceals a possible value orientation, 
phus, w h i l s t i t i s useful to attempt exhaustive definition"''''"^ i t must be remembered 
•ihat such d e f i n i t i o n i s an h i s t o r i c a l statement and should not hinder growth i n a 
dynamic system. I t s proper function Is, "by indicating past development, to point out 
J'uture p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
] h Binions v Evans'^ "'" Mrs Evans' husband had worked for Tredegar Estates a l l his l i f e , 
i f t e r his retirement, an arrarjganent was entered into by which he, and his wife i f 
£he survived him, might remain i n t h e i r cottage free of rent, subject to four weeks' 
notice on t h e i r part i f they wished to terminate the arrangement. The agreement would 
no doubt bind the parties to i t , following Foster v Robinson, but unfortunately t h i r d 
Jootnotes: 
108 Stone: Human Law & Human Justice p78. 
109 . I n the widest sense - ie society at large to the extent that social expectations 
! mould the law, practitioners and of f L c i a l s , as well as judges and legislators. 
i 
110 See, e g the discussion of licences by Megany, J i n Hounslow v Twickenham Garden 
Developments Ltd (1970) 3 A l l E R 321;. 
111 (1972) 2 A l l E R 70. 
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parties became involved when Tredegar Estates sold the property concerned to 
Mr and Mrs Binions. I t was admitted that they had notice of the agreement between 
the vendor and Mrs Evans, and f o r t h i s reason 'there i s no doubt that...they paid a 
reduced price f o r the cottage.'"^^ I n NPB v Ainsworth^-^ a mortgagee who had no notice 
of the wife's occupancy of tiiematrimonial home was able to take free of i t following 
the f a i l u r e of the mortgagor conpany, which was controlled by the husband, and to 
!which the husband had conveyed the property. Megaiwy and Stephenson L J J, i n Binions, 
preferred to grant a remedy to Mrs Evans, though t h e i r mode of doing so dif f e r e d 
from that of lisrd Denning, M R, the t h i r d member of the Court of Appeal. His view was 
that a contractual licence, which 'the courts of equity w i l l not allow the landlord 
t o . . .breach.. .nor the purchaser i f he bought w i t h knowledge of her r i g h t ' was the 
better s o l u t i o n s ^ t h e i r s was that Bannister v Bannister"'"''^ enabled them to confer 
Footnotes: 
112 Op c i t p73 per Lord Denning, M R. 
|113 (1965)AC1175. Had the decision gone the other way the bank would scarcely have been 
ruined, and the wife would have had somewhere to l i v e . I n an era of housing 
shortages the decision shews the usual social nyopia of the House of Lords. 
Mortgagees could have guarded against the si t u a t i o n by inspecting the premises, and 
the wife would moreover have received notice of the husband's intentions with 
respect to the matrimonial home. 
The House's concept of i t s own r o l e seems somewhat l i m i t e d , and i t s plea f o r 
l e g i s l a t i v e intervention on the one hand optimistic (See Blom-Cooper & Drewrys 
Final Appeal p209. Of li; cases i n which such a plea was expressly made 'in only seven 
...was there a d i r e c t response to the c a l l f o r reform'), and on the other naively 
confident i n the effectiveness of Parliamentary draftsmen, already overaorked by 
v i r t u e of Government l e g i s l a t i v e programmes. See Adams: Wroth v Tyler and the Measure 
of Damages LSG 13th June 1973 pl9 l 8 . See- also the comments of Msgarry, J i n that case 
(1973) 1 A l l E R 897 at p925D. 'The Act certainly changed the law; but not every 
change i s reform.' 
ikk (1972) 2 t a . B^R-70 at p75D. 
11$ (I9it8) 2 A l l E R133. A case i n which the purchaser was held to be a trustee of 
property during the l i f e of the vendor, and for her benefit, so as to prevent him 
from using siiO as an engine of fraud. Equity, i n other words, i s acting t y p i c a l l y , 
establishing a positive interest by restraining the use of common law remedies. 
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upon her a l i f e i n t e r e s t . 
The d i f f i c u l t y i n the l a t t e r solution i s that 'a tenant f o r l i f e under (the law of 
Property Act 1925) has power to sellthe property...and to t r e a t himself...as the owner 
..JJo .one would expect Mrs Evans...to be able to s e l l the property or to lease i t . ' 
Both conceptually and p r a c t i c a l l y , the d i f f i c u l t y of preserving a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
a tenancy f o r l i f e and an equitable l i f e i n t e r e s t seems too d i f f i c u l t to recommend 
Bannister as a solution f o r Mrs Evans' problem, which call s for a much less drastic 
course. 
Lord Denning's answer i s equally problematic and for the same, terminological,reason. 
Given that, to be s p e c i f i c a l l y enforceable, a licence must arise out of a contract 
capable of a t t r a c t i n g such a remedy, preservation of a d i s t i n c t i o n between contracts 
'which a court of equity w i l l enforce,' and others, enforceable at common law and 
requiidng consideration, becomes precarious: we have seen the assimilation by common 
law of equitable contract i n the past. The main objection to Atiyah's reformulation 
of a law of obligations i s that i t repeats the old terminology to the extent that i t 
I 
u t i l i s e s 'contract', and 'consideration', A fresh look, at the remedies required, 
rather than a t the substantive categories to which the results of the remedies may 
be analogous}"'"^'^ would be preferable. 
D.ir Raymond Evershed, M R however, accepted that, as between a landlord and a tenant, 
agreement to permit the tenant to remain on the premises rent free would be enforced 
jy the courts as a contract: Foster v Robinson. Similarly, i n Winter Garden Theatre 
'ootnotes: 
:L16 (1972) 2 A l l a R 70 at p7i4F per l o r d Denning, M R. 
;L16a I l l u s t r a t i v e of the danger of proceeding by analogy i n the area of natural 
science i s the controversy over the nature of l i g h t - particles or waves? I t 
turns out, f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes, to have the characteristics of both, because 
i t i s neither: the words are descriptions by analogy. 
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V Millenium Productions Ltd ' the court granted that a contractual licence might 
be s p e c i f i c a l l y enforced against the licensor. I t i s tenpting to suggest that t h i s 
remedy might a v a i l a p l a i n t i f f against a t h i r d party. M i l i t a t i n g against indiscriminate 
use i s i t s equitable (thus discretionary) nature. The point was deliberately l e f t open 
118 
by Ifegarry, J i n Hounslow v Twickenham, and i t may be that orthodoxy w i l l prevail. 
I 
A second interesting p o s s i b i l i t y suggested by Lord Denning M R, i s that 'the courtwiU 
impose on the purchaser a constructive t r u s t f o r her (Mrs Evans') benefit for the 
simple reason th a t i t would be u t t e r l y inequitable f o r the purchaser to turn the widow 
119 
out contrary to the s t i p u l a t i o n subject to which he bought the premises.' The 
120 
|objection raised t h a t a constructive t r u s t should be imposed only 'where a l l the 
policy considerations j u s t i f y such an action, not ju s t because i t happens to be 
121 
convenient i n the i n d i v i d u a l case' i s surely inappropriate, for policy can make 
i t s e l f f e l t only through in d i v i d u a l cases, and i t can never have been policy to 
r e t r a i n the extension of discretionary remedies, not subject to the 'hard cases' 
122 
aphorism, where i n j u s t i c e would otherwise r e s u l t . Mr Oakes' own suggestion of an 
Injunction to r e s t r a i n a breach of contract i s anyway open to precisely the same 
objection, since the end product i s the same. 
Footnotes: 
417 (I9i;6) 1 A l l S R 678 (CA) cited i n Hounslow v Twickenham (1970) 3 A l l E R 326 at 
p335d. The decision i t s e l f was reversed i n the House of Lords, (19U7) 2 A l l E R 
331, but 'nothing that I can see i n the speeches i n the House of Lords suggests 
that the Court of Appeal was wrong i n the law which that court applied to an 
irrevocable licence.' op c i t per Megariy, J. 
lil8 (1970) 3 A l l E R 326. 
119 (1972) 2 A l l E R 70 at p76b. Lord Denning cites Cardozo, J i n Beatty v 
Guggenheim (1919) 225 N Y 38O at p385: 'A constructive t r u s t i s the formula 
through which the conscience of equity finds expression.' 
1^0 Oakley: 35MLR551. 
l l a Op c i t at p556. 
1P.2 Mich overworked anyway. See Stone: Legal System. 
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Third, and coii?)letely overlooked by the ccurt, i s the conferring upon Mrs Evans of 
a r i g h t to enforce the contract between the other two, with or without the use of a 
123 
constructive t r u s t . Underlying Beswick v Beswick was the need to confer such a 
'right i n a widow as regards a contract made between her deceased husband and his 
.ephew, by the terms of which the l a t t e r agreed, i n return for the business, to pay 
jsums of money t o the husband, and, af t e r his death, to his widow. The court rejected 
Jher claim d i r e c t l y to enforce the contract^^^ but gave her an indirect remedy qua 
xecutrix. This scarcely stands scrutiny as anything other than a jus quaesitum t e r t i o , 
• f o r there i s a d i s t i n c t l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t y i n allowing her to stand i n the shoes of 
the deceased so as t o enforce a contractual term which the deceased could not have 
ijnforced: by i t s nature i t was not enforceable u n t i l he had died. This seems to have 
125 
been the view of the court i n Snelling v Snelling where Ormrod J said: 'the 
pri n c i p l e seems to be that i f the r i g h t parties are before the coiirt the action w i l l 
126 
1)6 maintainable.' Transposed i n t o the Binions situation the principle seems to 
^ l e l d t h i s : that where Mrs Evans pursued the defendants her contractual relationship 
Tr^ith Tredegar Estates would have enabled her to j o i n them as c o - p l a i n t i f f s , w i l l y -
r J i l l y . Once the parties were served with process, they would be before the court, and 
Ormrod J's dictum would have applied. 
127 
Ap-ternatively, the much-neglected approach of Tomlinson v G i l l might have been 
used. Here a widow was promised by the defendant that i n consideration of his appointment 
as administrator of her l a t e husband's estate, he would pay any debts due t o a 
Footnotes: 
123 (1967) 2 A l l BR 1197. 
l[lh This accords w i t h conventional wisdom. See Dunlop v Selfridge (l9l5)AC8ii7j 
Dowrick: Jus Quae s i turn Tertio i n Contract l 5 M[il37U. 
1J!5 (1972)\A11 S R 79. 
1^ :6 Op c i t at p87c. 
127 (1756) Ambler 330. For a more complete c i t a t i o n of authorities see Corbin: 
Contracts f o r the Benefit of a Third Party U6LQR12. 
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deficiency of. assets. As her husband's creditor 'the p l a i n t i f f i s proper fo r 
r e l i e f here...he could not maintain an action at law, for the promise was made to 
the widow; but he i s proper here for the promise was made for the benefit of the 
128 
creditors and the widow i s a trustee for them.' 'The equitable rule was that the 
party to whose use, or f o r whose benefit a contract had been entered into has a 
129 
remedy i n equity against the person with whom i t was made.' The rule i n Lamb v 
129 
Vice that the promissee i n a contract made for the benefit of a t h i r d party could 
have f u l l , and not merely nominal, damages for the breach of the contract i s consequent 
• 130 upon t h i s reasoning. 
I t i s important t o notice that i n creating a t r u s t , the court i n Tomlinson did not 
make the defendant a trustee of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, but 
instead made the widow a trustee of the promise for t h e i r benefit. I t was not of a 
fund, -but of the r i g h t to sue that she was trustee. I n terms, once more, of Binions 
V Evans, whether or not Mrs Evans had a contract with Tredegar Estates - the efficacy 
of t h i s being the lynch-pin of the other solutions - she may sue the Binions through 
her trustees, Tredegar Estates, who, though they no longer hold an interest i n the 
property, r e t a i n a r i g h t to sue on the contract with the Binions, and i f necessary, 
obtain an i n j u n c t i o n to r e s t r a i n them from evicting Mrs Evans. 
Footnotes: 
[L27A His motive was presumably as to obtain the status of preferred creditor i n the 
deceased's estate, a valuable perquisite of an administrator's o f f i c e p r i o r to 
1971. 
128 Op c i t at P33U. 
L29 Corbin op c i t at pl8l-2. The common law position was summed up i n Lamb v Vice 
(l8i4.0) 6 M & ¥ 1;67, a case i n Exchequer Chamber, and therefore superior to the 
subsequent case of Tweddle v Atkinson (I86I) 1 B & S 393^ which could be held 
to be per incuriam. 
i30 That he could have only nominal damages 'is a s t a r t l i n g and an alarming doctrine, 
and a novelty.» per Lush, J i n Lloyd's v Harper (I88O) I6 Ch D 290. 
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T h i s l a s t seems the t i d i e s t s o l u t i o n , and the one most c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the nature 
of e q u i t y . I n essence, the t r u s t i s a r e s t r a i n t , granted a t the s u i t of a t h i r d party 
131 
b e n e f i c i a r y , upon the promissor. As Cbrbin i n d i c a t e s , the search f o r a t r u s t fund 
i s misguided, f o r there i s nothing inherent i n a t r u s t which r e q u i r e s t h i s : i t i s the 
132 
produce of a l a s t i n g j u r i s t i c preoccupation w i t h ' t h i n g s . ' 
However one views the d e c i s i o n i n B i n i o n s v Evans, the widow obtained a r i g h t to 
remain on the land: i t seems b e t t e r t h a t t h i s should have as i t s o r i g i n the c o n t r a c t 
between the vendor and the purchaser, so that both the i s s u e of the r e g i s t r a b i l i t y 
of the r i g h t , and i t s e f f i c a c y i n r e l a t i o n to the t h i r d party, are avoided. That a 
remedy has been given c r e a t i n g i n i t s wake a r i g h t not contemplated a h a l f - c e n t u r y 
ago i n Lord Birkenhead's l e g i s l a t i o n i s s c a r c e l y a cause for alarm, however, and 
even i f l o m l i n s o n v G i l l can be u t i l i s e d i n Binions v Evans i t i s c l e a r that there 
w i l l be many cases i n which i t cannot be a p p l i e d ; for example i t would be i n a p p l i c a b l e 
i f Mrs Evans were not mentioned a t the time of the c o n t r a c t f o r s a l e . Thus the need 
f o r the k i n d of remedy envisaged by Lord Denning, M R, p e r s i s t s . 
A defense of the l a t t e r i n v o l v e s an examination of one of the premises of the present 
t h e s e s . Concepts, I have submitted, are subordinate to, indeed given substance by, 
the uses to which they are put. Chaos and Old Night are avoided i n the r e a l i t y of a 
132 A 
l i v i n g system of law by the u n i t y of approach governing both ends and means. That 
[Footnotes: 
131 I n the above-cited a r t i c l e . 
132 Hohfeld's t a l k of 'bundles of r i g h t s ' to describe r i g h t s i n rem i s unhelpful i n 
i n t h i s r e gard. See a l s o some d i s c u s s i o n s of l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y . 
132A C h e s h i r e : A New E q u i t a b l e I n t e r e s t i n Land 16MLR1 a t plO, c i t e s Lord brougham i n 
K e p p e l l V B a i l e y (1834) My & K 517. 'Great detriment would a r i s e and much confusion 
of r i g h t s i f p a r t i e s were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying 
r e a l property, and to impress upon t h e i r lands and tenements a p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r 
which should f o l l o w them i n t o a l l hands, however remote.' As Cheshire points out, 
f o u r t e e n y e a r s l a t e r came Tulk v Moxhay (1848) (1843-60) A l l E R Rep 9, with »A 
new e q u i t y of remarkable v i r i l i t y . ' Moreover, the p r e d i c t e d detriment did not occur 
and i t i s worth remembering t h a t land was of g r e a t e r s o c i a l and economic 
s i g n i f i c a n c e then. 
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Mrs Evans' i n t e r e s t i n land depended f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e upon the j u s t i c e of her cause 
does not as s i m u l a t e the members of the Court of Appeal to the cad i under h i s palm 
t r e e , C0hjui"ing up the s p i r i t s of u n c e r t a i n t y whom Lord Halsbury sought to e x o r c i s e . 
I n a l l cases the statement 'Y has X i n t e r e s t i n land' i s merely another way of s t a t i n g 
t h a t 'the m e r i t s of Y's case outweigh those of Y's opponents,' The same core p r i n c i p l e 
133 
u n d e r l i e s the statement that ' i t i s i n e q u i t a b l e that Y should be turned out by Z.' 
I f we can explore why i t i s i n e q u i t a b l e , without merely r e s t a t i n g that i t i s so i n 
Iwords which are d i f f e r e n t , y e t seem to compel! us to awkward con c l u s i o n s , we may 
avo i d the charge of c a p r i c e . Chaos and u n c e r t a i n t y are r e s i s t e d because i f we can 
read the meaning of the preceding law, add t h i s to the f a c t s , and then include the 
in d i s p o s a b l e c a t a l y s t of s o c i a l d e s i r a b i l i t y , we can p r e d i c a t e the p r i n c i p l e 
Icontaining the solution i n advance. The 'Bad Man' of Massachusetts may have h i s 
[answer, 'what the c o u r t s w i l l do, and nothing more p r e t e n t i o u s , ' though he may not 
l i k e i t . 
'Che equation I have o u t l i n e d i s not an attempt to r e s u r r e c t Savigny's V o l k s g e i s t , 
nor i s i t a d i f f e r e n t way of ex p r e s s i n g the d i s c r e d i t e d view that law i s declared 
and not made. I t s components vary w i t h s o c i a l p r i o r i t i e s , and as a r e s u l t , so w i l l 
;he answer. N e i t h e r through l o g i c ^ ^ ^ nor through s t a r e d e c i s i s ^ c a n law become 
c e r t a i n . I n s o f a r a s law i s concerned w i t h j u s t i c e - not the j u s t i c e of the A u s t i n i a n , 
I 
f o r there are too many v a r i a b l e s i n the c a l c u l a t i o n , nor tha t of the u t i l i t a r i a n 
whose a r i t h m e t i c c a l c u l a t i o n s are too crude - we may approach a c e r t a i n t y of 
Footnotes; 
133 A t i y a h : A c c i d e n t s , Compensation and the Law approaches the reasoning behind the 
li duty of car e i n the same way, r e f e r r i n g to 'the e x t r a o r d i n a r y hold which l e g a l 
concepts a c q u i r e on the minds of la w y e r s ' ( p 4 6 ) . 'The concept of the duty of care 
i s simply c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h the boundaries of l i a b i l i t y ' ( p 4 7 ) . 
134 See Ll o y d : Reason and Lo g i c i n the Common Law 64I/5R468. 
i'35 See, i n t e r a l i a . Stone: L e g a l System, r e f e r r i n g to L l e w e l l y n ' s 'leeways'. 
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symbolism, although the v a l u e s which we a t t r i b u t e to the symbols w i l l i n e v i t a b l y 
13 6 
a l t e r . Through Rawls' s o c i a l - c o n t r a c t we can perhaps f i n d an acceptable hypothesis 
concerning j u s t i c e . 
Simply put then, u s i n g the S)mibols given by generations of judges, f o r example, 
j u s t i c e , r e asonableness, f a i r n e s s and eq u i t y among oth e r s , and by proceeding i n the 
s p i r i t of the e a r l i e r cases to which I have r e f e r r e d , one might examine, say, Mrs Evans' 
c a s e . T h i s i s , t h a t she has r e l i e d upon her agreement - c o n t r a c t u a l or not - wi t h 
Tredegar E s t a t e s . She has not been induced to do tha t which she was not al r e a d y 
i n c l i n e d todo, or indeed, doing, but a promise was made to her i n c e r t a i n circumstances 
j u s t i f y the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the law to enable her to continue to b e n e f i t from the 
promise or, i n other s i t u a t i o n s , to r e c e i v e compensation f o r her disappointment, 
depends upon f a c t o r s e x t r i n s i c to the law and which sound nebulous: n e v e r t h e l e s s i t 
i s upon these f a c t o r s that the s u p e r f i c i a l l y more s u b s t a n t i a l t e s t of 'reasonableness' 
r e l i e s . As a b a s i c l e g a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n from the cases we might suppose that where a 
promise, or an a c t , or omission has occurred such that i t generates a reasonable 
I b e l i e f i n the o r d i n a r y course of events i n the mind of a r e c i p i e n t , that the person 
fjho promised, a c t e d , or omitted to a c t , w i l l do or has done something i n r e l a t i o n to 
:he r e c i p i e n t , the r e c i p i e n t w i l l be e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f or compensation f o r h i s 
subsequent disappointment, i f any. 
The boundaries of what i s a 'reasonable b e l i e f w i l l vary according to the views of 
soc i e t y , i n s o f a r as t h i s i s t r a n s m i t t e d through the c o u r t s , as to who should bear 
:.osses. Thus i t may be that i n an e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l or c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , or one which 
:he c o u r t s b e l i e v e i s such, a g r a t u i t o u s promise given i n a commercial context w i l l 
not be one which w i l l generate a reasonable b e l i e f i n i t s i n v i o l a b i l i t y . A f u r t h e r t e s t 
nay be added, namely t h a t , o utside the sphere of insurance, or ex c e p t i o n a l 
137 
c^irciamstances, t h e r e should be 'reasonable f o r e s e e a b i l i t y ' before the party causing 
fl'ootnotes: 36 E a w l s : A Theory of J u s t i c e ; I n p a r t i c u l a r the essay ' J u s t i c e as F a i r n e s s ' . 
i37 The width of e x c e p t i o n a l circumstances w i l l vary w i t h s o c i a l e x p e c t a t i o n s . I n the 
game of 'Diplomacy' Hedley Byrne would not be compensated f o r r e l y i n g on H e l l e r & 
P a r t n e r s ' statements as to Easipower's f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s . 
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the disappointment should s u f f e r compared w i t h the r e c i p i e n t . I n the Binions v Evans 
s i t u a t i o n , t h i s produces the r e s u l t t h a t had the Binions had no knowledge - and the 
imputation of ' c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e ' i s , again, a t i n k e r i n g w i t h 'reasonable 
f o r e s e e a b i l i t y ' to a d j u s t l i a b i l i t y to s o c i a l circumstances - which i s expressed as 
' n o t i c e ' i n the context of r e a l property law, then Mrs Evans would have been 
138 unprotected. 
139 
The not d i s s i m i l a r case of Hussey v Palmer was solved by the m a j o r i t y of the Court 
of Appeal us i n g , once more, 'generalisations...more f a m i l i a r to American than E n g l i s h 
140 
l a w y e r s . ' P l a i n t i f f , a woman 'we l l over 70' s o l d her condemned house, and was 
i n v i t e d to s t a y w i t h her daughter and son-in-law. Since t h e i r house was i n s u f f i c i e n t l y 
l a r g e , the p l a i n t i f f p a id f o r an a d d i t i o n a l room to be b u i l t from the proceeds of 
s a l e of her own house. She and the daughter q u a r r e l l e d and a f t e r f i f t e e n months she 
l e f t . A year l a t e r , being hard up - the balance of the proceeds of s a l e presumably 
having been spent - she asked the son i n law, f i r s t f o r some f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e and 
then, s i n c e t h i s r e q u e s t were unacknowledged, f o r a repayment of the cos t of the e x t r a 
141 
room. She was n e a r l y defeated by the ghosts of the forms of a c t i o n , r a t t l i n g t h e i r 
c h a i n s i n her path, f o r the r e g i s t r a r before whom she f i r s t appears, claiming 
repayment of the loan, decided t h a t t h i s was a family arrangement and was there f o r e 
lunenforceable. To overcome t h i s d i f f i c u l t y she claimed the money under a r e s u l t i n g 
t r u s t . Lord Denning, MR agreed, though f e e l i n g 'that the t r u s t i n t h i s case, i f 
there was one, was more i n the nature of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t ; but t h i s i s more a ta t t e r of words...The two run together. By whatever name i t i s described i t i s a t r u s t ootnotes; 
138 Quaere whether a t r u s t would not have a f f e c t e d the purchase-money, however. 
139 (1972) 3 A l l E R 744. 
140 Goodhart: 89LQR2. 
|l41 The circumstances assume importance of course, once one accepts that the law i s 
more than a system of r u l e s produced by g e n e r a l i s i n g from the f a c t s of each 
c a s e , but a method of s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s i n a s o c i a l l y acceptable way. Disputes 
r a r e l y s o r t themselves out f o r the b e n e f i t of p o s i t i v i s t lawyers w i t h t h e i r 
P r o c r u s t e a n concepts. , 
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imposed by law whenever justice and good conscience require i t . I t is a l i b e r a l 
process, to be applied i n cases where the defendant cannot conscientiously keep the 
142 
property for himself alone' The judge at f i r s t instance, and Cairns, L J on appeal, 
both preferred to see the 'transaction as a loan. Had this been the majority view on 
appeal, Mrs Hussey would have been unsuccessful, the pleadings not having claimed the 
return of money lent , as a result of the Registrar's decision. 
Dr Goodhact objects to the use of the principle stated i n Chalmers v Pardoe (ante) on 
the ground that there was here no promise to Mrs Hussey of a conveyance of the 
property: however, the expectation was created, and within the principle I have already 
stated, such an expectation was i n the circumstances reasonable. No express promise 
143 
ijas made i n Inwards v Baker (ante). Goodhart's second objection i s that a 
constructive t r u s t should not have been imposed without a consideration of Carl Zeiss 
144 
S t i f f t u n g V H Smith. An examination of the circumstances of this case leaves l i t t l e 
troom to doubt that i t could have been distinguished. The alleged constructive trustees 
were s o l i c i t o r s , and the receipt of assets by them took place during l i t i g a t i o n , 
l)etween an East German and a West German foundation, which had lasted since 1955. I n 
145 
;he words of Lord Selborne, i n Barnes v Addy ' I f those principles were disregarded. 
know not how anyone could, i n transactions admitting of doubt as to the view which 
A Court of Equity would take of them, safely discharge the o f f i c e of s o l i c i t o r , of 
banker, or of agent of any sort to trustees.' The principles were that the constructive 
tfrustee must have had cognizance of the t r u s t , and that the transfer of funds to him 
146 
V as a misapplication of the funds. However, '...as I understand i t , no stranger can 
pecome a constructive trustee merely because he i s made aware of a disputed claim the 
\ f a l i d i t y of which he cannot properly assess.''''^^ 
ootnotes: ]l42 (1972) 3 A l l E R 744 at p747c per Lord Denning M R. 
143 (1972) 3 A l l E R 744 at p748A per Lord Denning M R. 
144 (1969) 2 A l l E R 367. 
1145 (1874) 9 Ch App 244 at p252 cited by Danckwerts L J (1969) 2 A l l E R 367 at 
p374G. 
146 Reference was made at p372F to Halsbury 3rd Ed vol 38 paras 1446-1450. 
147 (1969) 2 A l l E R 367 at p378B per Sachs L J. 
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lEdraund Davies L J i n that case approved Snell's expression: 'A possible d e f i n i t i o n 
i s that a constructive t r u s t i s a t r u s t imposed tiy equity i n order to satisfy the 
demands of j u s t i c e and good conscience -without reference to any express or presumed 
i n t e n t i o n of the parties.' 'Concepts', the learned judge adds,'may defy d e f i n i t i o n 
tnd yet the presence i n , or absence from a sit u a t i o n of that which they denote, nay e beyond doubt. The concept of 'want of probity' appears to provide a useful touchstone 
1 ] p 
!in considering circumstances said to give r i s e to constructive t r u s t s . ' 
I n Hussey^v Palmer the Court of Appeal accepted that Mrs Hussey did not intend a g i f t 
of the money. At the time of the payment i t s purpose was to provide her with somewhere 
t o . l i v e for the r e s t of her l i f e , and 'want of probity' i s surely evident i n the son's 
refusal to accept l i a b i l i t y of any kind following the f a i l u r e of that intention. 
lij.9 
Both the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the constructive t r u s t doctrine, and the principles of 
Inter a l i a Unity v King, Chalmers v Pardee and Inwards v Baker attest the correctness 
3f the decision. 
!?wo further cases i l l u s t r a t e t t e essential f l e x i b i l i t y of the equitable approach. I n 
^ J Alan Ltd v SI Nasr Co"^^^Kenyan sellers of coffee entered two contracts with the 
2'espondents each f o r the sale of 2^0 tons of coffee, payment to be by confirmed 
irrevocable l e t t e r s of c r e d i t , and i n Kenyan s h i l l i n g s . The buyers paid f o r the entire 
Shipment of ^00 tons by means of a single l e t t e r of credit which, i n several other 
v ays did not conform w i t h the terms of the contract: moreover payment was expressed 
"to be made i n pounds s t e r l i n g . Nevertheless, the sellers accepted t h i s mode of payment 
l y drawing on the l e t t e r f o r the amount of the i n i t i a l 250 tons, and shipped the 
palance of the coffee (the quantity shipped i n September of 196? i n two instalments 
c t u a l l y being 279 tons). Devaluation of s t e r l i n g occurred very shortly a f t e r the 
decond shipment, and the sellers required additional payment, asserting that the 
slo.otnotes:'.- • , ^ • / 1U8 I b i d at p38l, c i t i n g Snell: Equity 26th Ed p201. 
]Jl49 See also the matrimonial cases cited by Lord Denning M R at (1972) 3 A l l E R 
7hh at p7i+7E. 
i t o (1972) 2 A l l S R 127. 
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Kenyan currency was the money of account, not merely the money of payment"'"^ under 
the contract. The buyers replied that t y accepting the nonconforming l e t t e r of credit 
the sellers had inade a representation varying the contract which they were now precluded 
from leneging 2 i n other words they could not r e l y on t h e i r s t r i c t legal r i g h t s . 
There was no detriment to the promissee, indeed, as l o r d Denning indicates, there was 
la benefit. But 'he has conducted his a f f a i r s on the basis that he has that benefit 
[and i t would be inequitable now to deprive him of i t . •"''^^ A clear development i s taking 
place, away from the confusion between detriment, reliance and the consideration 
doctrine, yet s u f f i c i e n t v i t a l i t y remains, and promise-enforcement has not become a 
doctrine, so that i n the similar case of Woodhouse AC I s r a e l Cocoa Ltd S A v Nigerian 
Produce Marketing Co Ltd'*'^^ both the Court ,of Appeal and the House of Lords agreed 
that the decision diould go the other way. I n W J Alan the circumstances were such 
as to render enforcement by the se l l e r of his legal r i g h t s inequitable, whilst i n 
Moodhouse they were not. 
jlere cocoa had been purchased i n s t e r l i n g u n t i l a request by the sellers had had the 
E f f e c t of substituting Nigerian pounds. Because i t was not possible to buy t h i s 
currency forward, the buyers obtained two concessions from the sellers: one was that 
eixisting contracts could be treated as i f the 'money of account were B r i t i s h currency'; 
knd the second was that for the future s t e r l i n g should be the currency of account, 
l i o t h of these concessions were subsequently withdrawn despite the requests of the 
buyers. Crucial t o the decision was whether, i n the l i g h t of t h i s withdrawal, a l a t e r 
].etter agreeing that payments might be made i n s t e r l i n g was a representation that 
s t e r l i n g had once more become the currency of account. With devaluation impending, 
the concessions had clearly been withdrawn to prevent t h i s , and the alleged representation 
lootnotess 
l|5l The d i s t i n c t i o n i s made liy Lord Denning M R i n the C A i n Woodhouse AC Isra e l Cocoa 
Ltd S A V Nigerian Produce Marketing Co (1971) 1 A l l g R 66$ at p662. 
lfe2 As i n High Trees, where i t was to the promissee's advantage to pay a rent of 
£1,2^0 p a rather than of £2,500. 
1^3 (1972) 2 A l l S R 127 at pli+OF per Lord Denning M R. See also the judgement of 
Megaw L J at pli|/|E. 
15k (1972) 2 A l l B R 271. p ^  ^  
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was i n response to the buyers' request ' i f you can arrange to accept payment against 
documents i n s t e r l i n g i n Lagos as a temporary alternative?'"^^^ The umpire's finding 
that the reply was a representation estopping the sellers was unfortunate, not least 
because i t could be overturned only i f i t were a finding of law. To permit the finding 
to stand appeared manifestly unjust to both appeal courts, and so the question of 
what a representation was i n a l l the circumstances becomes, l i k e the 'reasonable man' 
a leg a l concept: one fears that i t s t e r r e s t r i a l feet may atrophy, and after 'the whole 
sequence of cases based on promissory estoppel...(is) reduced to a coherent body of 
dectrine'"^^^ i t may become yet another mere vehicle f o r lawyerish preconceptions. 
Footnotes: 
155 I b i d at p279B i n Lord Hailsham's judgement. 
156 I b i d at p282G per Lord Hailsham. 
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CONCLUSION 
At the outset i t was suggested that law should be seen as a dynamic apparatus for the 
resolution of disputes, and that noles of law are h i s t o r i c a l statements of how th i s 
has been accomplished - namely by the grant or refusal to grant recognition to claims 
asserted by individuals or groups - and why. The normative content of these statements 
derives from one of the components i n the postulated justice equfation; that of the 
f e l t need fo r consistency, or evenhandedness i n the administration of law. Consistency 
i s generally seen as s a t i s f a c t o r i l y reached by means of analogy: l i k e cases shouldT be 
treated alike unless some other component i n the equation i s given p r i o r i t y . 
I n the 'trouble' case, analogy i s extended and weak. The other component, that of 
social efficacy, becomes i n r e l a t i o n more powerful i n such cases; but even where a 
rthole l i n e of decisions i s interlocked by analogy, the question of social efficacy 
Lies to hand, f o r l e g a l principles are not formed i n vacuo. Iso l a t i o n of social 
natrices assists i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of unsuspected analogies, and, as suggested 
•above, reveals the fundamental unity of remedy and resultant r i g h t . 
:j: have t r i e d to locate i n equity a coherent body of principles relating to l i a b i l i t y 
' 2 'or promises, established by a line of decisions from those discovered by Barbour 
0 Hughes^ and from Hughes to the present, and j u s t i f i e d by reference to social 
Expectations. I t i s no accident that continuity of development by analogy, from case 
•t o case, i s i n t h i s sphere at i t s most confusing i n the l a t t e r h a l f of the nineteenth 
cjentury: nor i s i t surprising that, i f I am correct i n suggesting that equity and 
ommon law developed a d i f f e r i n g view of contracts, t h i s should have occurred at the 
tieginning of what was i n the West a period of dramatic commercial expansion. Equity 
was by t r a d i t i o n the law of the poor man, through the Court of Requests? nor did 
Star Chamber's remedies benefit only the Grown i n t h e i r application to the r i c h and 
powerful. I f a poor man encountered a national law at a l l , other than upon suspicion 
Footnotes: 
For a less agreeable exanple, see the reasoning behind Priestley v Fowler (1837) 
3 M & W 1. 
Barbour: History of Contract i n Early Jffiiglish Equity. 
Hughes V Ifetropolitan Ry (ante). 
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of having broken the King's Peace, the chances of i t s being equity were high. Equally, 
e q u i i ^ was the law of the King and his executive. Their concern, as much as the poor 
man's was to achieve stability!:^ Bureaucracy, which term almost by d e f i n i t i o n embraces 
any formal means of government, strives to maintain a status quo. Commerce, at i t s 
[entrepreneurial outset, has e n t i r e l y the opposite objective^ 
The men of commerce looked to the common law, and, as I have suggested, i t was the 
common law which assisted the rapid development of a market economy, whilst paradoxically, 
purporting to provide a p i l l a r for cherished t r a d i t i o n s and beliefs. Those who ventured 
themselves or t h e i r wealth were i n pursuit of the i n f i n i t e , and the common law reflected 
t h e i r ethos i n the sixteenth century, j u s t as the Chancellor's court came to echo at 
times the universal m a t e r i a l i s t optimism of the Victorians. 
,6. r e s u l t of the modem recognition that the world may af t e r a l l not be inexhaustable, 
and t h a t societies may not increase t h e i r wealth i n f i n i t e l y has been a greater 
realisation that misfortunes must be shared; they cannot be repaired tjy the victim's 
seeking recompense i n a New World wilderness. I n other words, l i k e the preColumbean 
v i l l a g e , modem society can work j u s t l y only given legal recognition of the inter-^ 
dependence of the communi-ty's members. 
::t i s i n t h i s context that the Igrpothesis concerning the legal effect of promises i s 
£iet. i t seems self-evident that wherever men deal with one another, where l i v i n g 
£!pace and essential commodities, money and credit are i n v i s i b l y f i n i t e supply, a 
Society wMch i s organised on a formally egalitarian basis^ and equally, i n a formally 
footnotesi 
See Plucknett: Concise History p638 '...the council and the Chancellor were at 
f i r s t concerned p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h the de facto f a i l i n g s of the common law (to 
maintain the peace) rather than with i t s doctrinal shortcomings.' 
See Schon's 1970 Reith Lectures for an account of the homeostatic nature of 
both Government and commercial bureaucracies. 
That i s to say the kind of society which Dicey had i n mind. Society i s s t i l l 
formally e g a l i t a r i a n where access to remedies compares, i n the famous 
phrase, w i t h access to the Ritz Hotel. 
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s t r a t i f i e d society, insofar as the relations w i t h i n the strata are so organised, 
duties w i l l be found in^^osed on the members of the society, or strata, i n much more 
stringent terms than would be the case i n the expansive societies found i n the West 
between the sixteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between de facto equals there 
w i l l be, law aside, a f e l t need to avoid methods of l i v i n g and transacting which are 
I 7 
[damaging to dequalsl To the extent that law i s under the control of de facto equals, 
i t h i s f e l t need w i l l f i n d l e g a l means of expression. 
We should therefore expect i n such societies l e g a l - using the term here to include 
the 'laws' of private and l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s , and those of the Chancellor - sanctions 
attending what we may term bad f a i t h : the supply of shoddy goodsj the conduct of 
dangerous a c t i v i t i e s , the breach of promises. A l l things are a matter of degree, of 
course, so that a purchaser of cheap goods may be taken to assume the r i s k that they 
' f l i l l not compare i n qu a l i t y w i t h equivalent but more^expensive goods; and the 
:recipient of an ambiguous promise, or one which i n a l l circumstances cannot be l e g a l l y 
ijcknowledged to have been seriously meant, should not expect legal help to enforce i t . 
Some "of these expectations are to be found realised i n the middle ages; i n particular, I 9 
as Barbour's researches show, the Chancellor upholds promises. Vinogradoff indicates 
the same readiness on the part of l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s , and indeed much ear l i e r the 
Footnotes; 
I 
Clearly, the notion of freedom of contract, the 'hands-off' approach epitomized 
by a Chancery judge of the nineteenth centuiy. S ir George Jessel, (see the Sanpson 
case c i t e d ante), does not s a t i s f y t h i s Eeeed. 
8| I n the sense a) that the promissor did not mean i t j or b) that the promissee did 
» not believe that the promissor meant i t ; or c) that i t would place a socially 
unacceptable burden upon promissors to have them bound to unwary promissees i n a l l 
the circumstances where the promissor did not intend to be bound. 
Vinogradoff: Reason and Conscience i n S«xteenth Centiny Jurisprudence 2ULQR373' P T 0 
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'Common law i s to be found granting r e l i e f without a specially i n actions on a 
covenant"}*^ Despite the eclipse of the conciliar courts i n the seventeenth century we 
can trace the continued existence of promise-enforcement u n t i l the nineteenth century, 
and the phrase mam^fsgext' consideration supports Atiyah's contention that the term 
consideration meant essentially a reason fo r -having entered i n t o a transaction; or, 
nore properly, a reason why the courts should step i n and impose l i a b i l i l y . I n equity, 
bhen, the term contract did not mean what i t came to mean at common law, that i s to 
say, a bargain, or a transaction framed to f i t the bargain-form. 
;[f the hypothesis i s correct, not only s h a l l we f i n d a d i s t i n c t l i n e of promise-
<3nforcing decisions of the kind postulated, i n equity, but we shall also discover a 
I growing tendency towards the same practice at common law: not merely by virtue of the 
inile that equity prevails, but because society has changed. Atiyah argues''^ that i t 
12 
%s only by ignoring a substantial body of case law that we can assert the nineteenth 
c;entuiy dogma concerning common law contract. 
I*rior to 1875 we can f i n d numerous examples of j u d i c i a l acknowledgement that reasonable 
expectations created by promises, or conduct reasonably capable of being taken to be 
pjromises, should not be disappointed: Luders v Anst^; Hammersley v de Biel; Piggott 
Stratton;^ Dilwyn v Llewllyn;^ Ramsden v Dyson"!"^  After 1875^ at a time when we might xpect a hardening of the l e g a l a r t e r i e s , the same phenomenon reappears i n Plimmer v 
Footnotes: 
10 Pollock & Maitland: History Vol I I chapter 5-
11 Atiyah: Consideration. 
1-^j ^ ^The: perpetuation of the old views may owe much to Miessrs Cheshire & Fifoot. See 
. the select bibliography i n Atiyah: introduction to the Law of Contract 2nd ed p28l. 
ll3 (1799) h Ves 501. 
IJ;' (18U5) 12C1 & Fin 
11J (1859) IDe G F & J 33. 
16 (1866) LR I HL 129. 
i:' (1862) i; De G F & J 517-
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jJellington; Hughes}^ & Birmingham?'^ I n spite of Jorden v MoneyP and for the reasons 
I have stated t h i s seems to be a much narrower decision than i s commonly supposed, 
i t may be possible to refer t o an 'equity' of promises, for we can trace the l i n e of 
equitable authorities more clearly. From a technical point of view - as d i s t i n c t from 
the f u n c t i o n a l i s t and somewhat sociological view adopted immediately above - i t i s 
22 
a r a t i o n a l next step to use Hohfeld's heuristic technique to explain post-1875 
developments. We can state that the s t r i c t common law of contracts w i l l be applied 
unless the equity i s invoked, when a promise w i l l be enforced despite i t s non-bargain 
lature: which i s r e a l l y to say that the law w i l l uphold promises, dependent upon the 
circumstances. Now that equity automatically prevails i n a l l courts, what we have to 
Look to are the p a r t i c u l a r facts of the case. Just as the presence of what technically 
23 
amounted to consideration did not a v a i l the p l a i n t i f f i n Jones v Padavatton because 
the courts could f i n d no reason to enforce the mother's promise, so the absence of 
jjonsideration did not a v a i l the p l a i n t i f f i n Tabor v Godfrey^^ or High Trees^^ or the 26 27 defendant i n Chalmers v Pardee or Ward v Kirkland. 
i'ar from being weakened, the persuasiveness of the equity's existence i s strengthened 
l y the variety of subject matters i n r e l a t i o n to which i t appears, for we have 
postulated a Choiiiskyan 'deep-structure' need to have promises enforced i n certain 
social contexts, and we should anticipate the manifestation of t h i s across a wide 
range of law categories, 
lootnotes: ]J8 (I88ii) 9 App Gas U39. 
19 (1877) 2 App Gas U39. 
2 0 (1888) ho Ch D 268. 
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The constraints which should operate for the future development of a wider law, of 
obligations rather than of contract; have already been adverted to. I t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to conduct analysis of the l e g a l past, with i t s undoubtedly normative influence on 
the present and the future, without imparting a natural science vocabulary and 
f o r g e t t i n g momentarily that the parameters i n the justice equation, referred to 
3 a r l i e r , are man-made. I have postulated a ' f e l t need' to impose l i a b i l i t y to indemnify 
Ln certain circumstances, given certain changes i n the nature of society; and the 
3xistence of the l i n e of equitable authorities makes i t possible to impose such 
l i a b i l i t y . What i s required i s merely a proper common law eclecticism, applied across 
the range of equitable and l e g a l remedies. 
28 
;'. have pointed out the l i m i t a t i o n s of Jorden v Money and the narrowness of Foakes 
29 
•T Beer. Exploitation of the Hughes and Birmingham cases rather than the more 
30 
(sonservative authorities t y p i f i e d t y The Citizens' Bank case, would have been 
I)ossible. Indeed the l a t t e r may i n s t r u c t i v e l y be seen i n the terms used by Childres 
31 
dnd Spitz i n r e l a t i o n to contracts. Here was a 'formal' transaction entered into 
l y sophisticated equals conversant with the legal rules as to preferment of creditors. 
Ead the Louisiana bank been successful, t h i s could only have been at the expense of 
the other creditors, w i t h commercially'' inefficacious results. 
Hughes was, however, consigned to obscurity, although the need for such a principle was recognised i n , i n t e r a l i a . Tabor v Godfrey^^ and Re William Porter^^ even i f not 
expressly admitted. A second opportunity arose following the e x p l i c i t r e d e f i n i t i o n 
of the 'equiiy' i n High Trees, apparently t o be l o s t again as a result of Combe v 
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l i g h t : the merits lay clearly with the defendant. Both t h i s case and D & C Builders 
35 
Rees i l l u s t r a t e the necessity for a more f l e x i b l e response to the facts than 
might be accorded to them t y the application of an extension of the common law 
contract doctrine advocated t y Atiyah. And viewing Combe v Combe, courts might 
'discover in'the (past) court's unmentioned knowledge of the consequences (of tiie 
rule i n the decision).. .a motivation for decision which cuts deeper than any shown 
by the opinion.' I n other words they may f i n d that 'the available leeway i s nothing 
less than huge . '-^ ^ 
.inalogical development, the s t u f f of the law, points to assimilation by the general 
squity of proprietory estoppel, and there i s every indication that whilst Lord Denning 
:remains i n the Court of Appeal, and w h i l s t the Lords' antipathy toward i t s i n f e r i o r ' s 
reformiLg zeal remains dormant i n t h i s area, i t w i l l occur. The arguments for maintaining 
|he d i s t i n c t i o n appear a p r i o r i i n nature and not functional, for the principle 
inderlying Ramsden v I>yson,- Foster v Robinsonf Binions v Evans, Hussey v Palmer, 
TIOOI Metal^"^ and Alan^^ i s , I have argued, the same, and i s not affected by the 
difference i n subject-matter. I f t h i s i s indeed the case, then there seems to be no 
j 
reason why the High Trees equity should not be used to found a cause of action: the 
courts can clearly cope with such a situation, as they do i n the so called proprietary 
estoppel cases, and as they have done i n the e a r l i e r cases, i n Chancery. One of the 
e.srly reasons, I suggested, f o r the difference between law and equity, i n this regard, 
w is that at common law a defendant was not heard i n his own defence, so that a 
Footnotes: 
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ijitness against him could not be answered. I n equity, on the other hand an allegation 
3f a representation, supported by the testimony of a witness could be countered \sj 
3vldence sworn by the defendant himself. The foundation fo r the d i s t i n c t i o n has since 
Ijone, too, so that there appears to be no reason why the new equity should not afford 
us much protection as the old. 
have discussed, i n the context of Binions' and Hussey's cases the objection that a 
I'emedy which appears to contemplate the creation of a new interest i n land i s 
imfortTinate i n complicating the p r i s t i n e s i m p l i c i t y of the 1925 l e g i s l a t i o n . I t i s a 
J'unction of a dynamic society that new l e g a l remedies are sought from time to time, 
£ind w h i l s t no provision f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n of the equity exists, hurried l e g i s l a t i o n 
i,o provide for i t before the courts have f u l l y worked out the implications does not 
seem to be the answer. Consolidating l e g i s l a t i o n may be used to simplify existing 
law, but i t cannot anticipate and should not stunt future growth. I t presupposes 
development by the. courts, and i n the Binions v Evans situ a t i o n t h i s has not happened 
ys t . Moreover, future moves may not be analysable i n terms of interests i n land, for 
I 
sich a concept may prove too r i g i d . The desired solution must precede the l e g a l 
p r i n c i p l e , which can be used as a sheet-anchor to r e s t r a i n excesses and indicate the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
One primary objection to the use of the equity i n promise situations i s the absence 
from some of these -of consideration. J^ y answer has been that consideration as i t was 
oaxiered i n the l a t t e r h a l f of the nineteenth century was an impractical aberration: 
t l i a t i t was an indicium of a certain social view which could not survive as a blanket 
resquirement a f t e r the exposure of that social view - which i n the legal world might 
Fc otnotess 
hi See the preceding discussion of the case for l e g i s l a t i o n which followed the 
somewhat negative decision i n NPB v Ainsworth. 
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have been delayed u n t i l 1932^ Since i t was the touchstone of the enforceability of 
contracts i t has been stretched f a r beyond i t s o r i g i n a l unitory meaning and i t i s 
quickly becoming a shib b o l e t l i whose adherents grow weary. For f o r t y years i t has 
been imder regular academic attack^^ and i t may be that only the 'Formal Style' of 
the English j u d i c i a r y has maintained the i l l u s i o n of i t s i n t e g r i t y . Now might be the 
time to relieve i t of excess burden by a t t r i b u t i n g to i t merely i t s e a r l i e r meaning. 
iMany alternative tests of obligation can be formulated, - though preferrably none 
should be exclusive - but for our purposes i t remains to reiterate that a promissee 
who has been given what the law i n i t s search f o r justice considers a reasonable basis 
for believing i n the seriousness of a promise should be able to enforce the promise 
46 
or obtain recompense to the extent that i t appears j u s t that he should. For the above 
reasons i t appears to me that the' law i s moving i n t h i s direction, though hesitantly 
md with diffidence. 
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